Western Approaches to Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Comparing the Cases of Iran and South Korea

Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis

Authors

• Hassan Borjalizadeh ¹
• Mehdi Zakerian ²
• Behzad Shahande ³

¹ Department of International Relations, Theology, Law and Political Science, Science and research branch of islamic azad university, Tehran, Iran

² Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Theology, Law and Political Science, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Iran, Tehran and, Associate Member, Center for Iranian Studies, SOAS,

³ Professor of International Relations, University of Tehran.

Abstract

Highlights

Introduction

The nuclear case against Iran involves allegations of nuclear activities carried out without notification to the International Atomic Energy Agency. This case was brought before the United Nations Security Council on charges of non-compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Despite Iran's efforts at confidence-building, the crisis remains unresolved. While the Iranian nuclear crisis has been the most high-profile nuclear issue in the history of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it is not the only nuclear case to have come before the agency. Various countries have faced accusations of violating or failing to comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, among which South Korea stands out as a prominent example. From 1979 to 2000, South Korea engaged in nuclear activities without notifying the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that the South Korean nuclear case was “resolved.” This research aims to explore the Western approach to non-proliferation and investigate why the final outcome of the nuclear cases of Iran and South Korea differed. The hypothesis of this research posits that, based on the principles, norms, and rules of the international non-proliferation regime, the primary reason for the difference in the ultimate outcome of the two cases of Iran and South Korea lies not in the political systems of the two countries or their political relationship with the West, but rather in the way in which Iran and South Korea interacted with and confronted the West's policy of non-proliferation.

 

Research Methodology

This study employs a descriptive-analytical methodology intending to test the research hypothesis. The data collection method used in this investigation is based on library research. The research documents utilized include the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA Statute, reports by the Director General of the IAEA, and the IAEA Board of Governors resolutions. Additionally, written memoirs of politicians and officials involved in the Iranian nuclear issue, as well as books and articles published by nuclear non-proliferation experts and university professors in both domestic and foreign scientific journals, were consulted. Via a thorough document examination, the underlying causes of the nuclear dispute concerning Iran have been explored. Furthermore, a comparative analysis was conducted between the nuclear program and violations of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement of South Korea and those of Iran. This analysis included an assessment of the outcomes of these two cases.

 

Findings

The dichotomy of Western and Eastern countries or Western and non-Western countries does not apply to the framework of nuclear non-proliferation. Instead, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons categorizes member nations into two distinct groups: nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. Hence, this study regards the Western approach as tantamount to the approach of nuclear-weapon states. Per Krasner's definition of the international regime, the Western approach to nuclear non-proliferation entails reinforcing the regime in the technological, legal, and operational spheres. As such, Western nations have endeavored to establish novel norms and regulations or fortify existing ones through diverse initiatives such as enhancing nuclear safeguards, setting up multinational centers and fuel banks, and more. The peaceful use of nuclear energy without enrichment and reprocessing, along with institutionalizing the implementation of the Additional Protocol, can be regarded as new norms in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. By viewing the Additional Protocol as an indicator and standard for monitoring the nuclear programs of countries, accepting the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency as police or detective rather than an auditor in the non-proliferation regime, and utilizing the mechanisms of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, new rules are effectively established in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Western approach to nuclear non-proliferation, especially concerning uranium enrichment and used fuel reprocessing, remains independent of political affiliations. Ample evidence exists to demonstrate the West's firm opposition to uranium enrichment, even in cases where the countries in question are considered allies.

The present study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Western approach to nuclear non-proliferation through a comparative examination of the nuclear safeguards files of Iran and South Korea. The reports submitted by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on implementing the nuclear safeguards agreement in both countries serve as the primary sources for evaluating their compliance with the agreement.

 

South Korea	Iran	Nuclear Safeguards Violations
-	*	Gas centrifuge	Failure to declare enrichment
*	*	Laser centrifuge
*	-	Chemical centrifuge
*	*	Construction and irradiation of targets	Failure to declare reprocessing
*	*	Plutonium separation
*	*	Uranium conversions	Failure to declare uranium conversions
*	*	Metallic uranium production
*	*	Failure to report the import of materials
*	*	Failure to report transfer of materials
*	*	Failure to update facility design information
-	*	Lack of cooperation and transparency
*	*	History of concealment

Results

This study examines the different outcomes of the Iran and South Korea cases in relation to the international non-proliferation regime. The analysis shows that the nature of the political systems of these countries or their political relations with the West is not the main factor affecting the outcomes. Instead, the study suggests that the different consequences arise from how Iran and South Korea have dealt with Western non-proliferation policies, considering the principles, norms, and rules of the international non-proliferation regime.

It is argued that countries’ approach to non-proliferation cannot be assessed solely based on their types of government or their relations with the West. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons categorizes its signatories into two main groups: nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. After the September 11th incident, the Western approach to non-proliferation, as observed in countries with nuclear weapons, has been to strengthen the regime through standardization, principles, and creating new rules.

The Western non-proliferation policy seeks the norm of granting the right to access the nuclear fuel cycle without uranium enrichment and reprocessing to all countries that lack nuclear weapons, whether allies or non-allies of the West. The West considers the acquisition of uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing by countries without nuclear weapons, including Iran and South Korea, unacceptable due to the risk of nuclear proliferation. As such, the West has taken both negative actions by imposing restrictions and sanctions and positive measures by offering plans and incentives to counter the risk.

South Korea has avoided confrontation with the West by accepting the Western non-proliferation policy and refraining from enrichment and reprocessing, which allowed it to resolve its non-compliance with international law quickly. In contrast, Iran has insisted on uranium enrichment as a right, despite extensive efforts and confidence-building measures beyond its legal commitments. However, this approach has failed to find a solution to the crisis.

Keywords

• Iran&rsquo
• s nuclear issue
• South Korea
• non-proliferation
• West
• Uranium Enrichment

Main Subjects

• Iran
• Islamic Republic of Iran
• Middle East
• International Organizations
• Nuclear Policy
• East Asia
• Far East
• West Asia