"ممنوعیت برقع" پیشگامان حقوقی برای دانمارک، تجارب آمریکایی، و تجربیات فلسفی و انتقادی

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی مستقل

نویسنده

استاد دانشگاه ایندیانا آمریکا

چکیده

همانطور که عنوان مقاله نشان می‌دهد، "ممنوعیت برقع ": پیشگامان حقوقی برای دانمارک، تجارب آمریکایی، و تجربیات فلسفی و انتقادی، نویسندگان در حال بررسی تحقیقاتی و راهکارهای بازتابی هستند. به صورت دقیق‌تر، آنها از مقاله " ممنوعیت برقع " در سال 2018 دانمارک: پیوستن به روند‌ی اروپایی و ارسال پیام ملی (منتشر شده به عنوان یک مقاله همزمان، اما جداگانه در این شماره فصلنامه) به عنوان یک پلت فرم برای تجزیه و تحلیل بیشتر و بحث از دیدگاه های مختلف استفاده می کنند. این موارد شامل قانون پیشین در سطح بین‌الملل، با توجه به اصول اخلاقی و استدلال قضایی توسط دادگاه حقوق بشر؛ تفکر انتقادی در دین، اخلاق، حقوق بشر و فضای عمومی دموکراتیک؛ بررسی مداخلات برقع توسط دولت‌های فدرال و همچنین دادگاه‌های مختلف در ایالات متحده؛ و تفسیر فلسفی و در برخی موارد انتقاد از رویکرد دانمارکی و‌/ یا اروپایی (فرانسوی و غیره) است. مشارکت‌های مختلف اهداف متفاوت دارند. بخش حقوقی در سطح بین‌المللی بر روی قضاوت‌های مرکزی گزارش می‌دهد که در واقع کمک‌کرده است تا مسیر را برای ممنوعیت برقع در پادشاهی دانمارک باز کند. در مورد قضات متعهد در دادگاه حقوق بشر، این نظرات به حمایت از ممنوعیت پیش از موعد و دادن اختیار گسترده به مقامات ملی منجر شد، و بنابراین بررسی دادگاه  را محدود ساخت.
نویسندگان با بحث در مورد مذهب، اخلاق، حقوق بشر و فضای عمومی دموکراتیک، تلاش می‌کنند تا به اخلاق به عنوان معیاری برای قانون بپردازند و به شکل های مختلف "نگرانی بیانگر" در ارتباط با حجاب را به چالش بپردازند. در‌حالی که بخش‌هایی به دیدگاه‌های آمریکایی اختصاص دارد، یک نظرسنجی جامع از پاسخ های سیاسی و حقوقی به ویژه حجاب چهره مانند برقع را نشان می‌دهد. به نظر می‌رسد قانونی بودن برقع در آمریکا تا حدی یک سوال باز است، اما تمایز بین دلایل مذهبی، سیاسی و یا شخصی یک فرضیه قانونی است. با توجه به این که قانونگذاران دانمارکی که قانون 219 را برای ممنوعیت برقع در مکان‌های عمومی به اسلام سیاسی متکی می‌کنند، دلایل مذهبی و شخصی خود را به حوزه خصوصی منتقل می کنند و همچنین سکولاریسم را به عنوان یک فرضیه پذیرفته‌اند. این در آخرین پاسخ نویسنده مقاله، یک ماتریالیسم است که به نوبه خود در مورد زنان مسلمان مورد استفاده قرار می‌گیرد. اگر سیاستگذاران و قانون‌گذاران در انجام کارهای ذهنی مشارکت داشته باشند، می‌توانند از استراتژی‌های قانونی که در روحیه مخالف نظریه آنهاست، هر چند به طور ضمنی، اجتناب کنند. از لحاظ قانونی، سیاسی، اجتماعی و فرهنگی، حل مناقشات باید رابطه بین حاکمان و‌حکومت را به یک ایدئولوژی جدایی‌ناپذیر تبدیل کند. این هدف عینی برای یک جامعه دموکراتیک است که نویسندگان مقاله آن را دنبال می‌کنند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Burqa Ban”: Legal Precursors for Denmark, American Experiences and Experiments, and Philosophical and Critical Examinations

نویسنده [English]

  • Erik Baldwin
Indiana University Northwest, Gary, IN, U.S..
