بررسی پیامدهای قوانین مبارزه با رشوه‌خواری خارجی بر تجارت و سرمایه‌گذاری خارجی کشورهای در حال توسعه

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی مستخرج از رساله

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق بین‌الملل، واحد ساری، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، ساری، ایران.

2 استادیار گروه حقوق، واحد قائم‌شهر، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی قائم‌شهر، ایران

3 استادیار گروه حقوق، واحد ساری، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، ساری، ایران.

چکیده

فساد به‌مثابه یک بیماری در تمام کشورها خصوصا کشورهای در حال توسعه وجود دارد و جامعه بین‌المللی در چند دهه اخیر با آگاهی از اثرات زیان آور فساد جهت پیشگیری و کاهش اثرات آن طی همگرایی، جنبش ضدفساد جهانی را ایجاد نمود و با تدقیق در رشاءخارجی و جرم انگاری آن قوانین مبارزه با رشوه خواری خارجی را اجرایی کرد که علاوه بر پیامدهای مثبت، گاهی انگیزه فعالان اقتصادی را در ورود به کشورهای میزبان فاسد در حال توسعه سست و جریان تجارت و سرمایه‌گذاری را کاهش می دهد تا جایی که اگر مقامات دولتی کشور میزبان در اقدامات اجرایی کشورشان ضمن مشارکت با اشخاص فاسد رشوه نیز دریافت نمایند با عدم شناسایی و پیگرد این مقامات، تاثیر ثمربخش در نظام‌ حقوقی داخلی آنها نخواهد داشت. سوال پژوهش این است که قوانین مبارزه با رشوه‌خواری خارجی چه پیامدهایی بر تجارت و سرمایه‌گذاری خارجی کشورهای در حال توسعه داشته و این پیامدها دارای چه ماهیتی می باشد. با روش توصیفی- تحلیلی و رویکردی حقوقی- اقتصادی نتایج نشان می دهد این قوانین علاوه بر بازدارندگی، گاهی برای ذینفعان فساد مطلوبیتی در اقدامات جایگزین با تغییر در نوع سرمایه گذاری و نهایتا فساد ایجاد می نماید که ممکن است باعث تشدید یا تداوم روش‌های ناکارآمد در کشورهای میزبان در حال توسعه گردد. از سوی دیگر اقدامات اجرایی قوانین مبارزه با رشوه‌خواری خارجی در کشور متبوع تاجر یا سرمایه‌گذار می‌تواند درک عمومی از رشوه‌خواری را در کشورهای میزبان در حال توسعه تقویت و جنبش جوامع را در چرخه ویرانگر فساد تحت تاثیر قرار دهد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Investigating the Consequences of Foreign Anti-Bribery Laws on Trade and Foreign Investment in Developing Countries

نویسندگان [English]

  • Ramin Moradi 1
  • Karan Rohani 2
  • Reza Nasiri Larimi 3
1 PhD Student in International Law, Sari Branch, Islamic Azad University, Sari, Iran.
2 Assistant Professor at Law, Ghaemshahr Branch, Islamic Azad University, Ghaemshahr, Iran
3 Assistant Prof. at Law, Sari Branch, Islamic Azad University, Sari, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Corruption as a disease exists in all countries, especially in developing countries and the international community in recent decades, while is aware of the harmful effects of corruption, is seeking to prevent and reduce its effects within this convergence which is created as the global anti-corruption movement. The countries while considering the bribery as a crime, they enforced anti-bribery laws, which have both positive and negative consequences, sometimes reduce the motivation of economic actors to enter corrupt host countries and make trade and investment flows so weak to the extent that if the government officials of the host country receive bribes in the executive actions of their country while participating with corrupt persons, if they are not identified and prosecuted, it will not have a fruitful effect on their domestic legal systems. The question of the present article is what effects the anti-bribery laws have on the foreign trade and investment of developing countries. This research has been carried out on the basis of descriptive-analytical method and legal-economic approach, and its result results show that these laws, in addition to deterrence, sometimes create benefits for the beneficiaries of corruption. In other words by taking an alternative measures, they change the type of investment and corruption, which may intensify inefficient methods in developing countries. On the other hand, the enforcement of anti-bribery laws in the home country of a trader can strengthen the general perception of bribery in developing countries and influence the movement of communities in a destructive cycle of corruption.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • International Trading
  • foreign bribery
  • Anti-corruption laws
  • Developing countries
  • fighting against corruption
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