Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis
Highlights
Introduction
Iran’s relations with Latin America have been a subject of significant interest to both domestic and international researchers, particularly among scholars in the Americas. Among Latin American countries, Iran has maintained its closest and warmest relations with Venezuela. The unprecedented nature of this relationship across political, economic, cultural, and military dimensions has heightened international sensitivity, increasing the demand among political analysts and academic researchers for greater understanding of the objectives, strategies, and implications of this bilateral engagement. The most recent scholarly works published in English on this topic include those by Akbar (2022), Evan Ellis (2023), Moya Mena (2020), Defort (2020), Vianna De Azevedo (2018), Humire and Berman (2016), Karmon (2010), and Dodson and Dorraj (2008). A common thread running through all these studies is the emphasis on Iran’s presence in Latin America as a threat to the entire region, asserting that the United States and its allies must confront and counter this growing influence. Thus, these studies rely solely on political-strategic analysis and have largely neglected the economic dimensions of this relationship. Moreover, the primary focus of these articles is the Ahmadinejad presidency, with no comparative analysis conducted between Iran’s different presidents. This shortcoming is also evident in Persian-language research on Iran-Venezuela relations. Therefore, the questions that arise are as follows: How have Iran-Venezuela relations evolved across the three subsequent administrations, Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and Raisi? What have been the most significant similarities and differences? The main hypothesis of this study is that each Iranian government has highlighted certain elements that shape Iran’s identity while downplaying others, thereby altering its perception of Venezuela and the nature of bilateral relations.
Research Methodology
The data for this article are derived primarily from primary sources, including the General Administration of Iranian Customs, the Organization for Industrial Development and Trade, affiliated with the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade, the Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture, the Union of Exporters of Petroleum, Gas and Petrochemical Products of Iran, as well as interviews conducted by Iranian and Venezuelan officials with various media outlets. Secondary sources play a minimal role in the article, serving only to confirm statements or briefly reference findings from other authors. The research employs a comparative method, and its theoretical framework is based on constructivist theory. This theory emphasizes that shared identity elements between the two countries, such as revolutionary rhetoric, state-led economies, anti-American and anti-imperialist foreign policies, and Third World solidarity, have fostered common interests and shaped the dynamics of their bilateral relations.
Results and Discussion
The data indicate that Iran has experienced its warmest relations with Venezuela during the presidencies of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, followed by Ebrahim Raisi and Hassan Rouhani, respectively. The most significant joint investments under the Ahmadinejad and Chávez administrations included major financial initiatives and collaborative projects such as the establishment of a joint Iran-Venezuela bank with an initial capital of 1.2 billion dollars in 2009, a 1.5-billion-dollar contract for the development of Venezuela’s oil fields in 2010, and a 760-million-dollar agreement for cooperation in the South Pars gas field. Furthermore, a shared perception between the two sides regarding the necessity of reforming the international political and economic order, enhancing economic self-sufficiency among developing countries, and advancing South-South cooperation propelled them toward broader collaboration. In the oil sector during Ahmadinejad’s tenure, numerous memoranda of understanding and contracts were signed covering the construction of petrochemical units, the establishment of joint oil companies, participation and investment in oil and gas field development, the construction of an LNG plant, a 500-million-dollar agreement to build two joint methanol units, training of Venezuelan oil and gas personnel, transfer of technical knowledge and engineering services, and the purchase of petroleum products such as gasoline. According to the provided statistics, despite the growing impact of sanctions on Iran’s economy starting in 2010, export trends rose in 2011 and peaked in 2013 at 120 million dollars.
In contrast to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who placed Third World solidarity and South-South cooperation at the core of his foreign policy, the Rouhani administration prioritized engagement with the West and countries of the Global North, perceiving power and capital primarily in these states rather than in the Global South or developing nations. As a result, Iran-Venezuela political relations during this period remained largely "symbolic" rather than "substantive," never reaching the intensity or depth seen during the Ahmadinejad era. With diminished interest in advancing political ties with Venezuela, economic relations under Rouhani’s administration also declined significantly. The highest level of trade with Venezuela, which had reached 120.6 million dollars in the first half of 2013, dropped sharply in 2014 to just 20.383 million dollars, roughly one-sixth of its previous peak. A year later, this figure fell to its lowest point at only 85 thousand dollars and remained low throughout the period of sanctions against Iran. Similarly, Iran’s imports from Venezuela experienced a notable decline, peaking at around two million dollars at most. According to data from Iran’s General Customs Administration, Iran’s share of Venezuela’s total imports between 2014 and 2021 accounted for less than 0.2 percent of Venezuela’s overall import volume.
With Ebrahim Raisi’s rise to power, the domestic political landscape in Iran shifted. Iran’s revolutionary and anti-Western identity was reinvigorated, and fostering relations with Latin America once again became a priority. Like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Raisi sought to strengthen Iran’s international engagements by drawing closer to Latin American countries, particularly Venezuela, in order to bolster an anti-American alliance. Venezuela’s deepening isolation under intensified sanctions following internal political upheavals in 2018, along with Maduro’s growing need for political and economic support, further increased Venezuela’s interest in strengthening ties with Iran. According to statistics released by the Islamic Republic of Iran Customs Administration, Iran-Venezuela trade in 2022 experienced significant growth compared to 2021, increasing by 197 percent in dollar terms, 507 percent in Rial terms, and 49 percent in terms of weight. An overview of bilateral trade reveals that in 2022, Iran exported over 118 million dollars’ worth of various goods to Venezuela, elevating this trading partner to the 30th position among Iran’s trade destinations. During a meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart on June 13, 2023, Ebrahim Raisi announced that bilateral foreign exchanges had reached three billion dollars and expressed his desire to increase this figure to ten billion dollars in the first phase, and eventually to twenty billion dollars, though this momentum was halted following the tragic helicopter accident that claimed the life of the Iranian president.
Conclusion
The findings of the research indicate that Iran-Venezuela relations have flourished during periods when populist political ideologies and socialist economic outlooks, particularly distribution-oriented policies, have dominated Iran’s domestic agenda. What has given coherence to this relationship is a shared rejection of liberalism, capitalism, and the prevailing international order, coupled with a mutual inclination toward Third World solidarity, independence, and self-reliance. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that historical, cultural, religious, revolutionary, and anti-colonial struggles for freedom and sovereignty have played a significant role in shaping this bilateral affinity. Nevertheless, given the absence of structural foundations for establishing strategic relations between Iran and Latin American countries, it appears that these ties in Iran remain largely contingent on shifting political outlooks and will continue to experience fluctuations. On the other hand, as long as leftist and populist currents remain influential in Venezuela, the potential for advancing relations will persist. Otherwise, a distancing between the two countries, especially in the event of a rise in nationalist political forces (such as Juan Guaidó), would not be unlikely.