چکیده [English]

As the title of the article suggests, “The Burqa Ban”: Legal Precursors for Denmark, American Experiences and Experiments, and Philosophical and Critical Examinations, the authors embark on a factually investigative as well as a reflective response. More precisely, they use The 2018 Danish “Burqa Ban”: Joining a European Trend and Sending a National Message (published as a concurrent but separate article in this issue of International Studies Journal) as a platform for further analysis and discussion of different perspectives. These include case-law at the international level while focusing attention on recent rulings and judicial reasoning by the ECtHR and the ECJ; critical thought-experiments in religion, morality, human rights, and the democratic public space; a contextualized account of burqa-wearing interventions by federal and state governments and, moreover, various courts in the United States; and philosophical commentary and, in some instances, criticism of the Danish and/or European (French, etc.) approach. The different contributions have different aims. The section on case-law at the international level reports on those central judgments that, in effect, helped to pave the path for the Kingdom of Denmark’s burqa ban. Concerning the concurring judges at the ECtHR, the opinions served to uphold a preexisting ban and to grant a wide margin of appreciation to the national authorities, thereby limiting the Court’s own review.
As regardsto the ECJ, the legality of company rules that contain a policy of neutrality for the workplace was examined, with a similar outcome. The authors who discuss religion, morality, human rights and the democratic public space are endeavoring to, respectively, appeal to ethics as a testing stone for law and to both challenge and address several forms of “expressivist worry” in connection with face veils. In doing so, the authors ask a number of thought-provoking questions that hopefully will inspire public policymakers to careful analysis. While the section that is devoted to American perspectives highlights a comprehensive survey of political and legal responses to, in particular, full-face veils like the burqa, the relevant author also incorporates public perceptions and, in the course of examining these, draws a parallel to “the fate” of the hoodie. The constitutionality of burqa-wearing in America, so it also appears, is partially an open question, but differentiating between religious, political, or personal reasons is a de jure premise. Given that the Danish legislators who drafted law L 219 to ban burqa-wearing in public places rely on a reference to political Islam, they relegate religious and personal reasons to the private domain, thereby also adopting secularism as a premise. This is explored in the last author response of the article, more precisely, in an account of the underlying materialism that, in turn, is applied to Muslim women. If policymakers and legislators engaged in Thinking Things Through exercises, they could, as a minimum, avoid law-making strategies that are not in the spirit of the theory they themselves invoke, albeit tacitly. While the aim of, as it were, arresting culturally self-contradicting legislators is unique for the section in question, all the authors who contribute to the joint research project have one end-goal in common, namely to inform about important perspectives while at the same time opening up for parameters for (more) fruitful, constructive and (if need be) critical debate in the future. With this in mind, four recommendations are presented by the research director for the project. Legally, politically, socially and culturally, conflict-resolution should not translate the relationship between rulers and the ruled into a separation ideology, an instance of controllers versus the controlled. All things being equal, that is the objective limit for a democratic society.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Islamic full-face veils
  • democratic public space
  • Europe
  • U.S
  • case-law
  • policymaking
  • separation ideology
[1]. See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/24118241>.
[1]. ECtHR, Case of Lautsi and Others v. Italy, Application no. 30814/06, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 18 March 2011.
[1]. Resolution 1743 (2010) and Recommendation 1927 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on Islam, Islamism, and Islamophobia in Europe.
[1]. See Global Justice-Decisions of International Courts And Tribunals, in Global Community YILJ (G. Ziccardi Capaldo, General ed.).
[1]. ECtHR, Case of  S.A.S. v. France, Application No. 43835/11, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 1 July 2014, paras. 141-142.
[1]. ECtHR, Case of Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, Application No. 37798/13, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 11 July 2017; Case Dakir v. Belgium, Application No. 4619/12, Second Section, Judgment, 11 July 2017.
[1]. ECJ, Samira Achbita, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, Case C-157-15, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 14 March 2017.
[1]. ECJ, Asma Bougnaoui, Association de defense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v. Micropole Univers SA, Case C-188/15, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 14 March 2017.
[1]. EU Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16).
[1]. Living together. Combining diversity and freedom in 21st-century Europe Report of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe, available at
<https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/highereducation/2011/KYIV%20WEBSITE/Report%20on%20diversity.pdf>.
