Document Type : Original Independent Original Article
Highlights
Introduction
Foreign policy is shaped by multiple factors, among which study seeks to elucidate the concept of “rationality” as a critical determinant. Given that within a political system, the political elite – operating at various hierarchical levels – bear primary responsibility for foreign policy decision-making, the depth, diversity, and quality of their understanding of rationality, along with the extent and manner of its application, can produce markedly distinct outcomes in foreign policy. These differences significantly influence the strategic trajectories charted for the society. Thus, analyzing foreign policy through the lens of varying conceptualizations and applications of rationality can, in its own right, influence the determination of the outcomes.
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the moderates emerged during the mid-years of the Iran-Iraq War[1] under the banner of Majma-e Oghala [the Forum of Rational Individuals] within the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Iranian Parliament), an entity that continues to operate to this day (Bastejani, 2020). Notable achievements attributed to the moderates include the cessation of the Iran-Iraq War[2] and negotiations surrounding United Nations Security Council Resolution 598[3], critical talks with Europe[4], efforts to de-escalate tensions with the United States during the Clinton[5] administration, the nuclear negotiations under Iran’s reformist government[6], and ultimately, the talks leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)[7].
A discourse analysis of moderation, with a particular focus on the role of rationality prevailing in the political climate of the Islamic Republic – largely oriented toward foreign rather than domestic policy – offers valuable insights into several dimensions of Iran’s foreign policy. This study specifically aims to scrutinize the nuclear negotiations culminating in the JCPOA, exploring them through the analytical lens of rationality as a guiding principle.
The main research question was: What is the relationship between rationality, as conceptualized in the Rawlsian framework, and the discourse of moderation in Iran? The hypothesis under examination posits that cost-benefit analysis, as a key component of rationality, underpins the emergence of moderation in foreign policy decision-making and practice. It is important to note that this study focuses specifically on John Rawls’s conception of rationality, excluding his broader theories on political economy and justice, which lie beyond the scope of this analysis. In essence, the arguments presented here center on rationality rather than justice.
The principal objective of this study is to elucidate a pivotal discourse in Iran’s political landscape, including its foreign policy – a discourse that appears to align closely with dominant discourses observed in other governments. This clarification sets the stage for the subsequent section, which conceptually explores the discourse of moderation and its counterpositions, offering a foundation for future scholarly works.
Methodology
Discourse analysis, as a methodological approach that reveals the surface structures based on modern grammar, examines the semantic constructionist structures, illuminating the underlying hypotheses, relationships, meanings, and strategies often concealed within texts. Rooted in a multidisciplinary tradition, this approach emerged in response to widespread scientific and epistemological shifts across disciplines that prioritize systematic investigations of the structure, function, and production processes of speech and writing (Fairclough, 2003).
Norman Fairclough believes that texts, first and foremost, have a totality on which they depend. In texts, there is a set of elements that are not only related to each other but also form a totality, which he refers to as discourse. Fairclough’s model comprises three analytical levels: description (revealing ideological predicates and positions of the text), interpretation (showing the interaction between text and context), and explanation, which is a macro level (the reciprocal influence of structures on discourse and discourse on structures) (Fairclough, 2003: 3).
At the first descriptive level, Fairclough focuses on words, syntactic aspects, and linguistic analysis of the text in search of “experiential values”, “relational values”, and “expressive values” within the text, what he calls “formal features” of the text. A distinguishing aspect of Fairclough’s approach, in contrast to poststructuralist perspectives, is his assertion that discourse is not solely a constructive phenomenon but also a product of other phenomena. This perspective underscores the dialectical relationship between discourse and other social elements (Jorgensen, Philips, 2010: 116).
In Fairclough’s view, ideology is “semantic constructs” intricately linked to the production, reproduction, and transformation of inequal power relations (Soltani, 2005A: 99). Accordingly, ideology is connected with discourse and language, which are means of meaning production, through meaning. In this study, parts taken from speeches, interviews, and writings by key decision-makers during the specified period in Iran were selected as representative samples of the prevailing discourse of the time. These texts were then analyzed through Fairclough’s method in three analytical processes – surface-to-surface, depth-to-surface, and surface-to-depth (Soltani, 2005B: 169).
