Dimension of Nuclear Disarmament in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis

Authors

1 Ph.D. Student, Department of Public International Law, UAE Branch, Islamic Azad University, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

2 Assistant Professor of Law Department , Central Tehran Branch, Tehran Islamic Azad University, Iran.

Abstract

The treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  (TPNW) is a significant international achievement and a stable multilateral regime. It imposes limitations on developing, testing, producing, accessing, having at the disposal, storing, or threatening to use nuclear weapons. The pact was ratified in September 2017 and enacted on Jan. 22, 2021. Making this treaty universal takes purposeful political effort. Persuading nuclear and nuclear-armed countries to participate in enforcing the agreement is difficult. It will face vehement political opposition. Such involvement requires a different approach and a discourse-oriented atmosphere. Criteria associated with human rights, humanitarian rights, international ethics, and international security should be introduced into this matter. Sadly, despite the extensive efforts of peace advocates and the goodwill of numerous countries, the governments have taken no disarmament-oriented measures. This paper uses a descriptive-analytical method to answer the question, “How can we realize nuclear disarmament through TPNW?” Our results indicate that the wording of the treaty provisions makes nuclear disarmament possible through the global consensus of the member states.

Highlights

Introduction

The treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  (the UN, 2017) was enacted in January 2021. Joining this treaty is an opportunity to enhance standards opposing nuclear armament. The primary goal of the convention is a global commitment of states to refrain from having nuclear weapons. No nuclear-armed country has declared support for the treaty. Nevertheless, two main options allow nuclear-armed countries to join. They can either eliminate such weapons before joining or follow the elimination method specified in the treaty once they enter it. The global community’s abundant efforts toward nuclear disarmament and their political role in international laws are undeniable. From the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the establishment of the United Nations (UN) and after the cold war, there have been developments in the proliferation and non-proliferation of nuclear armament. The first UN resolution was to eliminate atomic weapons. Compare these evolutions with the self-serving political interests. The age of the atom throws facts on humans at an overwhelming speed. It exceeds our mental capacity to deal with the political issues arising from the power of atomic technology.  And there is no turning back. The physical energy of matter and nuclear technology have become political power and challenged international laws at any level possible. The goal of nuclear disarmament is described idealistically In TPNW. It implicitly legitimizes atomic states.  This pact, nevertheless, has supplied a legal framework for a nuclear-weapons-free world. This paper uses international laws and international relations (and their critiques of each other) to assess the following hypothesis,  “Can TPNW effectively create and maintain a global standard against nuclear weapons and lead to nuclear disarmament?” The study first examines the general principles of nuclear disarmament for TPNW members. We then discuss how the treaty interacts with and treats the non-atomic countries who request to become nuclear.  Finally, we analyze the convention legally.

 

Methodology

This paper uses descriptive-analytical methodology.

 

Results and Findings

Our study indicated that global nuclear disarmament could be realized through the intelligent use of explicit rules of TPNW. The treaty has content that lets a state with atomic weapons join it. An international authority must eliminate and destroy those nuclear armaments according to a scheduled program in such cases. Executing this plan would face a wide range of challenges, including protecting access-restricted information during disarmament; It also requires specialty in atomic arms or full cooperation of nuclear-armed countries. The treaty is a practical means to carry out joining options and disarm. TPNW presents the disarming state and member ones with a feasible, credible solution to destroy atomic armament. The international authority can plan a procedure that includes all nuclear disarmament activities to deal with nuclear weapons elimination challenges.  Once all the atomic arms and fissile materials released during removal are eliminated, the authority can verify the process and confirm the veracity of the material size declared initially. This lets a TPNW authority certify the disarmament process without accessing access-restricted or classified information regarding atomic arms. Such authorities might focus on shutting down or changing the use of fissile material production facilities. While producing military-grade materials is a crucial part of the nuclear armament program, verifying the termination of fissile materials production in those facilities does not need special knowledge or specialty. As a result, the globalization of TPNW is rooted in standards, principles, and persuasive reasoning. The primary argument of treaty-supporting countries is making the possibility of freeing the world from nuclear armament through negotiations and globalization a fixed priority in the coming years through treaty. To this end, civil society plays a vital role in keeping TPNW and nuclear arms at the center of public attention and asking for constant participation and political measures regarding nuclear disarmament to reduce the atomic violence threat.

Keywords

Main Subjects

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International Studies Journal (ISJ)
Volume 19, Issue 3 - Serial Number 75
January 2023
Pages 251-269

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