[1]. ECtHr, KA and AD v. Belgium, Application No.  42758/98, 17 February 2005.
[1]. Study of possible legal grounds for banning the full veil, Report adopted by the Plenary General Assembly of the Conseil d’Etat, 25 March 2010.
[1]. Id.
[1]. Note that the U.S. Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education 330 U.S. 1 (1947) interpreted First Amendment religious protections as applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby broadening the scope of enforcement. See John T Noonan, Jr. & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Religious Freedom: History, Cases, and Other Materials on the Interaction of Religion and Government 1100 (3d ed., 2011); National Archives, The Constitution of the United States [hereinafter U.S. Constitution], available at <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript> (for examples of rights of individuals, inter alia, to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness against interference from other individuals and the government itself per the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution). Note also that the U.S. republic is defined as a nation-state, in which the supreme power is held by the people® ‌and which has elected representatives and a chief executive (a president) who are responsible to them and who govern according to the law. Its e pluribus unum assumption entails multi-ethnicity. In turn, the so-called “melting pot” phenomenon or, as it is now referred to, the “(patchwork) quilt”, generates a commitment to respect different races and different religions. See Itabari Njeri, Beyond the Melting Pot, Los Angeles Times, 13 January1991, available at <http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-13/news/vw-1_1_melting-pot>.
[1]. U.S. Constitution, supra note 15 [author’s emphasis].
[1]. Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, Widespread Support for Banning Full Islamic Veil in Western Europe: Most American Disapprove, 2010 [hereinafter Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project], available at
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/07/08/widespread-support-for-banning-full-islamic-veil-in-western-europe> (for “Sixty-five percent of Americans say they would oppose a burqa ban”). Note that a similar project has not been published since 2010.
[1]. Lindsey Bever, After outcry, Georgia lawmaker abandons bill that would have banned Muslims from wearing veils, The Washington Post, 8 November 2016, available at
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/11/18/after-outcry-georgia-lawmaker-abandons-bill-that-would-have-banned-muslims-from-wearing-veils/?utm_term=.88d1eed6bb2f>.
The current law in Georgia reads: “A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he wears a mask, hood, or device by which any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal the identity of the wearer and is upon any public way or public property or upon the private property of another without the written permission of the owner or occupier of the property to do so”. The proposed amendment would have added the word “she” and various exceptions.
Historically, “Most anti-mask laws were passed… in response to the Ku Klux Klan, whose members used masks to hide their identities as they terrorized their victims… Some 15 [of 50 states] states have anti-masks laws… Supporters of such laws argue that wearing masks embolden people to commit crimes and makes those crimes more frightening to the victims. Opponents argue that (a) anti-masking laws impair freedom of association; (b) masks constitute symbolic speech; and (c) anti-masking laws violate the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they make exceptions for Halloween masks, masquerade ball masks, and masks worn for medical reasons, but not masks for political acts”. See Robert A Kahn, Anti-mask Laws, The First Amendment Encyclopedia, available at <https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1169/anti-mask-laws>.
[1]. Until we are able to determine and understand this problem (the hatred) and the dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human life. See Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban all Muslim travel to U.S., CNN, 8 December 2015, available at <https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-ban-immigration/index.html>.
[1]. Richard Wolf, Supreme Court upholds President Trump’s travel ban against majority-Muslim countries, USA Today, 26 June 2018 available at
<https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/26/supreme-court-upholds-president-trump-immigration-travel-ban/701110002>; USSC, Trump v. Hawaii 585 U.S. _ (2018).
[1]. Ibidem.
[1]. Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, supra note 17.
[1]. Emanuella Grinberg, Hoodie’s evolution from fashion mainstay to symbol of injustice, CNN, 27 March 2012, available at <https://www.cnn.com/2012/03/27/living/history-hoodie-trayvon-martin/index.html>.
[1]. Ibidem.
[1]. Amanda Sakuma, Muslim Women Wearing Hijabs Assaulted Just Hours After Trump Win, NBC News, 10 November 2016, available at <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/muslim-women-wearing-hijabs-assaulted-just-hours-after-trump-win-n681936>.
[1]. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. [Author’s emphasis].
See USSC, Raynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), available at <http://www.pewforum.org/2007/10/24/a-delicate-balance2>; USSC, Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), available at <https://www.supremecourt.gov>.
[1]. Some Muslim women interpret their duty to be modest as the duty to “draw their veils” over their hair only and not over their hands or eyes; and thus, these women would dress modestly by wearing headscarves. Other Muslim women include their face, their hands, and their eyes as part of their beauty. These women wear burqas to cover these parts as well. Yet other Muslim women read no obligation to wear religious garb into the 24:31 provision of the Quran. They argue that the absence of a mandate means that women are free to choose for themselves. Muslim scholars have offered equally divergent views regarding the meaning of “modesty”. The interpretation of the provision is “relative to the culture in which Muslims find themselves”. See Shaira Nanwani, The Burqa Ban: An Unreasonable Limitation on Religious Freedom or a Justifiable Restriction? 25 Emory International Law 1431 (2011), available at <http://law.emory.edu/eilr/content/volume-25/issue-3/comments/burqa-ban-limitation-religious-freedom-restriction.html>.
[1]. Supra note 18 (for the Ku Klux Klan as an example).
[1]. USSC, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) [hereinafter Brandenburg v. Ohio], available at <https://www.supremecourt.gov>.
[1]. Amnesty International, Women’s right to choose their dress, free of coercion, 2011, available at <https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2017/02/womens_right_to_dress_boerkaverbod_3.pdf?x17739>.
[1]. Hurst Hannum The UDHR in National and International Law, 3/2 Health and Human Rights 145, 147 (2014), available at <https://cdn2.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2014/04/16-Hannum.pdf>.
Hannum adds: “The vast majority of the world’s population has no direct domestic or international redress for violations of human rights recognized under international conventions”. See id., at 153.
[1]. USSC, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), available at
<https://www.supremecourt.gov>.
[1]. Therefore, whether or not a religious belief is “sincerely held” by an applicant or employee is only relevant to religious accommodation, not to claims of disparate treatment or harassment because of religion. In those claims, it is the motivation of the discriminating official, not the actual beliefs of the individual alleging discrimination, that are typically relevant in determining if the discrimination that occurred was because of religion. In general, employers are required by federal law to make exceptions to their usual rules or preferences to permit applicants and employees to observe religious dress and grooming practices. See U.S. EEOC, Compliance Manual, Section 12: Religious Discrimination, 22 July 2008, available at
<https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html#_Toc203359488>; Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace; Rights and Responsibilities [hereinafter Rights and Responsibilities], available at
<https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_religious_garb_grooming.cfm>.
[1]. To clarify the meaning of accommodation, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has posted the following on its website:
A private company may adopt a policy barring any headgear... the employer should consider requests to wear religious headgear on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the identified risks exist in that situation and pose an undue hardship. Relevant facts may include the individual's job, the garb at issue, and the available accommodations. For example, if an individual's religious headgear is or can be worn in a manner that does not inhibit visual identification of the employee, and if temporary removal may be accomplished for security screen[ings] and to address smuggling concerns without undue hardship, the individual can be accommodated.
See U.S. EEOC, Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 33, at
<https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_religious_garb_grooming.cfm>.
[1]. Sample speech limitations include no yelling “Fire!” in a crowded theater, see USSC, Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), available at
<https://www.supremecourt.gov>; no “fighting words”, cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), USSC, ibidem; no “obscene and appeal to a prurient interest”, cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), USSC, ibidem.
In addition, there are numerous nudity, decency and school-setting restrictions on the right to wear clothing.
[1]. Virgil C. Blum, Religious Liberty and the Religious Garb 22 U. CHIC. L. REV. 875 (1995), available at
<https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2885&context=uclrev>; Caitlin S. Kerr, Teachers’ Religious Garb as an Instrument for Globalization in Education, 18/1 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 539 (2011) available at <https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1453&context=ijgls>
Note that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (1894) rejected the contention that the wearing of religious dress in public schools was equivalent to sectarian teaching, and that North Dakota (1936) and Indiana (1940) followed suit as opposed to states which denied teachers the right to wear religious garb, inter alia, Missouri (1953), New York (1906), Iowa (1918), New Mexico (1951), Oregon (1923), and Nebraska (1919).
[1]. USSC, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), available at
<https://www.supremecourt.gov>.
