Evaluating the Role of Energy in the Ukraine War and the Emerging New World Order within the Framework of Interdependence Theories

Document Type : Original Independent Original Article

Authors

1 MA of Regional Studies, Allameh Tabatabai'e University, Tehran, Iran

2 Professor of Energy Policy, Energy Department,, Sharif University of Technology

Abstract

Energy security has become intricately intertwined with state power, resulting in a complex web of interdependence among energy-producing and consuming countries. Any disruption in this network of interdependencies can have significant ripple effects on the international system. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had a profound impact on the international system following the Cold War. Russia's substantial reserves of oil and gas have historically positioned it as the primary energy exporter to Europe, and the interconnected energy networks resulted in a significant level of interdependence. The main questions of this research are, considering the significance of energy in the dynamics between Russia and Europe, what has been the role of this prominent factor in the conflicts between Russia and Europe? And what changes did the consequences of the war in Ukraine create in the energy geopolitics of the international system? In this regard, this study seeks to find the correlation of energy in the Ukraine war within the framework of interdependence theories, and its findings indicate that energy, as a strong field of interdependence between Russia and Europe, for reasons such as ideological differences, long-standing distrust, and most importantly, the weaponized use of it by the parties not only failed to create a pluralistic security society but have also led to threatening perceptions. These perceptions have escalated to the point of war and have had an impact on international relations.

Highlights

Introduction

States are now entangled in a complex network of interdependencies, such that any disruption in the network can have a significant impact on the international system, akin to a butterfly effect. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is a significant event following the Cold War, which fundamentally altered the framework of the global order. Due to its substantial deposits of crude oil and natural gas, Russia has emerged as the foremost energy exporter to Europe. Over two years has elapsed since Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine, resulting in significant repercussions for the global energy industry and power dynamics. The intricate and interconnected energy exchanges between Russia and Europe had been fostered a significant level of mutual reliance. Consequently, decisions regarding the energy sector have been made within the framework of security considerations, particularly in influential institutions such as the Supreme National Security Council. Consequently, energy has emerged as a contributing factor to the escalation of conflicts. Furthermore, as a result, the interdependence between the parties became severed.

The significance of different domains of power, such as political, military, economic, and cultural, has exhibited variations in recent years, with each domain potentially assuming greater prominence at specific junctures. Energy is currently a crucial determinant in multiple domains of governance. The significance of energy in the industrial capacity of nations and the overall economy, along with the political sway of governments, is indisputable. Consequently, it plays a crucial role in shaping the dynamics of international relations in this domain. Within the expansive network of interdependence among nations in the global system, energy exchanges emerge as a crucial and indispensable domain of interdependence. This interdependence arises from various factors such as the security of energy supply and demand, the competitiveness of energy carriers, and the environmental impacts associated with the utilization of fossil fuels. Energy is regarded as a crucial element of power in this scenario, serving as a means to facilitate cooperative interactions and align with favorable policies. Moreover, it possesses the capacity to function as a tool for coercing nations into adhering to the preferred governmental policies.

 

Methodology

This study aims to analyze and contrast the theoretical frameworks of "Regional Security Complex" proposed by Buzan and "Weaponized Interdependence" put forth by Farrell and Newman. The objective is to examine the distinct perspectives offered by each theory about the concept of interdependence. In this analysis, we will examine the energy-related interactions between Russia and Europe within the context of the aforementioned theories. Additionally, we will explore the extent to which energy plays a role and exerts influence in the Ukraine war and ongoing tensions between the involved parties. Furthermore, by an examination of the established and developing participants in the energy sector within the contemporary global framework, and an interpretation of the novel energy exchange networks, construct a comprehensive depiction of Ukraine's energy geopolitics in the aftermath of the conflict. The objective of the authors is to analyze the significance of energy and interdependence between Europe and Russia in the context of ongoing conflicts between the two parties. This analysis encompasses the period from the initial formation of this relationship to the point of war and the subsequent dissolution of this interdependence.

