Document Type : Original Independent Original Article
Highlights
Introduction
During the ongoing transition of the international system, geoeconomics is gradually replacing traditional geopolitical competition. Unlike the Cold War era, where competition among great powers was based on military capabilities and ideological alliances, today economic tools—such as infrastructure investment, supply chain control, and technological standards—have become the main arteries of strategic influence. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to create an intertwined network of trade, energy, and digital corridors. The Persian Gulf region, due to its geopolitical sensitivity and hydrocarbon reserves, is a focal point for Beijing. Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” and the UAE’s “Projects of the 50” seek economic diversification and reduced oil dependence, aligning significantly with China’s goals.The main research question is: What opportunities, challenges, and strategic consequences has China’s interaction with Saudi Arabia and the UAE under the BRI produced, and how has it affected the region’s geoeconomic balance? The hypothesis is that the BRI, by intensifying “coopetition” between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for Chinese capital and technology, has become China’s primary tool for deepening its influence, while creating developmental opportunities and ultimately leading to “unequal interdependence” and a shift from a security-based regional order to a geoeconomic one.
Methodology
This research is descriptive-explanatory and employs a documentary/library-based data collection method. Sources include international economic reports (e.g., Chinese customs data, World Bank reports), content analysis of MoUs and bilateral agreements, and strategic documents from China, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The conceptual framework rests on three pillars: geoeconomics (the new logic of power), unequal interdependence (the mechanism of influence), and coopetition (the dynamics of Riyadh-Abu Dhabi relations). By adopting a triangular “China-Saudi Arabia-UAE” perspective, this article provides an integrated and structural analysis of the transforming regional order of the Persian Gulf.
Results and Discussion
China-Saudi Strategic Convergence: Bilateral economic ties have surpassed traditional oil buyer-seller relationships. Trade volume reached $107.2 billion in 2023, making China Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner. The synergy between Vision 2030 and the BRI has led to over 140 Chinese companies participating in infrastructure projects, a $10 billion petrochemical investment, a $5.6 billion electric vehicle agreement, and a $50 billion national currency swap deal.
China-UAE Strategic Convergence: The UAE has become China’s trade gateway to the Middle East and Africa. Bilateral trade reached $77 billion in 2022, and China is the UAE’s third-largest foreign investor. As a founding member of the AIIB, with a $10 billion joint investment fund and 13 MoUs signed in 2018, the UAE has positioned itself as the BRI’s logistics and financial hub in the region. 90% of the UAE’s non-oil trade is with BRI member countries.
Riyadh-Abu Dhabi Coopetition: The two Arab states simultaneously cooperate (to enlarge the regional “economic pie”) and compete (for exclusive investments, regional hub status, and supply chain primacy). Examples include rivalry over hosting Chinese corporate HQs, the 2021 OPEC+ policy disagreement, and competition between Saudi NEOM and the UAE’s Khalifa and Jebel Ali ports.
Opportunities, Challenges, and Consequences: The main opportunity is the synergy between the BRI and national diversification plans, helping Saudi Arabia and the UAE transition from oil-based economies while securing China’s energy security and new trade corridors. The primary challenge for the Arab states is the risk of “unequal interdependence” in technology and infrastructure; for China, it is balancing diplomatic ties with Iran versus Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The ultimate consequence is the redefinition of the regional order from a Western-centered, security-based structure to a multipolar, Eastern-centered geoeconomic order, along with intensified “coopetition” between the two Arab powers.
Conclusion
This research demonstrates that China’s interaction with Saudi Arabia and the UAE under the BRI is far more than bilateral economic cooperation—it is a coherent geoeconomic strategy. By creating “unequal interdependence,” Beijing has secured its energy lifelines and trade routes while deepening its influence in the Persian Gulf. The synergy between the BRI, Vision 2030, and Projects of the 50 has transformed this relationship from a desirable option into a necessity for the Arab states. However, the challenge of technological and infrastructural dependency risks the long-term agency of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The most significant consequence is the transition from a unipolar US-led security order to a multipolar geoeconomic order, where economic competition replaces traditional military alliances, and the Belt and Road Initiative has become the primary driver of this transformation in the Persian Gulf.
