Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis
Highlights
The geopolitical Structure of the Arab Middle East, coupled with the presence of trans-regional powers in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), and the confrontational geopolitical strategies pursued by Saudi Arabia and Iran in the first two decades of the 21st century, exacerbated instability and insecurity in West Asia. Starting from 2006, Riyadh intensified its efforts to establish itself as the hegemonic power in the region, seizing the opportunity to fill Iraq’s power vacuum in the Persian Gulf. Such approach, aimed at creating security crises and regional instability, ultimately led to proliferation of sectarian and proxy wars. Subsequently, with the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011, Saudi Arabia took direct interventionist actions in troubled regional countries such as Bahrain (2011) and Yemen (2015). These developments signaled a shift in the region’s geopolitical dynamics to the detriment of Riyadh; As far as the new generation of Saudi politicians, driven by concerns about the changing situation, abandoned caution and conservatism, and adopted unprecedented aggressive approaches.
Against this background and in response to the question put forward by the present research, “How much of the aggressiveness of Saudi foreign policy can be attributed to geopolitical rivalries?”, this paper hypothesizes that Riyadh has employed a range of strategies, leveraging its considerable military, security, and diplomatic capacities to counter the expansion of Iran’s influence and power in the region. The research utilizes a descriptive and analytical method, as in different parts of article, examining the consequences of Saudi Arabia’s policies and strategies, as well as those of its regional and international allies, at the different times, aimed to shift the regional balance in their favor and contain and isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In the course of investigating the impact of Saudi geopolitical rivalries on the country’s aggressive foreign policy, the following propositions have been extracted and analyzed as the Research’s concrete findings:
Proposition 1: Between 2001 and 2015, the geopolitical Structure of the Middle East was deeply affected by the power maximization and hegemonic tendencies of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The competition, aimed at undermining and contain the other while enhancing its own position, ruled the geopolitics of chaos in the the region. Breaking free from this state is challenging due to the formation of military and security alliances, as well as political polarizations, increasing the likelihood of its reproduction in new forms.
Proposition 2: Despite a shift in foreign policy priorities of the United States, as well as presence of new powers in the Middle East and other international developments, the role of the global hegemon (America) remains decisive in the region’s geopolitical equations. This has historically fueled destructive rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran, effectively consolidated the geopolitics of chaos. In the future, the United States will likely maintain control over relations between regional countries, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, often by creating and managing crises.
Proposition 3: The involvement of multiple regional and international actors in the Middle East’s geopolitical structure has made it impossible for Riyadh and Tehran alone to establish their desired order in the respective geopolitical regions they seek to create. This will remain true in the future as well.
Proposition 4: As the regional balance shifted in favor of Iran during the aforementioned period, and lack of expected reaction by Riyadh from the United States, failed Saudi Arabia’s ambition to become the hegemonic power of the Arab Middle East, leading to the adoption of an aggressive approach in its foreign policy.
Proposition 5: If Saudi Arabia’s current priority is to stabilize and secure the region to advance its development plans, it must depart from its geopolitics of chaos and aggressive approaches, embracing a geopolitics of stability. This requires utilizing military, security, and diplomatic measures to control rivalries, manage crises, and effectively pursue an interactive approach toward Iran.
Evaluation of the successes and failures of Saudi Arabia’s aggressive foreign policy reveals that this approach has not yet to become a permanent feature of Saudi foreign policy; but it has not been completely abandoned either. Therefore, it is possible that with a new ruling party in America (for example, the Republicans in the White House), Saudi Arabia may move towards intensifying geopolitical competition with Iran and renewing its aggressive approach. Simultaneously, it is evident that the country has distanced itself from a defensive foreign policy.
In summary, Saudi Arabia’s aggressive approach has increased the costs of Iran’s foreign policy and, in some cases, hindered the realization of its regional goals. However, it has not been able to contain and isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran or establish Riyadh’s desired order and security in the Arab Middle East. Other examples of the failure of Saudi Arabia’s aggressive approach include the erosion of the war in, the survival of Bashar al-Assad in power, the continued activities of the so-called Resistance Movement, and the resumption of diplomatic relations between Tehran and Riyadh.
Regarding Iran, although the establishment of relations between the two countries has somewhat reduced the severity of the Saudi government’s stances and actions towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia’s security and geopolitical concerns about Iran’s regional policies and movements persist. The strategy of containing and weakening Iran has not been altogether abandoned by Saudi officials. It can be said that at best, relations between the two countries have not surpassed the level of a “cold peace.” As such, the process of normalizing relations and expanding cooperation between them is progressing slowly. There is even concern that every change and event favoring Iran’s policies in the region could become a subject of dispute between Riyadh and Tehran, resulting in a strong reaction from Saudi Arabia.
Organizing the geopolitical rivalries between Riyadh and Tehran and rectifying the contentious geopolitical structure of the region is crucial for stability of the Middle East. This can be achieved through defining and identifying spheres of influence, roles, and mutual interests, addressing the security concerns of both countries, and implementing trust-building mechanisms. Instead of advising Iran not to interfere in Arab Middle East affairs, Saudi Arabia would be better off engaging in sincere and constructive negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran on vital regional issues, while recognizing its role and influence. Riyadh must also cease its dangerous arms race aimed at power maximization and Saudi Arabia’s military superiority in the region. And last but not least, the continued effort to isolate Iran and undermine its geopolitical influence through various regional and international coalitions, as well as encouraging Western states to sanction Iran, poses a significant obstacle to gaining Tehran’s trust and resolving its legitimate security concerns.
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