 

Outcomes

Although the Druzhba oil pipeline marked the beginning of Russia's energy connections with nations in Eastern Europe that belonged to the Eastern Bloc, Russia's energy interdependence with the Western Bloc predates the fall of the Soviet Union. However, as gas pipelines expanded, this reliance grew stronger over time. From the start, the US was adamantly against this cooperation and kept trying to sabotage it by tightening sanctions on Russia's energy industry. Meanwhile, Putin has utilized energy resource policymaking to forge Russia's place in the world order, bolster his domestic legitimacy, and boost his geopolitical power. Despite challenges like Ukraine's unreliable transit country, Russia continued to search for new projects to build gas pipelines in order to enhance energy supply security, eliminate competitors, establish itself as Europe's primary energy partner, and further strengthen the West's dependence on itself. Although, in 2014 over 40% of the capacity of its gas pipelines to Europe remained unused. This was the outcome of the "active Russian pipeline diplomacy towards Europe".

Europe's reliance on Russia for 50% of its natural gas demand and 30% of its oil need reached a significant level, while this region is the third largest economy globally, encompasses countries such as Germany and France, which rank fourth and seventh in terms of economic strength, respectively. Consequently, any disruption in energy supply could have far-reaching implications for both the regional economy and the global economy as a whole. However, an alternative perspective to consider is Russia's reliance on Europe in terms of economic and security considerations. Whether Russia's energy strategy was formulated with the objective of fostering Europe's self-reliance or not, Russia found itself entangled in this cycle of dependence. After dedicating significant time, labor, and substantial financial resources, the nation initiated the construction of an extensive energy pipeline network to Europe. Consequently, Europe had a surge in LNG imports from the U. S. in 2022, with a total of 72.1 billion cubic meters being imported. This is a notable 43% increase compared to the previous year. In addition, it has significantly mitigated its gas supply deficit by importing additional natural gas from Norway, and other European countries.

 

Conclusion

The historical ideological differences, deep-rooted distrust, and use of energy as weapons have hindered the convergence and closeness between Russia and Europe. Instead, these factors have fueled the securitization of their relations and perception of enmity and hostility. This has been evident in the war in Ukraine, which has resulted in the separation of their energy ties. The energy ties between Russia and Europe underwent significant changes following the Ukraine war, resulting in the alignment of European countries and the United States in the energy sector. Therefore, it may be inferred that overall, we should expect to witness increased cohesion and convergence across the Western bloc in various other domains. Conversely, following the West's attempts to restrict Russia's energy exports, China, India, and Turkey have emerged as significant players in Russia's energy diplomacy. Therefore, this problem has compelled Russia to align itself with regional and Eastern powers.

