United States of America and the Iraq War According to Constructivism and Cultural Strategy

Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis

Authors

1 Ph.D. Student, of International Relations Department, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.

2 Political Sciences, Political Sciences, Islamic Azad University Central Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran

3 Professor of International Relations , Department, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.

4 Assistant Professor of International Relations Department, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

For constructivists, strategic culture is the product of norms and culture-bearing units such as norm entrepreneurs. They believe that the United States invaded Iraq to replace the dominant strategic cultural norms under the logic of the Cold War with a new approach, i.e., democratic regime change through preventive war. However, during the Iraq War, the proposed paradigm, advocated by neoconservative norm entrepreneurs and traditional conservatives in the Bush administration, could not take the place of the Cold War-era strategy for multilateral containment. This norm was a part of a larger revolutionary strategy that advocated the policy of preventive war and the hegemonic paradigm, promoting the US hegemon of democracy through force. The US sought to spread this new view by piloting it in Iraq in order to prove the viability and effectiveness of preventive war. New international groupings such as “coalitions of the willing” and the national security strategy of 2002 provided the documents legitimating these new policies. However, the publishing of these documents encountered strong opposition at domestic and international levels. Therefore, the American strategic culture and national security policy briefly worked with the proposed opposing neoconservative paradigm, but presently they are returning to a version of the Cold War normative paradigm. In constructivist view, the Iraq War not only was not able to show the validity of a new vision of American strategic culture, but also undercut the paradigm it was supposed to underpin.

Highlights

Introduction

The real causes of the war were largely connected with the foundations of American political vision. Today, after the invasion of Iraq by the US and the UK, there is a consensus that none of the provided official reasons for interference were based on reality. Perhaps this is a distinct aspect of the Iraq War that needs to be seen as one of the main factors in forming the perception that it was a unique and transformative event. False claims by the Bush administration about the links between Iraq and Al-Qaeda and Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), more than everything else, revealed the consequences of an uncontested unipolar international system. Moreover, the war propaganda machine unveiled the great influence of lobbies on the American foreign policy.

 

Methodology

Many theories in the field of international relations (IR) seek to present a coherent report of the 2003 Iraq War. Given that Iraq did not pose any concerning threat to the US, reconciling the invasion with the American national interests may seem impossible. Constructivism clearly explores this problem as it highlights how the notions of national interest and power might change over time, while other theories drive us to use fixed and restrictive categories. For constructivists, there is not distinction between the existence of national interests and how they are legitimated.

Findings

Considering the shortcomings in the literature, this study examined the US invasion of Iraq in the light of constructivism and strategic culture.

According to constructivists, the US took up arms in Iraq because the dominant strategic cultural norm, that of seeking geopolitical stability through multilateral deterrence, appeared bankrupt to the Bush administration after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11).

This led the elites in the Bush administration to prescribe democratic regime change in Iraq as imposing an international norm of hegemonic global policing through unilateral preventive war. The conception of the normative logic of American strategic culture, deriving from de jure expression, finally went through transformation and became de facto realities, organizing the employment of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine during the Persian Gulf War. It should be noted that the doctrine from the 1980s, the American national security strategy in 2002, as the official American national security policy-making road map was the epitome of the administration of the second Bush against 9/11. In this regard, it was decided that the US should not send forces on missions in foreign countries unless it was vital to US interests and had a fair assurance that it would have the support of the American public. Such  a caution was completely contrary to the employment of preventive war. The doctrine’s circumspect tone also set it completely in contrast with the “Wilsonian Messianic Idealism” and ambitious aims of overt American hegemony seen in the proposed hegemonic paradigm during the second Bush administration, when the younger Bush and Rice abandoned the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine after 9/11. 

Such actions for disrupt any initiatives based on multilateralism were totally in line with the defense policy guidance of 1992, made by such neoconservatives as Paul Wolfowitz, Libby, and then secretary of defense Cheney, who argued for readiness for preemptive military actions if required for preventing the “reemergence of a new rival” that threatened American interests.

Neoconservative norm entrepreneurs adopted a more invasive tone after 9/11. Richard Perle and Wolfowitz were at the forefront of this new neoconservative paradigm, arguing against “myopic and false realism that wrongly had sought accommodation with evil.” According to Wolfowitz, “the idea that we could live with another 20 years of stagnation in the Middle East that breeds this radicalism and breeds this terrorism is, I think, just unacceptable—especially after September 11th.” At the root of such statements lay the views manifested in Douglas Feith’s assertion that “terrorist organizations cannot be effective in sustaining themselves over long periods of time to do large-scale operations if they don’t have support from states” and thus to succeed in suppressing terrorist groups and organizations, the states that support these organizations should be suppressed and eliminated.

It is noteworthy that in 2002, when the US saw no threat from the Cold War period and the policies based on multilateral deterrence against the Soviet Union and its follower states, it needed a new normative structure for preventive and firm acts against new threats against American interests. Condoleezza Rice was one of the main advocates of this view in the form of the national security strategy of 2002. In constructivist view, such a deterrence was “less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.” Accordingly, “the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction” and Thus there would be a stronger argument for anticipatory actions to defend American interests. At that time, the US was justified for this exemption to international law by its extensive military power and moral legitimacy to take reciprocal measures against terrorist attacks on the US such as 9/11.

The fact that the proposed hegemonic paradigm, backed by the Bush administration, neither achieved its aims nor drew close to them confirms the failure of the norm. The neoconservative proposed paradigm met public opposition. It earned the opposition of the US European allies and Japan as well as Russia and China.

Therefore, the proposed hegemonic paradigm that was supposed to transform American strategic culture and its national security policy broke down, and the world entered a norm paradigm deriving from the Cold War-era strategic culture. Overall, it can be argued that the result of the above-mentioned test case was very disappointing to the point that it invalidated a norm that was advocated as the replacement of the Cold War norm.

Conclusion

For constructivists, strategic culture is the product of norms and culture-bearing units such as norm entrepreneurs. They believe that the United States invaded Iraq to replace the dominant strategic cultural norms crystallized under the logic of the Cold War with a new proposal propounding a democratic regime change for authoritarian states even through resorting to military force. During the Iraq War, the proposed paradigm of preventive war, backed by neoconservative norm entrepreneurs and traditional conservatives in the Bush administration, failed to replace the Cold War–era strategies of multilateral containment and maintenance of the geopolitical status quo. This norm was a part of a larger revolutionary strategy that advocated the policy of preventive war and the hegemonic paradigm, promoting the US hegemon of democracy through force. New international groupings such as “coalitions of the willing” and the national security strategy of 2002 provided the documents legitimating these new policies. Accordingly, the American strategic culture and national security policy became slightly in line with the proposed neoconservative paradigm, but presently they are returning to a version of the Cold War normative paradigm. In sum, based on constructivist view, the Iraq War not only was not able to illustrate the validity of a new vision of American strategic culture, but also undercut the paradigm it was supposed to elevate at global level.

Keywords

Main Subjects

References

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