[1]. Anja Matwijkiw & Willie Mack, Making Sense of the Right to Truth in Educational Ethics: Toward a Theory and Practice that Protect the Fundamental Interests of Adolescent Students, 2 Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 355 (2007).
[1]. USSC, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) [hereinafter Virginia v. Black], available at <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/538/343/case.html>.
[1]. Ibidem.
[1]. Anita L. Allen, Veiled Women in the American Courtroom: Is the Nijab a Barrier to Justice?, in The Rule of Law and the Rule of God (Simeon O. Ilesanmi et al, eds., 2014), available at <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1618>; 9th Cir., Souhair Khatib v. County of Orange, No. 08-56423 (2010) [hereinafter Souhair Khatib v. ® ‌ County of Orange], available at
<http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/03/15/08-56423.pdf>; Gabriel San Roman, Local Muslim Woman Wins Hijab Settlement With OC Sheriff’s Department, 14 February 2013, available at <https://www.ocweekly.com/local-muslim-woman-wins-hijab-settlement-with-oc-sheriffs-department-6455336>.
[1]. Veronica Rocha, Muslim woman awarded $85,000 after her hijab was forcibly removed by Long Beach police officer, Los Angeles Times, 10 August 2017, available at <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-muslim-woman-hijab-removed-settlement-20170810-story.html>.
[1].It was never intended that the First Article of Amendment to the Constitution, that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ should be a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society...
See USSC, Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), available at
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/538/343/case.html>.
[1]. Souhair Khatib v. County of Orange, supra note 41; Allen, supra note 41.
Note that the Supreme Court of Michigan has adopted a rule that provides: “The court shall exercise reasonable control over the appearance of parties and witnesses so as to (1) ensure that the demeanor of such persons may be observed and assessed by the fact-finder, and (2) to ensure the accurate identification of such person…” See Evidence ProfBlogger, What Not to Wear, Religious Edition: Supreme Court of Michigan Adopts Rule Allowing®Judges to Exercise “Reasonable Control over the appearance of Parties and Witnesses” Based on Niqab Case, 18 June 2009, available at
<http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2009/06/michigan-611httpwwwgooglecomhostednewsaparticlealeqm5gljakuaz1okb1ordgalldjo93luwd98sm7a81httpcourtsmichigangov.html>.
[1]. San Roman, supra note 41.
[1]. Brandenburg v. Ohio, supra note 29.
[1]. Virginia v. Black, supra note 39.
[1]. Jennifer M. Westerfield, Behind the Veil: An American Legal Perspective on the European Headscarf Debate, 54 AM. J. COMP. L, 637, 661-62 (2006).
[1]. USSC, Tinker v. Des Moines 393 U.S. 503 (1969), available at
   <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/538/343/case.html>.
[1]. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, available at
 [1]. Saied R. Ameli & Arzu Merali, Hijab, Meaning, Identity, Otherization and
     Politics: British Muslim Women 64 (2006).
[1]. Ibidem.
[1]. Rabiha Hannan, An Exploration of the Debates Pertaining to Head Covering and Face Veiling of Women in the British Muslim Context, in Islam and the Veil: Theoretical and Regional Contexts 91 (Theodore Gabriel & Rabiha Hannan eds., 2011).
[1]. Id., at 92-94.

[1]. James Crisp, Belgian ban on Muslim full-face veil is legal, European Court of Human Rights rules, The Telegraph, 11 July 2017, available at

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/11/belgian-ban-full-face-veil-legal-european-court-human-rights>.

[1]. ECtHR, Case of S.A.S. v. France, Application No. 43835/11, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 1 July 2014, para. 125.
[1]. Id., at para. 126.
[1]. National Archives, The Constitution of the United States, available at
<https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript> (for Amendment 1).
[1]. USSC, Schenck v. United States 249 U.S. 47 (1919), available at
<https://www.supremecourt.gov>.
[1]. Ibidem.
[1]. See Council of Europe, Media, Defamation and Freedom of Expression: A Study of the case law of the ECHR, 2016, available at <https://book.coe.int/eur/en/human-rights-and-democracy/7072-freedom-of-expression-and-defamation.html>.
[1]. U.N. General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, GA Res. 2106 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965), art. 4(a), available at
< https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cerd.aspx>.
[1]. U.N. General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), art. 20.
