Document Type : Original Independent Original Article
Highlights
Introduction
A significant portion of Iran and Iraq’s population consists of Shiites, with the largest Shiite communities in the world residing in these two countries. Despite this shared religious and cultural identity, relations between them marked by conflict and tension. These tensions persisted until Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003, fueled by geopolitical disputes, nationalist and ethnocentric rivalries, and the influence of their respective political structures and the international system. Such conflicts overshadowed their religious commonalities and repeatedly brought the two nations to the brink of war, culminating in the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. Overall, relations between Tehran and Baghdad—from the Baath Party’s coup in 1968 to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003—were not only abnormal but often outright hostile. The fall of Saddam and the dissolution of the Baath Party following the 2003 U.S. invasion marked a turning point in Iraq’s relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, initiating a paradigm shift. With the transfer of power from Paul Bremer, the U.S. military governor, to a national Iraqi government led by Shiites, conditions emerged for a transition from conflict to cooperation. The ISIS invasion of Iraq and Iran’s subsequent military, advisory, and economic support to the Iraqi government fostered an existential security bond between the two nations. This bond quickly expanded into political, cultural, social, and economic cooperation, evolving into a new form of alliance distinct from past patterns, so-called soft alliance.
Methodology
This research used a qualitative approach and a descriptive-analytical methodology. Additionally, the data collection method involved gathering data from both documentary and library sources including written and online materials.
Results and Discussion
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Saddam’s ouster marked a pivotal moment in Iran-Iraq relations. Following the transitional period and the handover of power from the U.S.-led coalition to an Iraqi government, Shiites assumed political leadership for the first time in modern Iraq. This shift facilitated greater cooperation between Tehran and Baghdad. The withdrawal of U.S. forces (2007–2011) further accelerated this trend, elevating bilateral relations from mere cooperation to a soft Balance. A soft alliance does not entail alignment against a third party but involves cooperation against shared threats—both security and non-security. For instance, Iran and Iraq collaborated to counter ISIS, a non-state actor that seized territory in Iraq and Syria, posing an existential threat to both nations. This partnership exemplifies a soft alliance directed against a common enemy rather than other states. Unlike hard alliances, which are state-centric, soft alliances extend beyond governments to include sub-state actors. Given Iran and Iraq’s ethnic and religious ties, their relations operate at both official and unofficial levels (Mahmoudian, 2023: 304). Historically, political asymmetry and nationalist extremism in either country strained relations. However, post-Saddam, a symmetry emerged between the governments and peoples of Iran and Iraq, fostering deeper connections. While hard alliances focus on military cooperation, soft alliances are multifaceted. Iran-Iraq relations over the past two decades have prioritized identity and religious ties, rooted in their shared Shiite majority (approximately 88% in Iran and 60–65% in Iraq). These bonds facilitate cultural exchange, with many Iranians visiting Iraq for pilgrimage and Iraqis traveling to Iran for tourism, healthcare, and trade. The depth of these interactions has led scholars to describe the Iran-Iraq border as a "soft border" reflecting the erosion of rigid divisions. Another dimension of Iran-Iraq relations that has strengthened the transition toward a soft alliance is the economic aspect of their ties. Over the past two decades, Iran-Iraq relations have extended into the economic sphere and, in recent years, under the Islamic Republic's neighborhood policy, have become one of Iran’s top priorities. Hard alliances are based on military relations, where economic tools are used to alter behavior or even change the regime of the target country. Sanctions, which instrumentalize the economy in foreign policy, have shifted in function in recent years from a deterrent tool to a tool of warfare. In a soft alliance, the economy holds a special position, serving not as a means of unilateral dependence or a patron-client relationship but as a complementary tool for both countries. Since the post-Saddam era, the two countries have consistently been among each other’s largest trading partners, a trend that has strengthened over the past decade. Iraq’s total trade exchanges in 2023 exceeded 130 billion, withexportsaccountingforover130 billion, with exports accounting forever 84 billion (due to high oil exports) and imports around 45billion. Accordingly, Iran holds a 2045 billion. Accordingly, Iran holds a 208.9 billion in exports. Statistics show that over the past two decades, Iran’s exports to Iraq have grown at an average annual rate of 26%. The 8.9 billion in exports to Iraq in 2023 are a stark contrast to the 8.9 billion in exports to Iraq in 2023 is a stark contrast to the 30 million recorded in 1998. Meanwhile, Iraq’s exports to Iran have grown at an average rate of 16% over the past 25 years, rising from 30 million in 1998 to 30 million in 1998 to 1.1 billion in 2023. Over the past decade, Iraq has consistently been among the top five destinations for Iranian exports, with over 2,000 different types of goods exported from Iran to Iraq.
Conclusion
This article explains how Iran-Iraq relations transitioned into a soft alliance after Saddam’s fall. Despite historical and religious commonalities, political factors once drove the two nations into a protracted war. While other actors, including the U.S., invested heavily in shaping post-Saddam Iraq, Iran adopted a soft alliance strategy, reviving shared cultural and political ties through multidimensional engagement. Rather than pursuing a rigid, unilateral alliance, Iran expanded its relations with Iraq within a flexible framework. This alliance is reinforced by disaster diplomacy and para-diplomacy, fostering people-to-people interactions that have softened borders and laid the groundwork for future cooperation. However, alliances are not static; they can expand or contract based on regional dynamics. For instance, Iran’s health tourism market among Iraqis has recently faced competition from other actors, necessitating strategic adjustments. A key takeaway is that soft alliances should not be conflated with hard alliances. Overemphasizing antagonism could provoke regional counter-alliances, destabilizing the Middle East further. Maintaining the non-aggressive dimension of this partnership is crucial to avoiding unnecessary conflict and ensuring long-term stability.
Subjects
