جایگاه دفاع پیش‌دستانه از منظر حقوق بین‌الملل با تأکید بر تبیین موانع حقوقی بین‌المللی اعمال آن جهت حفاظت از غیرنظامیان

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی مستقل

نویسندگان

گروه حقوق، واحد مشهد، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، مشهد، ایران.

چکیده

با مرور حوادث به وقوع پیوسته در نبردهای بین‌المللی همچون جنگ جهانی دوم متوجه می‌شویم که رهبران کشورهای دارای ناوگان نظامی پیشرفته هیچ ابایی از کشتار غیرنظامیان و نقض اصل تفکیک ندارند. در این میان ایالات متحده آمریکا پای را فراتر گذاشته و با ابداع مؤلفاتی همچون دفاع پیش‌دستانه بدعت جدیدی در مقابل ماده 51 منشور ملل متحد پدید آورده است. ذیل مؤلفه اخیر، آمریکا و پیروان دکترین نظامی این کشور همچون اسرائیل به جای انتظار برای دریافت ضربه نخست از جانب دشمن، صرف کشف تهدید قریب‌الوقوع از سوی دشمن را جواز توسل به زور علیه او دانستند. پرسش کلی تحقیق حاضر آن است که توسل به دفاع پیش‌دستانه در نزد حقوق بین‌الملل تا چه اندازه مقبول است و به لحاظ حقوقی و نظامی رهبران در توسل به این راهبرد جهت حفاظت از غیرنظامیان در برابر تهدیدات قریب‌الوقوع دشمن آنگاه که تهدیدگر هیچ ابایی از عملی کردن تهدیداتش ندارد چه مواردی را می‌بایست مد نظر قرار دهند؟ فرضیه تحقیق آن است که توسل دفاع پیش‌دستانه مقبول حقوق بین‌الملل نیست لیکن توسل بدان جهت حفاظت از غیرنظامیان معقول به نظر می‌رسد. نویسندگان با استفاده از روش تحلیلی-توصیفی به این نتیجه رسیدند که علیرغم عقلانی بودن استفاده از دفاع پیش‌دستانه در برابر تهدیدات قریب‌الوقوع معطوف به غیرنظامیان، توسل به راهبرد اخیر به طور خودسرانه نزد حقوق بین‌الملل معاصر مقبول واقع نمی‌شود.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Position of Pre-emptive Defense from the Perspective of International Law with Emphasis on Explaining International Legal Barriers to Its Application to Protect Civilians

نویسندگان [English]

  • Pouria Ebrahimzadeh
  • Amir Hossein Molkizadeh
Department of Law, Mashhad Branch, Islamic Azad University, Mashhad, Iran
چکیده [English]

Reviewing the events that took place in international wars such as World War II, we find that the leaders of countries with advanced military fleets do not hesitate to kill civilians and violate the principle of segregation. The United States has gone further and has made new alterations to article 51 of the Charter by creating new norms, such as the preemptive defense. Based on these norms, the US and the other countries that follow its military doctrine have allowed themselves to resort to force against their enemies, simply on the premise of detecting imminent threats from them, without being attacked first. The main question of the current study is to what extent is the preemptive defense acceptable in international law, and what legal and military measures should countries take when protecting civilians against imminent threats of enemies when the threatening party does not hesitate to realize their threats. The research hypothesis is that resorting to preemptive defense is not acceptable in international law; however, doing it when protecting civilians seems rational. Using a descriptive-analytical method, the authors have concluded that despite being rational, resorting arbitrarily to preemptive defense against imminent threats to protect civilians is not acceptable in current international law.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Preemptive Defense
  • Preventive Defense
  • Security Council
  • Immediate Threat
  • Civilians

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