[1]. Jehovah’s Witnesses don’t accept blood transfusions for religious reasons. The Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania provide the following justification for their view: Both the Old and New Testaments clearly command us to abstain from blood. (Genesis 9:4; Leviticus 17:10; Deuteronomy 12:23; Acts 15:28, 29) Also, God views blood as representing life. (Leviticus 17:14) So we avoid taking blood not only in obedience to God but also out of respect for him as the Giver of life.
See <https://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq/jehovahs-witnesses-why-no-blood-transfusions>.
[1]. Mark Sheldon, Ethical issues in the forced transfusion of Jehovah’s Witness children, 14(2) Journal of Emergency Medicine 251, 256-257 (1996).
[1]. Id. at 256.
[1]. See generally id.
[1]. For a defense of this view, see Anja Matwijkiw & Bronik Matwijkiw, The Unapologetic Integration of Ethics: Stakeholder Realignments in the light of Global Law and Shared Governance Doctrine. – Distilling the Essence of Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo's Jurisprudential Paradigm-Shift,15 Global Community YILJ 885 (2016).
[1]. ECtHR, supra note 56, at para. 25.
[1]. Emile Nakhleh, A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World4 (2008).
[1]. E.g., see Tony Blankley, The West’s Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations? (2006).
[1]. See Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, From dawa to jihad: The various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order, March 30, 2005, available at <https://english.aivd.nl/publications/publications/2005/03/30/from-dawa-to-jihad>.
[1]. The Home Office, The independent review into the application of sharia law in England and Wales, February 2018, at 4, (Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty), available at
<www.gov.uk/government/publications>.
[1]. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality? 109/2 Ethics287-337 (1999).
[1]. Ministry of Justice, Forslag (og Bemærkninger) til Lov om Ændring af Straffeloven (Tildækningsforbud) [Proposal (and Commentaries) for Amendment of the Penal Law (Cover Ban)], 11 April 2018, j.nr. 2017-0090-0233, p. 2, available at <http://www.ft.dk/da/search?msf=&q=tild%C3%A6kningsforbud&as=1>.
[1]. Id.
[1]. Martha Nussbaum, Veiled threats? New York Times, 11 July 2010, available at <https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/veiled-threats/?mtrref=www.google.dk&gwh=ACFCEF4712AA5E279E14D6E8C7F590D2&gwt=pay&assetType=opinion>.
[1]. Folketinget [National Parliament], 1. Behandling af  Lovforslag nr. L 219: Forslag til Lov om Ændring as Straffeloven (Tildækningsforbud) [1. Reading of L 219: Proposal for Amendment of the Penal Law (Cover Ban)], 19 April 2018 (as presented by Danish Minister of Justice on 4 April, 2017), available at
<http://www.ft.dk/samling/20171/lovforslag/l219/beh1/forhandling.htm#speak0>; National Parliament, Preben Bang Henriksen, available at
<https://www.ft.dk/da/medlemmer/folketingetsmedlemmer/preben-bang-henriksen-(v)>.
Note that V is a Danish political party with historical roots in the emancipation and equality of the peasantry and a millennium vision of a “Future in freedom and community” where the latter entails a policy of increased European integration. Concerning freedom, the program of V prescribes that “the human thrives best in freedom [and] under [individual] responsibility. Freedom means the absence of coercion…“ See Venstre, available at <https://www.venstre.dk/>; <https://www.venstre.dk/partiet/skoleweb/liberal-politik>.
[1]. In a 2010 CNN interview, MP Naser Khader (Conservative People’s Party (K)) stated that the “the burqa and niqab have no place in Western Europe” and that the relevant dress code is an integral part of political Islam. Furthermore, MP Martin Henriksen (Danish People’s Party (DK)) insisted that “Islam is not just a religion, it is also an ideological and social-political movement”. Finally, the Danish Minister of Justice Søren Pape Poulsen (K) declared the burqa “incompatible” with the values of the Danish society. See Tom Evans, Burqa becomes focus of tense debate in Europe, CNN, 3 February 2010 available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/02/03/europe.burqa/index.html>; Ritzau, Khadar: Danskerne er imod politisk Islam, Berlingske, 3 February 2010, available at <https://www.b.dk/politiko/khader-danskerne-er-imod-politisk-islam>; Danish Ministry of Justice, Tildækningsforbud skal øge respect for fællesskabet og bekæmpe parallelsamfund, 6 February 2018, available at
<http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/nyt-og-presse/pressemeddelelser/2018/ tildaekningsforbud -skal-oege-respekt-faellesskabet-og-bekaempe>.
