کاربرد زور توسط ایالات متحده پس از پایان جنگ سرد و تأثیر آن بر حقوق بین‌الملل: سیطره قدرت بر قانون

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی مستقل

نویسنده

پژوهشگر روابط بین‌الملل و دانش‌آموخته دکتری روابط بین‌الملل، دانشکده حقوق، الهیات و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد علوم و تحقیقات،تهران، ایران.

چکیده

قواعد مربوط به ممنوعیت کاربرد زور و استثنائات آن، جوهره نظام حقوقی بین‌المللی برآمده از بزرگ‌ترین فاجعه انسانی تاریخ یعنی جنگ جهانی دوم است. در این نظام حقوقی، صلح به عنوان اساسی‌ترین ارزشی که باید مورد حمایت باشد، تلقی شد و برای ممنوعیت کلی کاربرد زور مندرج در بند 4 ماده 2 منشور ملل متحد، تنها یک استثناء در ماده 51 منشور شناخته شد که دفاع از خود فردی و جمعی را مجاز می‌دارد. امیدها برای تحقق یک نظم صلح‌آمیز بین‌المللی در فاصله سال‌های 1945 تا 1989و نیز پس از فروپاشی کمونیزم خیلی زود به یأس گرایید. امروز، استفاده از زور در روابط بین‌الملل نسبت به دهه‌های پیشین شایع‌تر است. نظر به اینکه ایالات متحده به عنوان تنها ابرقدرت بجامانده از جنگ سرد با برتری نظامی چشمگیر، یکی از دولت‌هایی است که بیشترین موارد توسل به زور را داشته است، این پرسش مطرح می‌گردد که رویکرد ایالات متحده به کاربرد زور در دوره پسا جنگ سرد، حقوق بین‌الملل را در این قلمرو مهم با چه چالشی مواجه کرده است؟ در پاسخ به این پرسش، با بهره‌گیری از نظریه واقع‌گرایی ساختاری، به تحلیل کیفی عملکرد و استدلال‌های حقوقی این کشور در رابطه با قواعد حاکم برکاربرد زور و نیز واکنش سایر دولت‌ها به آن می‌پردازیم تا این فرضیه را که دورنمای چالش پیش روی حقوق بین‌الملل در رابطه با کاربرد زور، بازگشت حاکمیت اعمال زور در روابط بین‌الملل و سیطره قدرت بر قانون خواهد بود، به آزمون بگذاریم.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Use of Force by the United States after the End of the Cold War and Its Impact on International law: The Supremacy of Power over Law

نویسنده [English]

  • Manizheh Eskandari Zanjani
International Relations Researcher and PhD. of Faculty of Law, Theology and Political Science, Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

The rules relating to the prohibition on the use of force, including its exceptions, are at the core of the international legal order that emerged after the greatest human-made disaster of all times: World War II. In that legal order peace is perceived as the main value to be protected and the general prohibition on the use of force embodied in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The hopes for a new peaceful international order between 1945 and 1989 and also after the collapse of communism were soon disappointed. The resort to force in international relations is even more prevalent today than previous decades. Since the United States has become the only superpower with its overwhelming military supremacy and has been one of the States that has resorted to force the most, this begs the following question: how has the post- cold war US approach to the use of force challenged international law in this important sphere? To provide an answer to this research question, by using a Structural Realism framework and a qualitative-analytical method, the US legal arguments and practice relating to the rules governing the use of force, and the reactions of other countries to them are analyzed in order to show that the post- cold war US challenge on international law will lead to the governing the use of force in international relations and the supremacy of power over law.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Use of Force
  • End of the Cold War
  • International Law
  • United States. Structural Realism

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