Document Type : Original Independent Original Article
Highlights
Introduction
The European Union has always faced challenges in achieving a common foreign policy due to diverging national interests, domestic pressures, and cultural-political diversity. The Taliban’s return in August 2021 clearly exposed both convergence and divergence among EU member states. While shared values such as democracy and human rights (e.g., resolutions against Taliban violations of women’s rights) fostered convergence, pragmatic interests like migration control and geopolitical competition with China and Russia fueled divergence. Eastern European states adopted a tougher stance, while Germany pursued limited technical contacts to manage migration. The research hypothesis argues that EU foreign policy toward Afghanistan lacks absolute unity: it shows convergent behavior in condemning human rights violations, but divergence and fragmentation in operational engagement with the Taliban, migration priorities, and geopolitical competition. Convergence and divergence occur simultaneously. The article first analyzes key concepts including convergence, divergence, EU foreign policy, common interests, and political consensus. It then applies a theoretical framework of neoliberal institutionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, reviews EU-Afghanistan interactions from before 2001 to the present, and finally examines the factors driving convergence and divergence among member states regarding the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Methodology
Neoliberal institutionalism is a major theory in international relations. It argues that despite the anarchic nature of the international system, cooperation among states is possible and sustainable. Robert Keohane is the most influential thinker of this theory. States are the main international actors. Since they behave rationally, they seek to maximize their own interests. To achieve these maximum gains, states pursue cooperation and therefore establish institutions. Although these institutions impose certain constraints on states, they facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty and costs. In this environment, states seek absolute gains rather than relative gains. Moreover, institutions have their own independent power and role. Even though institutions are created by states to realize their interests, they can change the game and increase cooperation by providing more information.
Liberal intergovernmentalism is an international relations theory that emphasizes the central role of states in the European integration process. Andrew Moravcsik is the most famous thinker and founder of this theory. He explains the formation of the EU in three stages, all rooted in national interests. The first stage is national preference formation, where states define their preferences based on the economic interests of powerful domestic groups. The second stage is intergovernmental bargaining, where states negotiate. The outcome depends on the relative power of states; those with greater relative power have stronger bargaining leverage. The third stage is institutional creation, where states delegate their sovereignty to supranational institutions to reduce costs and ensure compliance. This delegation is voluntary, limited, and under state control. Thus, liberal intergovernmentalism sees European integration as a set of rational choices and agreements among member states to increase their national interests. States remain the main actors, and national interests prevail over EU institutional interests.
By combining these two theories, this research analyzes EU relations with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. On issues such as human rights and especially condemning the violation of women's rights in Afghanistan, we see convergence among EU member states. In such cases, neoliberal institutionalism succeeds: EU institutions demonstrate independent and influential power, increasing cooperation among European countries. In contrast, on issues like humanitarian aid and official non-recognition, pragmatic national interests of member states override a common EU foreign policy – reflecting liberal intergovernmentalism. For example, while the EU's common goal in humanitarian aid is to prevent a human catastrophe, some states use aid as a political lever to gain concessions from the Taliban. Therefore, this research applies neoliberal institutionalism to analyze cases of convergence and liberal intergovernmentalism to explain cases where a common foreign policy on Afghanistan fails.
Results and Discussion
The EU’s foreign policy toward the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan reveals parallel trends of convergence and divergence among member states.
**Convergence** is driven by three factors. First, the **post-2021 migration crisis** led the EU to adopt a collective strategy of non-recognition but conditional engagement. The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) standardized asylum procedures for Afghans, while joint border operations and information-sharing increased. Second, **regional and international rivalries** – Russia’s recognition of the Taliban and China’s economic-political influence – pushed the EU to coordinate more closely, including through the “Global Gateway” strategy in Central Asia to counter geopolitical vacuums. Third, **shared norms and values** – demanding an inclusive, democratic government and protecting women’s rights – resulted in unified condemnations via European Parliament resolutions. Additionally, **Afghan diaspora pressure groups** (e.g., Afghan Diaspora Initiative and women activists) lobbied European institutions, reinforcing convergence on human rights.
**Divergence** stems from four factors. First, **different national interests**: Western states (Germany, France) prioritize migration control and practical engagement with the Taliban, while Eastern European countries favor strict border and security policies. Second, **legal and human rights constraints**: the UN and EU non-recognition of the Taliban limits interactions to exploratory contacts, yet some member states seek to bypass these restrictions to address migration. Third, **domestic far-right pressures** – parties in Austria, the Netherlands, France, etc. – view any Taliban contact as a betrayal of national security, undermining EU unity. Fourth, **contradiction between humanitarian aid and security/counter-terrorism concerns**: some members want to cut aid to prevent Taliban misuse, while others argue cutting aid worsens poverty and extremism, creating a structural tension that perpetuates divergence.
**Conclusion:** EU policy toward the Taliban mixes value‑based convergence (on democracy and human rights) with interest‑based divergence (on migration, security, and practical engagement). European institutions succeed in convergence mainly on normative issues, but national priorities override common policy on geopolitical and security matters.
Conclusion
EU foreign policy toward Afghanistan contains both convergence and divergence, making it a difficult test for a common policy. The hypothesis is confirmed: EU policy is neither fully convergent nor completely divergent. Convergence occurs on human rights (especially women's rights), non-recognition of the Taliban, migration control, and geopolitical competition with China and Russia—explained by neoliberal institutionalism. Divergence appears on practical engagement, security concerns, national interests, domestic pressures, and geopolitical differences, notably between Eastern and Western Europe. Thus, EU policy results from combining neoliberal institutional logic with liberal intergovernmentalism. Achieving a unified policy requires balancing security, norms, and geopolitics. Afghanistan shows that the EU's future depends on managing value-national interest tensions and reducing divergence among member states.