[1]. Danish Ministry of Justice, Forslag (og Bemærkninger) til Lov om Ændring af® ‌Straffeloven (Tildækningsforbud) [Proposal (and Commentaries) for Amendment of the Penal Law (Cover Ban)], 11 April 2018, 2, available at
<http://www.ft.dk/da/search?msf=&q=tild%C3%A6kningsforbud&as=1>.
[1]. Turkey declines to sponsor any state religion (unlike Denmark which has not disestablished the Lutheran Church of Denmark), in compliance with the Constitution of 1928. The list of countries that recognize Islam as their official religion encompasses states with Sunni Islam (e.g., Somalia and Pakistan) and Shi’a Islam (e.g., Iran). These do not separate religion and state politics. Examples of other countries that, according to researchers, “favor Islam” without naming it as their official religion, are Sudan and Syria. See Sarah Eekhoff Zykstra, Pew: Islamic Is Most Official But Christianity Is Most Favored Worldwide, CT, 3 October 2017, available at <https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2017/october/pew-islam-most-official-state-religion-christianity-favored.html>.
France is listed as a country that officially endorses a separation of church and state while introducing a (new) “category” that strictly blurs the separation with restrictions on religious practices, such as the ban on face coverings in public. See id; Humeyra Pamuk, Turkey lifts generations-old ban on Islamic head scarf, Reuters, 8 October 2013, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-headscarf-ban-idUSBRE99708720131008>.

[1]. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naʿim, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a (2010).

[1]. Supra note 79.
[1]. Part of the Danish government’s reasoning consists in the belief that law L 219 will “promote and facilitate social interaction and coexistence, which is crucial in society, because it contributes to letting people in Denmark meet one another in a proper way – with trust and respect, face to face”. See Danish Ministry of Justice, Draft – Proposal for Penal Law (Cover Ban), available at
<http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Pressemeddelelser/pdf/2018/lovforslag_tildaekningsforbud.pdf>.
[1]. Aksel Sandemose, A Fugitive Crosses His Tracks I-II, I-30, I-197 77 (4th ed,, 1968) (1933) [Eng. transl.1936].
[1]. On Sandemose’s premises, the Danish millimeter-democracy functions like a ruler that measures and then cuts everybody down to the same size, meaning that people who try to “rise above” the average and typical (cum proper form) of being and co-existing are met with retaliatory measures, in particular, non-recognition and exclusion from the group. See id., I-111.
[1]. Staff Writer, Danmark er en stamme – ikke et land, DR, 21 January 2002, available at <https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/danmark-er-en-stamme-ikke-et-land>.
[1]. On Sandemose’s premises, bad faith is an integral part of formalism. See Sandemose, supra note 85, at 62; Jesper B. Pedersen, Forsker: Danmark er verdens mindst religiøse land, Århus Stifttidende, 29 July 2013, available at <https://stiften.dk/aarhus/Forsker-Danmark-er-verdens-mindst-religioese-land/artikel/167025> (for Denmark as “the least religious country in the world”); Carsten H. Nielsen, Præst: Kulturkristne danskere vil være kristne og ateister på same tid, Kristendom.dk, 6 March 2014, <available at https://www.kristendom.dk/kommentaren/pr%C3%A6st-kulturkristne-danskere-vil-v%C3%A6re-kristne-og-ateister-p%C3%A5-samme-tid> (for ”Danish cultural Christians” as non-religious Protestants).
[1]. See generally Søren Kierkegaard, Øieblikket 1-10 [The Moment in English] (1964) (1855)
[1]. Ludwig A. Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums (1841), cited in Daniel Brudney, Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy (1998) [hereinafter Brudney].
[1]. Id., at 36.
[1]. Staff Writer, Denmark passes ban on niqabs and burkas, BBC News, 31 May 2018, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44319921>; Danish Ministry of Justice, supra note 80, at 2; ECtHR, S.A.S. v. France, Application No. 43835/11, Grand Chamber, Judgment,  1 July 2014, paras. 141-142 (for (civility, fraternity and respect as conditions of) “living together” (le “vivre ensemble”) as a legitimate goal of the restrictive measure and the incompatibility between systematic concealment of the face in public places and social interaction). [1] ECtHR, Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, Application ® ‌No. 37798/13, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 11 July 2017; Dakir v. Belgium, Application No. 4619/12, Judgment, 11 July 2017.
