The motivations behind Turkey A.K Party political-military campaign in Ninawa Province of Iraq

Document Type : Original Independent Original Article

Authors

1 Assistant Prof. at Law and Political Science University of Tehran

2 Regional Studies, Human Science Faculty, Tehran University, / Ph.D. candidate

Abstract

AK Party taking power in Turkey and Falling of Saddam and vacuum of power in Iraq took place almost at same time; after that political and security developments, we have witnessed a deep and multilayer campaign orchestrated by Turkey in Northern Iraq. In this regard Erdogan has cited to P.K.K. threat (as the military justification), Misak Ahdi Milli (as historic one), Baghdad-Ankara in 1980s (as the legal one) and dispatched Turkish land forces to 15 KM to Mosul; also Turkey has targeted many time by 200 KM within Iraqi territories by airstrike and Drones. This article is trying to answer the main question: “Why after Saddam falling and arousing of ISIS, Turkey has increased its military-political activities in Northen Iraq?”. To this end we have researched dozens of English, Persian, Arabic and Turkish sources and have come to this conclusion: Turkey by historic & identical motivations (emanating from Neo-Ottomanism Ideology), combined with Power-seeking preferences, has sought to expand its influence in Ninawa”. In other word, by using a descriptive-explanative method and utilizing Bayesian Realism as the theoretical framework, we have tried to illustrate whether Ankara is a greedy Actor or a Security Seeker in Ninawa.

Highlights

Introduction

There have been always conflicts in different parts of Iraq because of the role it plays in the Middle East geopolitics and regional and international power balance. These conflicts are noticeable in the current Turkey’s multifaceted political, diplomatic, security, military, and economic engagement (activities) in Iraq, especially in Nineveh Governorate. Turkish engagement has occurred in various periods of military operations in the Iraqi territory causing the establishment of a military base in Bashiqa, 15 km from Mosul and 90 km from Turkey–Iraq border. That said, the extent and type of the Justice and Development Administration/Party’s activities in northern Iraq and its true motive(s) have raised a number of questions and positive and negative stances (for and against Ankara). This paper sought to provide an answer to this main question: ‘Why did Turkey expand the scope of its political and military engagement in northern Iraq after the fall of Saddam and rise of ISIS?’ This paper aimed to classify Turkey under the Justice and Development Administration as a peace/security-seeking or a greedy actor according to the motivational (elliptical) realism. In line with this, we analyzed the data and information that could help us gain a better picture of the Turkish President (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) and his political and security policies about Iraq and the way he wishes to enforce them.

 

Methodology

To this end, this study adopting a descriptive–explanatory approach searched through library references and news and think tank sources in Turkish, Farsi, Arabic, and English to give a complete account of developments in northern Iraq and offer an informed explanation of the motivations announced and how they were materialized.

 

Results and Discussion

The research conducted revealed that the Turkish government, since its establishment in 1920s, have been voicing a claim on Nineveh in terms of its identity and history. However, the British presence and Ankara’s internal inabilities, Turkey has failed to hold sway over Nineveh. When the Ba’thist government started to decline in the mid-1980s, Turkey managed to gain a legal legitimacy for the expansion of its military presence in northern Iraq through a treaty with the Iraqi government. Afterward, Turkey was allowed to fight Kurdish opponents as far as 10 km into the Iraqi territory in 1984 and up to 25 km in 1999. After the fall of Saddam and the emergence of ISIS, Turkey gradually increased its territorial influence to 90 km in Iraq. In this process, Turkey cited its Misaki-i Milli (National Pact) to support its occupation and territorial expansion historically and legally. Frequently referred to by Erdoğan, Misak-i Milli asserts that Mosul and Kirkuk belong to Turkey. In addition, Ankara tries to attach identity to its engagement in Iraq under the pretext of defending the rights of Sunnis and Turkmens in Mosul and Kirkuk. In terms of security, Turkey has always expressed its concern over PKK presence in Iraq. All of the said items are included in Erdoğan’s Neo-Ottomanism Master policy. Over its decades-long engagement in northern Iraq, Turkey has mentioned the threat of terrorism more than any other factors; that is why most accounts/analyses consider Ankara’s actions legitimate and classify it as a pace/security-seeker.

