ابعاد خلع سلاح هسته ای از منظر معاهده منع تسلیحات هسته ای

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی مستخرج از رساله

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی‌دکتری‌گروه‌ حقوق ‌بین‌الملل‌عمومی، واحدامارات، دانشگاه‌آزاداسلامی، دبی، امارات‌متحده ‌عربی

2 استادیار گروه‌ حقوق،‌ واحد تهران‌ مرکز، دانشگاه‌آزاداسلامی‌، تهران، ‌ایران‌.

چکیده

معاهده منع سلاح‌های هسته‌ای موسوم به (TPNW)یک دست‌آورد بین المللی قابل توجه ویک رژیم چند‌جانبه پایداراست که شامل‌ممنوعیت‌هایی درحوزه‌‌های توسعه، آزمایش، تولید، دستیابی، دراختیارداشتن، ذخیره‌سازی، استفاده یاتهدیدبه استفاده ازسلاح‌های هسته‌ای می‌باشد.این معاهده درسپتامبر2017 به تصویب رسید ودر22 ژانویه2021 لازم الاجراشد. لازمه جهانی شدن این معاهده نیاز‌مند یک‌کارسیاسی هدفمند است. چراکه مشارکت‌کشورهای هسته‌ای وکشورهای‌ دارای سلاح‌ هسته‌ای برای اجرایی‌ شدن معاهده دشواروبه عبارتی مخالفت سیاسی‌ وحشتناکی را در پی‌خواهد داشت. ونیازمند‌یک رویکردی متفاوت وفضایی‌گفتمانی است‌که باید با معیارهای حاکم بر موضوعات حقوق بشری، حقوق بشردوستانه، اخلاق بین‌المللی وامنیت جهانی در دستورکارقرارگیرد. باعطف توجه به همه تلاش‌های گسترده طرفداران صلح وحسن نیت بسیاری از کشورهای جهان متاسفانه اقدامی درراستای خلع‌سلاح ا‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌زسوی‌کشورهای جهان صورت نگرفته است. مقاله حاضربا روش توصیفی تحلیلی در صدد پاسخ به این سوال است که چگونه می توان از طریق معاهده منع تسلیحات هسته‌ای به خلع سلاح هسته‌ای دست یافت؟ نتایج این تحقیق نشان می‌دهد ترتیبات معاهده به‌گونه‌ای تنظیم شده‌که امکان خلع سلاح هسته‌ای از طریق اجماع جهانی دولتهای عضو وجود دارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Dimension of Nuclear Disarmament in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

نویسندگان [English]

  • Goudarz Beyrami 1
  • Atefeh Amininia 2
  • Soudeh Shamlo 2
1 Ph.D. Student, Department of Public International Law, UAE Branch, Islamic Azad University, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
2 Assistant Professor of Law Department , Central Tehran Branch, Tehran Islamic Azad University, Iran.
چکیده [English]

The treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  (TPNW) is a significant international achievement and a stable multilateral regime. It imposes limitations on developing, testing, producing, accessing, having at the disposal, storing, or threatening to use nuclear weapons. The pact was ratified in September 2017 and enacted on Jan. 22, 2021. Making this treaty universal takes purposeful political effort. Persuading nuclear and nuclear-armed countries to participate in enforcing the agreement is difficult. It will face vehement political opposition. Such involvement requires a different approach and a discourse-oriented atmosphere. Criteria associated with human rights, humanitarian rights, international ethics, and international security should be introduced into this matter. Sadly, despite the extensive efforts of peace advocates and the goodwill of numerous countries, the governments have taken no disarmament-oriented measures. This paper uses a descriptive-analytical method to answer the question, “How can we realize nuclear disarmament through TPNW?” Our results indicate that the wording of the treaty provisions makes nuclear disarmament possible through the global consensus of the member states.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
  • Nuclear Disarmament
  • International Laws
  • International Security

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