Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis
Authors
1 PhD Student in Public International Law, North Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Assistant Professor, Department of International Law, North Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
3 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, North Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Highlights
Introduction
Terrorism is a phenomenon that has always troubled human societies for different purposes. This phenomenon is sometimes conducted by individuals and independent groups and sometimes by proximity groups affiliated with one or several states. Known as the primary followers of international law, states have always had substantial roles in forming and codifying the regulations of international law. In fact, they have played different parts. Regarding the formation of these regulations, a prominent topic is the policy adopted by states toward a specific problem. Confrontation with terrorist attacks on vital infrastructure can be analyzed in two aspects, i.e., cyberattacks and physical attacks. Given their definitions of vital infrastructure (which are various due to the lack of an internationally comprehensive definition), different states take different countermeasures. Any international actions taken by a state should be in compliance with the general framework of principles for international law, especially the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, countries sometimes lay the ground for the emergence of terrorist attacks, something which leads to their international liability in terms of action or inaction. With a focus on terrorist attacks on vital infrastructure of countries, this paper aims to determine how the liabilities of states can be verified in response to such attacks. The international liability of a state can be verified through assignability and an international commitment violated by that state.
Methodology
A descriptive-analytical method was used in this manuscript, and the desk method was adopted for data collection.
Results and Discussion
In brief, an international behavior of a state should be identified to verify its international liability. Therefore, it is possible to verify the liability of a state; however, there are different ways of verification. In other words, states can take actions through their representatives. Thus, behaviors of public organs or officials can be attributed to their respective states. The actions taken by persons, institutions, and individual groups might be attributed to their respective states if they are authorized (e.g., they are employed by the state) to exert some elements of the state authority and take relevant actions. Furthermore, actions of the individuals or institutions that do not perform public tasks may also be attributed to their respective sates if they have actually acted under the guidance or control of those states. If an agreement necessitates compliances with a legal commitment, the noncompliance of a member country will be considered the violation of public responsibility on the part of that country which fails to perform international commitments. Therefore, when terrorist groups are controlled either directly or indirectly by a state to damage the vital infrastructure of a country, the respective state can be held liable for criminal conduct. The existence of various international commitments to confrontation with terrorism can help countries try to avoid acts of violation.
Regarding the liabilities of states, it is always essential to firstly determine whether noncompliance with counterterrorism commitments is attributed to a state. Secondly, it is evident that a causal approach provides a basis for the liability of a state, something which completes the representativeness paradigm but not the replacement paradigm. If a country is held directly liable for a terrorist attack, it may potentially turn into a legal target for a forcible reaction. However, the right of self-defense depends on specific conditions that should be met if defensive countermeasures are to be authorized against an offensive state. In this case, the considerations of a non-causal character might be considered. The nature of a state’s participation in private terrorist activities can be considered directly correlated with the announced policies toward those activities. For instance, it could be feasible through evaluations of necessity and proportion in the right of self-defense. If a state provides extensive and constant support for a terrorist group involved in armed attacks, defensive countermeasures against its infrastructure might be a verifiable option. Similarly, if a state’s inaction against constant terrorist violence ensues from an organized policy toward implicit support that is necessary for the success of private terrorist attacks, the use of proportionate force against that state may finally be considered a legitimate option. This kind of action is meant to enforce adaptability and end terrorist threats to the vital infrastructure of a country.
Conclusion
The most prominent finding of this study indicates that it is difficult to verify the liability of terrorist groups if they are not affiliated with a country. In fact, countries can be held liable for terrorist attacks only in accordance with international law. In other words, only countries are viewed as the followers of international law. Therefore, if terrorist groups conduct some attacks that are not affiliated with any countries based on international law, it will be somehow impossible to verify their liabilities.
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Main Subjects