Realists have long focused on international order and stability. The struggle between revisionist and status quo powers has destabilized the international system and imposed significant costs on other actors. Most scholars within the realist paradigm see revisionist foreign policy as the cause of this instability. This study attempts to provide a clearer demarcation between order disrupters and other revisionists by showing a range of revisionist powers that do not seek to destabilize the international system. The question we will address in this study, therefore, is this: Why do some revisionist powers maintain their gains after achieving their goals, while other revisionist states continue their expansionist approach to foreign policy? This article attempts to take a step towards filling the theoretical gap based on the findings of a comparative historical study and can help us to arrive at an explanation of the failure and success of these states. Based on this question, based on the theoretical framework of the neoclassical realism school and using a qualitative research method including case studies, document analysis and historical data, we have examined the chancellorship of Bismarck and Hitler. In this article, by examining the points of distinction and similarity of these two powers, we have arrived at four spectrums of revisionist powers, only two of which are better at preserving their achievements. It has also been shown how the international and domestic contexts and variables of revisionist countries can lead to differences in the results of their efforts.