So, in addition to the policies announced by the Turkish government, an examination of the said indicators distinguishing a greedy actor from a security-seeking one, can shed light on another aspect of Turkey’s true motivations. Regarding minorities, Turkey has repressed numerous Kurdish activities inside and outside the Turkish territory, which even included several unarmed activities. As for weak neighbors, Turkey built a base 90 km into the Iraqi territory and expanded the range of its air strikes to 200 km when Iraq was weakened. Ideologically, Erdoğan is not averse to implying a historical claim that Mosul, and even Kirkuk, belong to Turkey; he even broaches it by reference to the Misak-i Milli. All the above accounts/realities show that Turkey’s political and military engagement in northern Iraq cannot be interpreted as the actions of a security-seeking government; they are examples of a greedy government thirst for territorial expansion/expansionism. Instead of fighting against Kurdish fighters, Turkey seems to take these actions to materialize Neo-Ottomanistic ideals, create a power balance with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and gain access to oil and gas reserves in northern Iraq. In other words, even though Turkey emphasizes security to legitimize its air-and-land operations in the Iraqi territory, and introduce itself as a peace- and security-seeker, it is clearly tracking the Neo-Ottomanism Theory (Turkey making presence along the borders of the Ottoman Empire, not those of Turkey), insisting that Mosul and Kirkuk belong to Turkey, underscoring the importance of the Misak-i Milli, protecting Turkmens and Sunnis against the Popular Mobilization Forces (which is officially announced as a terrorist group by Erdoğan), and countering the Islamic Republic of Iran’s regional policies; all of these items prove Turkey seeks nothing but expansionism. So, Turkey is a greedy actor, and contrary to the cover it has taken, it remains in northern Iraq for reasons beyond mere security; the Justice and Development Administration paved the way for the transportation of the PKK forces to northern Iraq through two treaties. Turkey cooperated with, and not operated against, ISIS when it took over Mosul, and it even purchased oil smuggled by ISIS in an organized manner. Turkey even did not withdraw its troops from the Bashiqa base near Mosul when the Iraqi government and parliament raised their objections. These findings led us to the following conclusion:

‘With a mixture of constructivistic identity-historical motivations (derived from Neo-Ottomanism) and realistic power-seeking/authoritarian motivations, Turkey takes the form of a greedy, and not a security-seeking, actor to expand its sway over northern Iraq.

Ankara started its multifaceted, serious engagement in northern Iraq when the Justice and Development Party took power, Saddam fell, and a power gap was formed in Iraq. Erdoğan’s government has increased its area for its troops to 15 km from Mosul and for its drone and air strikes to 200 km in the Iraqi territory by invoking the PKK threat (security factor), Misake-i Milli regarding the Turks’ ownership of Mosul and Kirkuk (historical factor), and Baghdad–Ankara Hot Pursuit Agreement (legal factor). AK Party conducts these actions emphasizing that Turkey should respect Iraq’s sovereignty and should not be after its territory.

 

Conclusion

Adopting a descriptive–explanatory approach, this paper searched through library references, historical accounts, news reports, and think tank sources in Turkish, Farsi, Arabic, and English to provide an answer to this main question: ‘Why did Turkey expand the scope of its political and military engagement in northern Iraq after the fall of Saddam and rise of ISIS?’ In the end, the following conclusion was reached based on the findings: ‘‘With a mixture of constructivistic identity-historical motivations (derived from Neo-Ottomanism) and realistic power-seeking/authoritarian motivations, Turkey takes the form of a greedy, and not a security-seeking, actor to expand its sway over northern Iraq.

Keywords

Main Subjects

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