This article examines the process of British imperial policymaking in the Middle East after the First World War, with particular emphasis on the 1921 Cairo Conference. The central concern of the study is to explain how British political decisions were formulated and how administrative structures contributed to the creation of new systems of governance in Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. More specifically, the article seeks to answer the question of how imperial bureaucratic networks and mid-level officials shaped the decision-making process and influenced the formulation of British policy in the region.

Employing a historical-analytical approach and a three-level analytical framework, the study explores the interaction between the structural constraints of the British Empire, intermediate bureaucratic networks, and the agency of key actors. The findings demonstrate that political officers, Colonial Office administrators, and regional experts played a significant role in shaping policy options and guiding decision-making processes through the production, collection, and transmission of field-based knowledge concerning local conditions. In this context, the Cairo Conference served as a crucial arena in which these policy alternatives were consolidated and translated into concrete arrangements of governance across Britain's newly acquired territories.

The article argues that the governance structures that emerged in Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine were less the product of a coherent grand design for a new Middle Eastern order than the outcome of bureaucratic efforts to establish cost-effective, practical, and administratively manageable forms of imperial rule under the constraints of the post-war environment.