Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis
Highlights
Introduction
In recent years, Southwest Asia has experienced profound transformations influenced by various political dynamics. One of the most significant trends in this context has been the process of US hegemonic decline, which has subsequently led to the adoption of an offshore balancing strategy. This behavioral outcome has resulted in a reduced direct US presence in Southwest Asia and increased pressure on its allies. At the same time, major events such as the Al-Aqsa Storm operation in October 2023 can be considered order-shaping developments, with implications for power balances, patterns of friendship and enmity, US strategic plans in the region (such as the Abraham Accords), and the role of great powers. One outcome of such developments in Southwest Asia, particularly following Trump's second administration and its aggressive regional policies, has been the emergence of a trend toward the "hegemonization of the Israeli regime"—a process through which Israel, with implicit US support, seeks to become the dominant regional power in Southwest Asia. Such trends and developments directly affect the position and interests of key actors in Southwest Asia, including the Iran and Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, the main research question is: How does the hegemonization process of the Israeli regime affect Iran-Saudi relations at the Middle Eastern level? The hypothesis of this paper is that Tehran and Riyadh, facing this common threat, exhibit balancing behavior based on the "balance of threat" theory, and that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) will serve as a favorable platform for the formation of a "dual-track coalition" between the two countries.
Methodology
This paper employs a mixed-method approach using an "exploratory case study" strategy. The theoretical framework is based on Stephen Walt's "balance of threat" theory and the concept of "regional hegemony." The primary research method is "critical discourse analysis" following Fairclough's model, which allows for the uncovering of hidden power relations, ideologies, and social actions within texts. The research data consists of five categories of sources: 1) statements from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (9 items), 2) statements from the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (11 items), 3) speeches by Saudi officials at the OIC (3 items), 4) speeches by Iranian officials at the OIC (3 items), and 5) published OIC documents and statements (4 items). The data period is from January 2025 (the start of Trump's second term and the intensification of the hegemonization process). Analysis was conducted at both micro-level (lexicon, verbs, metaphors) and macro-level (intertextuality and dominant discourses).
Results and Discussion
Over four decades, Iran-Saudi relations have been shaped by factors such as identity and geopolitical rivalry, evolving through a developmental trajectory. In recent decades, the interaction between the two countries has moved from hostility and costly proxy wars toward rational balancing and détente. In this process, the destabilizing role of the US and China's mediation within the context of great power rivalry have laid the groundwork for the restoration of relations and the formation of a new Middle Eastern order. Concurrently, the hegemonic decline of the US—exacerbated under Trump's second administration—has intensified the offshore balancing policy, which necessitates a reduced US presence in the Middle East. This power vacuum has paved the way for the hegemonization of Israel as the region's dominant allied actor. In such circumstances, analyzing the behavior of Iran and Saudi Arabia toward these trends reveals effective variables in behavioral analysis.
Findings from critical discourse analysis indicate that Saudi Arabia's discourse toward Israel in the period combines three domains: "legal," "moral," and "aggregative." In this discourse, the Israeli regime is described as an "occupying authority" and a "violator of international law," with verbs such as "condemnation," "warning," and "obligation" appearing frequently. In contrast, Iran's discourse is more revolutionary, moral, and based on Islamic propositions; Israel is characterized as "absolute evil," "child-killer," and "perpetrator of genocide," with "threatening" and "warning" verbs prevailing. Despite differences in tone and tools (Saudi conservatism versus Iran's confrontational pragmatism), significant commonalities exist between the two discourses: both countries consider the "growing threat of Israel" a common regional challenge; emphasize the "unity of the Islamic world"; and speak of "legitimizing collective action." These commonalities can be categorized into three areas: "shared other-making" (representing Israel as a hegemonic threat), "shared self-making" (the Islamic world as collective identity), and "legitimization of joint action."
According to the balance of threat theory, the emergence of the Israeli regime's hegemonization process—manifested in territorial expansionism, military threats against neighboring countries, and efforts to impose normalization agreements such as the Abraham Accords—has provoked a balancing response from Iran and Saudi Arabia. The March 2023 agreement brokered by China has provided a platform for détente and cooperation. Now, the OIC, as the most important Islamic international institution, has the capacity to become the platform for implementing a "dual-track coalition." Within this coalition, five key areas for institutional cooperation have been identified: 1) political and diplomatic pressure (Iran raising the issue of genocide and Saudi Arabia lobbying in the West); 2) international legal pursuit (filing lawsuits against Israeli officials at the ICC with Saudi financial support); 3) humanitarian aid to Palestinians (coordinated through the OIC); 4) official recognition of the State of Palestine (despite strategic differences, as a common ground); and 5) countering the expansion of the Abraham Accords and normalization with Israel. However, challenges such as differing perceptions of the threat's severity, geopolitical rivalries in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, and divergent views toward the West (especially the US) may hinder the full realization of this convergence.
Conclusion
This article demonstrates that the process of Israel's hegemonization in the Middle East—resulting from US hegemonic decline and Washington's adoption of an offshore balancing strategy—has created a common existential threat for Iran and Saudi Arabia. In response to this threat, contrary to their long-standing pattern of rivalry, the two countries exhibit behavior based on balance of threat. Critical discourse analysis of official texts from both countries from January 2025 onward reveals significant commonalities in representing Israel as a "regional threat," emphasizing the "unity of the Islamic world," and the necessity of "collective action." The OIC, given its founding history centered on the Palestinian issue and its institutional capacity, can serve as an appropriate platform for realizing a "dual-track coalition" between Tehran and Riyadh—a coalition in which Iran assumes the role of "maximum pressure" and Saudi Arabia the role of "legitimization and diplomacy." Five specific areas of cooperation—political pressure, legal action, humanitarian aid, recognition of Palestine, and countering normalization—are actionable. Overcoming challenges such as geopolitical rivalries and differences in foreign policy priorities is a prerequisite for the practical realization of this convergence. Overall, the article argues that, contrary to the strategic intentions of its architects, Israel's hegemonization may lead to the convergence of the two main powers of the Islamic world within the framework of the OIC.
