International Studies Journal (ISJ)

International Studies Journal (ISJ)

The Pendulum Policies of US Asian Allies Toward China: The Case of the Huawei Crisis

Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis

Authors
1 Ph.D. Candidate, International Relations, University of Guilan
2 Associate Professor, International Relations, University of Guilan
3 Associate Prof. Political Science, University of Guilan
Abstract
In the post-Cold War era, no US competitor or ally achieved 60% of its GDP – except for China. This significant economic milestone and fundamental national differences between China and the United States marked the gradual deterioration of Sino-US relations, beginning during the Obama administration. Under the Trump and Biden administrations, trade competition escalated into a full-fledged technological rivalry. This study sought to address two central questions: why has the US initiated a tech war against China, with the banning of Huawei as a focal point, and how have Washington’s Asian allies (South Korea, Japan, and Australia) responded? Employing a descriptive-analytical approach, the analysis relied on extensive library and documentary research. Accordingly, the hypothesis was that given the US decision-makers’ determination to maintain its global hegemony in technology, the White House tech war with China is driven by two vital reasons: 1. preserving technical, economic, and military leadership in artificial intelligence (AI) and 2. restricting Beijing’s influence in global technological markets by fostering deeper cooperation with its allies. The study revealed that the responses of these three Asian allies of the US align with Washington’s broader strategic objectives toward China, particularly in sanctioning Huawei.

Highlights

Introduction

In the second decade of the 21st century, the global order witnessed the United States’ strategic efforts to reassert its hegemony in response to significant transformations in the components of the international system. Among these changes, the emergence of new members like China and its increasing influence on the global stage, particularly in technology, posed a direct challenge to the US-led liberal international order. To counter China’s expanding technological influence and decoupling it from global supply chains, the US has recalibrated its policies in the recent years. This study focuses on one of the most notable measures against China and its government-linked companies, the imposition of stringent sanctions on Huawei, a Chinese super corporation and the largest provider of communication services. Amid the intensifying Sino-US strategic rivalry, establishing a coalition of allies to confront the competitor can mitigate the costs for the involved party. Based on this view, Washington has drawn upon the strategic support of its allies and close partners to shift the balance of power, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. Among East and Southeast Asian nations, Japan, South Korea (China’s neighbors with a long history of ties), and Australia have emerged as pivotal actors, exhibiting strong alignment with US policies against China. These countries play an essential role in upholding the US-led liberal international system and their own security commitments. In this respect, the responses of the US allies to the growing global economic opportunities with China, particularly in strategic sectors, have become a pressing concern for both the US and its allies. This study examines the responses of the US and its Asian allies, South Korea, Japan, and Australia, to the global economic influence of China based on the concept of halo alliance.

 

Methodology

In this qualitative and descriptive study, the data were collected through extensive library and online research and then collectively analyzed.

 

Findings

Given the US decision-makers’ determination to maintain its global hegemony in technology, the White House tech war with China is driven by two vital reasons: 1. preserving technical, economic, and military leadership in artificial intelligence (AI) and 2. restricting Beijing’s influence in global technological markets by fostering deeper cooperation with its allies. It is noteworthy that sanctions against China, particularly bans on Huawei products, reflect the culmination of longstanding US concerns over China’s industrial policies, such as the Made in China 2025 initiative, which Washington perceives as serving the strategic interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While the United States boasts significant advancements in cyber technologies and vast financial resources, the threat still persists. The issue of cyber attacks on the US has always been a serious concern, but it was elevated under the Trump administration and continued under the Biden administration. Thus, the US, along with its allies (at different cooperative levels), seeks to further its capabilities to confront the competitive forces, i.e., China. The alliance halo provides a useful framework for understanding the dynamics of various responses of US allies to China’s technological strategies. They have formed similar norms, whether stable or shifting, in response to a relatively shared issue, i.e., the banning of Huawei. In fact, US allies have chosen to position themselves within this “halo” by aligning their policies with US objectives to counter China. However, in this confrontation, China occupies a nuanced position – it is neither a definitive adversary nor a clear ally to the US. Chinese policies still have the potential economic opportunities and remain outside the realm of direct territorial aggression against US allies. Consequently, the security risks posed by China’s economic strategies, apart from military factors, have prompted a policy of cautious alignment revolving around credible perceptions (Huawei crisis) among US allies. When divergences arise among the allies under the expectations created by the alliance halo, they consider the other ally untrustworthy.  This can be manifested in actions such as buck passing, adopting diplomatic restraint initiative, intra-alliance bargaining, threatening to leave the alliance, alliance entrapping, or, in extreme cases, terminating the alliance and pursuing or expanding nuclear arms.

 

Conclusion

From the US perspective, containing and controlling China’s influence is imperative. Since 2018, US policies have escalated into a new phase of economic sanctions against China, including Huawei, alongside increased tariffs on Chinese imports. Huawei, as a technological super corporation, has faced significant pressure, with US sanctions terminating collaborations between American companies and Huawei in both software and hardware domains. Importantly, several countries including US allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia have supported these sanctions, albeit to varying degrees. In light of the competition hypothesis, it can be argued that not all policies adopted by these three allies can be explained in full alignment with those of the US, proving the hypothesis to be incorrect. Based on the alliance halo and the findings, these US allies, rather than engaging in absolute adherence to the US directives, have formulated policies informed by historical and spatiotemporal conditions. Japan has adopted banning of governmental procurement of Huawei products. Australia has enforced a strategy of guided discretion for the companies. South Korea has implemented strict governmental and corporate banning and prohibition of governmental procurement of Huawei products at the discretion of companies. Strategically, their responses can be categorized as inhibiting China’s influence, actively confronting China’s influence, and maintaining strategic neutrality, respectively.

Keywords

Subjects


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