Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis
Authors
1 PhD student of International Relations Dep., Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Central Tehran Azad University
3 Department of Political Science - Political Thoughts and Issues of Iran, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Highlights
Introduction
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, no codified periodical document qualifies as military doctrine. Thus, the military doctrine of the IRI armed forces can be inferred by reviewing national documents such as the “Constitution of Iran”, “Iran’s twenty-year vision plan”, “general policies of the development plans”, “general policies of Iran’s five-year development plans”, “five-year plans for the country’s development,” and “Iran’s annual budget laws”. Among these, only “general policies of development plans”, “five-year plans for the country’s development”, and “Iran’s annual budget laws” are presented as codified and periodic. Therefore, in the absence of a defense doctrine, the IRI’s five-year development plans are regarded as the most significant source for understanding Tehran’s “declared views” on the military sector, as well as the most important tool for understanding the Iranian states’ influence on the country’s defensive policies.
This paper aims to investigate the “offense-defense balance in IRI’s military doctrine” over a three-decade period and evaluate this doctrine’s relation with “Discursive differences in Iranian governments’ idealistic-realistic foreign policy”. “National development plans” are a source for understanding the offense-defense balance in IRI’s military doctrine, and “scrutinizing the stances and views of presidents” is a reference for understanding idealistic-realistic orientations in the government’s foreign policy discourse.
Methodology
This study is exploratory research conducted through a thematic analysis method. The data required to derive the findings, analyze, and answer the questions were gathered using documentary and desk research methods: presidents’ speeches were reviewed to understand the idealism-realism ratio in governments’ foreign policy discourse, and the first to sixth development plans were examined to understand offense-defense ratio in Iran’s military doctrine. A part of the data description and analysis process was conducted using a thematic analysis approach and the MAXQDA software. However, the final data analysis was performed using an inferential method and was based on the authors’ interpretation or comprehension.
Findings
Although idealism and realism had nearly an equal impact on Hashemi Rafsanjani’s understanding of the international system and the development of IRI’s foreign policy standpoint, the ratio was remarkably different in this organizing theme’s basic themes. Hashemi represents the international system as an unfavorable atmosphere that must be modified. Hashemi Rafsanjani highlights the significance of soft power in advancing IRI’s foreign policy, and while he admits (but does not dictate) the conflict between Iran and the Western world, he does not prioritize détente. Furthermore, in his understanding of the IRI’s foreign policy, the stances of Iran and Islam are almost equal.
Khatami’s paradigm for understanding the international system and foreign policy is overtly realistic. Although the international system is portrayed in Khatami’s view as a system that needs to be changed rather than a desirable system, and although the transnational perspective plays an essential role in his foreign policy, he views nearly every aspect of Iran’s foreign policy strategies and tools through a realistic lens.
The ratio of idealism to realism in Ahmadinejad's perception of the international system and international relations opposes that of Khatami. He has represented the international order as an entirely unpleasant environment in desperate need of reform. According to Ahmadinejad, the importance of hardware power in advancing IRI’s foreign policy goals is three times that of soft power and diplomacy. Furthermore, he views foreign policy strategies primarily through the lens of resistance to and conflict with the West.
The realism-idealism ratio in Rouhani's discursive framework regarding Iran’s international and foreign policy is 2 to 1. On the one hand, the devices and tactics he employs and the strategies he implements to advance the country’s foreign policy reflect his realistic perception of Tehran’s favorable foreign policy. On the other hand, he primarily represents the international system as an unfavorable environment that must be reformed.
Regarding the offensive-defensive balance organizing themes in the IRI armed forces’ doctrine -examined based on the country’s development plans- the findings indicate that the ratio of offensive-defensive approaches in the country’s first development plan was 3-1. This plan lacked any content to serve as a guide for the actions of the country’s military forces within the dual framework of anti-imperialism / strategic patience. Nonetheless, the offense-defense ratio increased in the second development plan compared to the first development plan, even though the absolute share of defense was still higher. The content of the country’s second development plan’s military and defense programs all indicated a sort of awareness about the normal condition of security.
The increasing ratio of offensive approaches to defensive approaches continued in the third plan as well. In this development plan, the proportion of offense exceeded that of defense for the first time. The paradoxical emphasis on anti-imperialism (as an offensive notion) and normalization of the country’s security condition (as a defensive notion) contributed the most to this plan.
The offense-defense ratio, which had gradually increased from the first to the third development plan, was changed in the fourth development plan, and defensive approaches once again surpassed offensive strategies. The fourth development plan emphasized soft power, and the propositions concerning military forces and the IRI’s military/defensive regime outweighed those concerning the threat condition.
The proportion of offensive versus defensive approaches increased significantly in the fifth development plan, and also, no statement mentioned the two concepts of strategic patience and border protection( in contrast to strategic depth).
Although offensive approaches have a lower share in the country’s sixth development plan than in the fifth, they remain dominant. Nevertheless, this plan does not mention the use of hard power measures to further Tehran's international goals. In contrast, recognizing the circumstance as a threat, as well as anti-imperialism discourse, had a significant proportion.
Conclusion
The spectrum of evolution in the doctrine of the IRI’s armed forces over the last three decades can be presented using the highly remarkable feature of increasing offensive approaches versus defensive approaches, as well as the less obvious feature of fluctuation between these two approaches.
In response to the primary research question regarding the relationship between the “offense-defense balance in IRI’s military doctrine and the idealism-realism balance in the states’ foreign policy discourse”, it can be concluded that despite the positive correlation between “idealism and offense” and “realism and defense”, this correlation fluctuates between moderate and weak. As a result, the weak correlation between idealism and offense and realism and defense can be attributed to the minimal influence of Iranian governments on the doctrine of the country’s armed forces. This is because the government’s role in Iran is primarily limited to developing the country’s development plans.
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