Keywords

Main Subjects

References

  1. Aspenia Online. (2022). The Ukrainian conflict and the long story of energy pipelines. Retrieved on August 11, 2023. https://aspeniaonline.it/the-ukrainian-conflict-and-the-long-story-of-energy-pipelines/
  2. BP statistical Review of World Energy, 2023.
  3. Bradshaw, M., Connolly, R. (2016). Russia’s Natural Resources in the World Economy: History, Review and Reassessment. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(6), 700-726.
  4. Buzan, B. (2003). Regional security complex theory in the post-cold war world. In Theories of new regionalism: A Palgrave reader. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
  5. Buzan, B., & W'ver, O. (2003). Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  6. Crawford, Ns. (2022). Europe’s Energy Crisis and the Pace of Transition. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), November 21, at: https://www.iiss.org/sv/online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/11/europes-energy-crisis/
  7. D'Anieri, P. J. (1999). Economic interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations, New York: SUNY Press.
  8. Etkind, A. (2011). Barrels of Fur: Natural Resources and the State in the Long History of Russia. Journal of Eurasian Studies. 2(2), 164-171.
  9. Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42-79.
  10. Giles, Keir. (2015). Russia and its Neighbors: Old Attitudes, New Capabilities. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center for Excellence, October 2, at: https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Ch02_CyberWarinPerspective_Giles.pdf
  11. Hoffmann, S. H. (1959). International relations: The long road to theory. World Politics, 11(3), 346-377.
  12. India Forbes. (2023). The Top 10 Largest Economies in the World in 2023. Jul 25, at: https://www.360tf.trade/the-top-10-largest-economies-in-the-world-in-2023/
  13. International Energy Agency (IEA) (2022). Frequently Asked Questions on Energy Security. November 16, at: https://www.iea.org/articles/frequently-asked-questions-on-energy-security
  14. Kasimov, N.S., & N.N. Alekseeva; A.A. Chulok; A.V. Sokolov. (2015). The Future of the Natural Resources Sector in Russia. International Journal of Social Ecology and Sustainable Development. 6(3), 80-103.
  15. Keohane, R. O., & Nye Jr, J. S. (1973). Power and Interdependence. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 15(4), 158-165.
  16. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1987). Power and interdependence revisited. International Organization, 4(4), 725-753.
  17. Korteweg, R. (2018). Energy as a tool of foreign policy of authoritarian states, in particular Russia. Policy Department for External Relations. European Parliament.
  18. Kupchinsky, R. (2009). LNG–Russia's New Energy Blackmail Tool. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6(77).
  19. Marsh, S., & Chambers, M. (2022). Germany freezes Nord Stream 2 Gas Project as Ukraine Crisis Deepens. Reuters, February 22, at: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germanys-scholz-halts-nord-stream-2-certification-2022-02-22/
  20. A. (2020). Power in Modern Russia; Manchester: Manchester University Press.
  21. Morgenthau, H. J. (1955). Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace... Revised and Enlarged. [With Maps, and a Bibliography.]. Fifth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
  22. Nichol, J., Woehrel, S., & Gelb, B. A. (2006). Russia’s cutoff of natural gas to Ukraine: Context and implications. In Focus on Politics and Economics of Russia and Eastern Europe. Nova Publishers New York.
  23. Nye Jr, J. S. (1990). Soft Power. Foreign Policy, (80), 153-171.
  24. Nye Jr, J. S. (2011). The Future of Power. Public Affairs. Energy Monitor. Retrieved on August 4, 2023.
  25. Petkova, M. (2023). Russia’s war in Ukraine inspires Turkish gas dreams. Energy Monitor, March 28, at: https://www.energymonitor.ai/policy/russias-war-in-ukraine-inspires-turkish-gas-dreams/?cf-view
  26. Pierini, M. (2019). IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook: Russia’s Energy Politics and Its Relevance for the European Union. European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), 301-305, at: https://www.iemed.org/publication/russias-energy-politics-and-its-relevance-for-the-european-union/
  27. Pirani, S. (2007). Ukraine's Gas Sector. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
  28. Russell, M. (2021). The Nord Stream 2 Pipeline: Economic, Environmental and Geopolitical Issues. European Parliamentary Research Service. July 1, at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)690705
  29. Rutland, P. (2008). Russia as an Energy Superpower. New Political Economy. June 13:12.
  30. Statista (2023). Share of gas supply from Russia in Europe in 2021, by selected country. August 1, at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1201743/russian-gas-dependence-in-europe-by-country/
  31. Statista Research Department (2023). Oil reserves in Russia 2009-2020. Statista, March 2, at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/264390/oil-reserves-in-russia-since-1990/#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20Russia's%20oil%20reserves,followed%20by%20Kazakhstan%20and%20Norway.
  32. Statista. (2022). Natural Gas Production in Russia from 2000 to 2020 [Dataset]. Jun. 29, at: https://www.statista.com/ statistics/265335/natural-gas-production-in-russia-since-1998/
  33. Tabuchi, Hiroko (2022). How Europe Got Hooked on Russian Gas Despite Reagan’s Warnings. The New York Times. March 23, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/23/climate/europe-russia-gas-reagan.html
  34. Tynkkynen, V. P. (2019). The Energy of Russia: Hydrocarbon Culture and Climate Change, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
  35. S. Department of State. (2020). Updated CAATSA Section 232 Guidance. July 15, 2023. at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Updated-CAATSA-Section-232-Guidance-July-15-2020.pdf
  36. Ursa Space (2019). European Refiners Scramble After Druzhba Pipeline Shuts. May 3, at: https://ursaspace.com/blog/european-refiners-scramble-after-druzhba-pipeline-shuts/
  37. Vatansever, A. (2017). Is Russia Building Too Many Pipelines? Explaining Russia's Oil and gas Export Strategy. Energy Policy, 108, 1-11.
  38. Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics (Vol. 67). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics