EU Role in the Insecurities of Central and Eastern European Countries in the Post-Communist Era

Document Type : Original Independent Original Article

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, Regional Studies Department , University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

2 PhD student of European Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

Central and Eastern European country (CEECs) from 1989 onward took a neoliberal turn despite having experienced decades of communist rule. At the same time, the European Union (EU) enjoyed a particularly attractive image—evoking the return to Europe—among the people and governments of the region. While CEECs’ security concerns were mostly of a military threat during communist rule, post-communism CEECs’ security concerns have undergone transformation and changed in nature. This study sets to answer the following research question: what role does the EU play with regard to security concerns of post-communist CEECs? To answer this question, the main hypothesis is that the EU—in the form of a neoliberal historical bloc—has brought about special security concerns for the CEECs. Regarding the research methodology, we adopted a qualitative method under the neo-Gramscian theoretical framework and carried through statistical analysis to examine the research question. The research findings indicate that under the workings of diverse mechanisms of EU neoliberal block, Central and Eastern European countries today deal with the issue of security from the economic dimension (the weakening of domestic industries, the housing crisis and the dependent capitalist economy) to political (political dependence), human (alienation and otherness), and socio-cultural one (elite recruitment in the neoliberal project and weakening of the higher education system).

Highlights

Introduction

The recent developments in Ukraine (which began with the Special Military Operations on February 24, 2022), created the expectation that the CEECs, which had become members states of the EU following the collapse of communism and after the period of transition from centrally planned economies to market economies and faced the same threat that Ukraine did, would adopt positions similar to those of the other EU member countries. Despite these expectations, we witnessed different positions of the CEECs and some of them, such as Hungary and Poland that are EU member states, criticized the Western European countries for being selfish in imposing sanctions on Russia. In other words, Poland criticized Western Europe, especially the leaders of Germany and France, more than it did Russia. Other CEECs, led by Hungary, stated that the developments in Ukraine were caused by that country and did not agree to take harsher steps and increase sanctions on Russia. In spite of the pressure from the West, Hungary does not consider Russia a threat to this country and has openly taken soft positions towards Russia and, sometimes, its position has even run counter to that of the Western European member countries in the EU. To counter this, Western European countries are still increasing their criticism of the trend toward democratization in the CEECs. Accordingly, the CEECs have different understanding of the threat to their security, and it seems that their security issue is no longer merely limited to the Russian Federation (as the successor state of the USSR) and has found new political, economic, human, and social dimensions. In fact, the heavy economic dependence of these countries on western European companies, the extensive migration and brain drain, the political dependence of the governing parties in these countries on the European Commission and the decisions made by the great European powers (led by Germany and France) are examples of the recent major security threats facing the CEECs. Considering the main role that the EU played in the economic and political transition period in the CEECs that was accompanied by conditioning and gradual and stage-by-stage increase in the conditions set for receiving financial and economic aid from the EU and, finally, for becoming member countries in it, this article intended to answer this question: "What consequences have adoption of neoliberal policies by the CEECs under the guidance of the EU had for the security of these countries?" The article studied this issue by putting forward the hypothesis that the EU, as a neoliberal historical bloc, has created special security problems and also difficulties and threats for the CEECs in the dimensions of economic, political and human security.    

 

Research methodology and the theoretical framework of the article

This research used the qualitative data analysis approach within the neo-Gramscian theoretical framework to answer the raised question. The references for the statistical analysis were selected from the annual reports published by the European Commission and the Council of Europe in relation to the CEECs and also from the statistics presented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (the IMF).The neo-Gramscian theory originated from the opinions and views of Antonio Gramsci and was expanded to an international level by Robert Cox. It acts as a hegemon by attracting and co-opting among other elements — even among the rival forces. Using the mentioned conceptual framework, the new threats facing the CEECs were evaluated by analyzing the economic, political and human reports and statistics.

 

The findings and results of the research

The research findings suggest that the CEECs today are confronting the security issue in the economic dimension (resulting from the dependent capitalist economy), political dimension (political dependence), human dimension (such as brain drain and migration), and cultural and social dimension (including ethnic conflicts and attraction of the elites in the neoliberal project) due to the various mechanisms used by the EU neoliberal bloc. They also indicate that the economies of the CEECs have turned into dependent capitalist economies as a result of the project advocated by the EU neoliberal historical bloc (the process of being annexed to the EU and of Europeanization). This heavy dependence on Western Europe and Western Europe multinational companies in effect strongly threatens the economic and political security of the CEECs and, considering the pressure applied by and decision making power of the companies and industries in the Western Europe neoliberal bloc, has severely limited the possibility of independent decision making for the CEECs. In addition, the research findings show that the EU neoliberal bloc has gained complete control over the CEECs by using the mechanism of mutual dependence of annexation tools, the type of economy, and the political structure of the CEECs.

 Creation of a two-level structure for the elites in order to cause rivalry and attract them is another mechanism employed by the EU to promote the interests of the neoliberal bloc in these countries. At the same time, the results of the study reveal that the human type of security threats has also further complicated the security issue in the CEECs. Brain drain, the very low ratio of researchers to workforce in the CEECs and the short-term migration to Western Europe have threatened both the economic security in cities emptied of the workforce and the social security of migrant families. Furthermore, the neoliberal policies of the EU, the backtracking of the governments, and reduced governmental help in the CEECs have caused strong ethnic conflicts, and the Muslim and Roma minorities have suffered the most. In fact, the countries in the neoliberal hegemonic bloc have caused economic, political and human insecurity in the CEECs by gaining control of the market, industrial companies and the banking sector and also by imposing policies that guarantee their own interests on these countries. Finally, the discourse of return to Europe has meant for the CEECs the weakening of their sovereignty over the political, economic and human sectors and the acceptance of decisions made in the neoliberal bloc.       

Keywords

Main Subjects


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