Indices Affecting Detection of Imminent Military Threats and Legal Reactions to Threats in International Law

Document Type : Original Independent Original Article

Authors

1 Department of Law, Mashhad Branch, Islamic Azad University, Mashhad, Iran

2 Department of Law, Payam Noor University, Iran, Tehran

Abstract

According to Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, it is forbidden to threaten to use force in international relations. This regulation refers first to the illegal military threats; however, the Charter mentions nothing about the characteristics of such threats. Since there are certain terms such as Preemptive defense that justifies the use of force due to the possibility of an imminent military threat, it is apparently essential to identify the indices affecting the detection of imminent military threats. This study aims to determine the characteristics of an illegal military threat. In fact, how can an imminent military threat be differentiated from a passive military threat? A descriptive analytical approach was adopted in this study to give a reasonable answer to this question. The answer was provided through the research findings emphasizing six indices: proximity, the time required to operationalize a threat, a threatening entity’s identity, the domain and area of a threat, the target of a threat, and the level of international relations. Reviewing some international documents and agreements, the authors finally proposed legal strategies for dealing with illegal military threats within the framework of international law.

Highlights

Introduction

Although the word “threat” referred to the military threat when the Charter of the United Nations was authored and approved, the contemporary issues of the national security require an extensive perception of the concept of threat in Paragraph 4 of Article 2 in the Charter. In fact, this concept should be generalized to political, social, and economic threats as well as other possible kinds. If a limited interpretation of the Charter is to be considered sufficient, the characteristics of an illegal military threat should be determined, for the Charter mentions nothing in this regard. The arrival of the 21st century was marked with the emergence of certain concepts such as Preemptive defense in the military literature of some countries such as the USA. In fact, some countries have considered the use of force legitimate against imminent military threats due to the concept of Preemptive defense. Although the international law does not unequivocally reject all cases of Preemptive defense, this military strategy is still pursued in the light of the legal gap in the research literature on how to differentiate imminent threats from passive ones. This study aims to determine the characteristics of an illegal military threat. Furthermore, how can an imminent military threat be distinguished from a passive military threat? The research hypothesis states that all the military threats excluded from Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations are illegal. Moreover, the military doctrines of countries can adopt a set of common indices to differentiate imminent military threats from passive ones. The authors used a descriptive-analytical approach to find a comprehensive answer to the above question. Reviewing various military treatises, they tried to analyze relevant theories and list the characteristics of illegal military threats and the indices that could be employed efficiently to distinguish an imminent military threat from a passive one.

 

Methodology

A descriptive analytical approach was adopted in this study.

 

Research Findings

An illegal military threat has three characteristics:

  • The threat message should be designed with a psychological military theme.
  • The content of the threat message should be illegal.
  • The threat message should be announced.

 

According to the balance of threat theory and the Copenhagen School of security studies as well as some military treatises and other relevant theories, six indices can be defined as below to differentiate an imminent military threat from a passive military threat:

  • Proximity
  • The time required to operationalize a threat
  • A threatening entity’s identity
  • The domain and area of a threat
  • The target of a threat
  • The level of international relations

 

From the perspective of the international law, certain actions can be taken as legal reactions to illegal threats. Although these actions are not consistent with the explicit text of the Charter, they will not contradict with the Charter and cause any international responsibilities if they are taken within the framework introduced in this manuscript. These actions are 1) to threat the threatening state to use legal defense in case of any military threats, 2) to reduce commercial affairs and diplomatic relationships, and 3) to perform military maneuvers. The authors believe that the best reaction to a passive military threat is ignorance and that the wisest reaction to an imminent military threat is to follow peaceful methods of settling disagreements while maintaining military preparation.

 

Conclusion

None of the documents in this study defined a threat, and the “use of force” was used immediately to describe the “threat” in all of them. Hence, it can be concluded that a threat refers to the military threat, which the authors of those documents did not consider necessary to emphasize. Three indices were defined to detect such threats. This study aimed to develop an analytical system to distinguish an imminent military threat from a passive one. For this purpose, six effective indices were identified by reviewing the balance of threat theory, the Copenhagen School of security studies, and many military treatises. Despite all the criticisms of this analytical system, it is fair to confess that discussion about the establishment of such a system appears to be very immature when the international community is unable to even reach a consensus about the definition of a threat. In fact, it is used only for academic analyses and is considered merely a proposed draft for designing such a comprehensive system. Nevertheless, as long as there are no novel methods of distinguishing imminent military threats from passive military threats, the acceptance of this analytical system is much more logical than its denial.

According to the international regulations, a threatened state is entitled to take the matter to the United Nations Security Council. However, if a threatened state does not report a threat to the Council when the threat is operationalized by any of the parties, the Council will be responsible to intervene. In this study, the proposed solution is presented as a question. Why does the United Nations Security Council, which is known as a body that should finally deal with such challenges, not take any stands to prohibit the use of threat so that military conflicts will be mitigated? This does not mean that economic punishments should only be imposed immediately on a threatening entity. Evidently, the Council is a political body that cannot sometimes take even constructive actions. However, it should be accepted that an authority like the Council is unable to support the decisions of states on military deployment in which the mere implementation of a threat deserves punishment. If the Council has managed to take appropriate stands against different cases of use of force so far, it can definitely make some decisions on the use of threats. As a result of the relatively passive stand taken by the United Nations Security Council against cases of threats in international relations, different international documents have been approved by the majority of countries to partly refer to the prohibition of threats in international relations. Therefore, if the Council takes a firm stand against cases of threat to the use of force, different states will benefit from this support and take the initiative to counteract threatening states through the ratification of conventions or the assistance of the United Nations General Assembly. Finally, it is believed that the best reaction to a passive military threat is ignorance and that the wisest reaction to an imminent military threat is to adopt peaceful methods of settling disagreements while maintain military preparation.

Keywords

Main Subjects


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