[1]. Man’s Inhumanity to Man (L.C. Vohah & Michael Bohlander eds., 2003); Robert Burns, Poems and Songs, Harvard Classics Vol. 6 (2015) (1784).
[1]. On the premises of materialism, the evolutionary process, which is partially determined by the economic conditions, cannot be expedited by law or other measures or means. This introduces an inconsistency on behalf of a secular state like Denmark. According to Feuerbach – and especially given the Danish MPs cum legislators’ belief in liberal democracy, the right thing to do is to promote an open discussion where all parties submit to rational arguments. – This is the recommendation.
[1]. C. J. Werleman defines the prohibitive measure itself (i.e., the burqa ban of right-wing legislators) as “a form of secular extremism, no more, or no less insidious or threatening than religious forms of extremism”. See C. J. Werleman, Denmark’s burqa ban: A lurch towards secular extremism, The New Arab, 6 June 2018, available at <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/6/6/denmarks-burqa-ban-a-lurch-towards-secular-extremism>.
[1]. Office of the Danish State, Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Opening Speech in 1999, available at <http://www.stm.dk/_p_7628.html>.
[1]. Sine R. Lund, DK: Derfor gik vi ikke i regering, Altinget, 5 August 2015, available at <https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/df-derfor-gik-vi-ikke-i-regering> (for DK’s political power calculation).
[1]. The same trend can be ascertained in the case of other restrictive measures that Denmark has recently introduced for immigrants in general. See Staff Writer, Is this Europe’s most drastic move yet against ‘migrant ghettos’?, The World Weekly, 9 March 2018, available at <https://www.theworldweekly.com/reader/view/16044/is-this-europes-most-drastic-move-yet-against-migrant-ghettos>.
[1]. Ritzau, Niqab-klædt kvinde: Burkaforbud er social kontrol fra staten, Jyllands-Posten, 4 June 2018,  available at
<https://jyllands-posten.dk/politik/ECE10489443/niqabklaedt-kvinde-burkaforbud-er-social-kontrol-fra-staten>; Kvinder i Dialog, available at <http://www.kvinderidialog.dk> and <https://iphone.facebook.com/kvinderidialog/?__tn__=CH-R> (for the new grassroots movement in Denmark Women in Dialogue that consists of both burqa/niqab-wearers and non-wearers who agree that the Danish ban constitutes a strategy of “discrimination, criminalization and oppression” and who are committed to the activist goal of protest and demonstration, especially on 1 August 2018 where the ban enters into force. One of the slogans of Women in Dialogue is “No to liberal hypocrisy”.
[1]. Evans, supra note 79.
[1]. Brudney, supra note 90, at 44.
[1]. H. C. Andersen Centre, available at
<http://www.andersen.sdu.dk/vaerk/hersholt/TheEmperorsNewClothes_e.html>.
[1]. See Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo, The Law of the Global Community: An Integrated System to Enforce “Public”International Law, 1 GLOBAL COMMUNITY YILJ 71, 75, 77, 104, 115, 119 (2001).
[1]. The names of individual contributors are on file with the research director, who assumes the full and sole responsibility for the recommendations. However, a special thank you should be extended to, respectively, Dr. Baldwin for recommendation III and Dr. Mack for recommendation IV.
[1]. Anja Matwijkiw & Bronik Matwijkiw, A Modern Perspective on International Criminal Law: Accountability as a Meta-Right, in The Theory and Practice of International Criminal Law: Essays in Honor of M. Cherif Bassiouni 68 (Leila N. Sadat & Michael P. Scharf eds., 2008).
[1]. I owe this insight to Dr. Baldwin.
[1]. I credit Dr. Mack for this point of view.
[1]. For the centrality of humanistic values in (global) justice, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (2011); Anja Matwijkiw & Bronik Matwijkiw, The Value Question and Legal Doctrine: The Inescapability of Ethics, in (special issue) Ethics & International Criminal Law (Anja Matwijkiw ed.), 16/2 International Criminal Law Review 323 (2016).