Findings and Analysis
At the outset of the government of “Wisdom and Hope,” the primary focus was managing international tensions. This priority emerged as a response to the challenges posed by Iran’s placement under resolutions based on Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter[8], titled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” and its associated economic, political, and social ramifications. Against this backdrop, the discourse of de-escalation in foreign policy gained significant traction, resonating with the Iranians during the 2013 presidential election and securing a decisive victory.
Moderates in Iran advocate for a foreign policy grounded in rationality, defined as safeguarding the country and regime’s expediency through an optimized cost-benefit analysis of diplomatic decisions. While protecting the core standpoints of the state, they emphasize preventing collective opposition against Iran on specific issues or using them as excuses, setting the stage in favor of Iran, and addressing targeted challenges with tailored solutions by adhering to principles of mutual respect in international relations. This approach aims to position the Islamic Republic of Iran not as “part of the problem” but as a contributor to regional and global solutions through improved international diplomatic ties.
During this period, the moderate administration prioritized avoiding the escalation of tensions through political and legal strategies at the international level. They also sought to safeguard their legitimacy (exemplified by Iran’s adherence to its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) obligations for a year after the US withdrawal from the agreement, despite having provisions for compensatory actions within the JCPOA. Reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) substantiated Iran’s compliance). This restraint was part of a broader strategy to prevent the formation of a global consensus against Iran, ensuring the international narrative did not shift towards portraying Iran as “the criminal rather than the rightful” in the case of withdrawal from the JCPOA. The approach also secured global consensus in the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and the favorable ruling of the International Court of Justice.
This strategy was rooted in two key considerations: first, that escalating tensions did not align with Islamic Republic’s strategic interests; and second, that safeguarding international legitimacy would preserve opportunities for diplomatic engagement for a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue even beyond the Trump administration. In this regard, even during heightened tensions forced by the US, Iranian moderates consistently emphasized that sanctions and political pressures impeded development and that dialogue grounded in mutual respect was essential for peaceful resolution of conflicts (as shown in Table 1).
Within the discourse of the JCPOA under rationality, President Hassan Rouhani consistently conveyed Iran’s readiness to negotiate in pursuit of national interests and to reduce unnecessary tensions in foreign policy and economic pressures. He emphasized that if peace, compromise, and soft solutions of stopping conflict were possible, Iran would be ready to resume its constructive diplomacy.
Rouhani viewed security as a collective affair, asserting that moderation and balance, as demonstrated by the “win-win” framework of the JCPOA, could foster cooperative approaches to encounter global challenges. This vision was to introduce constructive interaction as the Islamic Republic’s principal policy, aimed to pave the way for the regional states to get out of the vicious circle of conflicts and Iranophobia[9]. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s chief diplomat and representative in foreign policy, particularly in the JCPOA negotiations, underscored the transnational nature of fundamental human issues and the necessity of cooperative solutions at the international stage in which all actors had to actively participate. Zarif dismissed unilateral approaches and zero-sum games as ineffective for addressing global challenges[10].
Rouhani’s approach in the JCPOA marked a pivotal shift in Iran’s international positioning. His administration successfully diminished Iran’s prominence as a focal point of international tensions, normalizing the nuclear program and framing it as a solvable matter through cooperative diplomacy. This achievement alleviated future pressures and potential consensus against Iran. During the initial nuclear negotiations, under Mohammad Khatami’s administration, the primary goal was to prevent the referral of Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council. A similar strategy underpinned the JCPOA, culminating in efforts to remove Iran’s case from first, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and second, the UN Security Council in one of the evenings of the JCPOA talks[11].
Conclusion
Critical discourse analysts aim to uncover underlying ideologies by critically engaging with the deep layers of a text, employing language analysis in conjunction with the historical and social context in which the text is produced. Accordingly, critical discourse analysis serves as a vital tool for sociopolitical transparency, elucidating social inequalities and their discursive manifestations. This methodology facilitates an in-depth examination and accurate description of the shared meanings reflected within and across texts. Its objectives include identifying the dominant ideological and discursive elements underpinning dominant political representations, exploring variations in meaning-making processes across different texts, and investigating the diverse strategies employed to observe and reflect these meanings.
Based on the findings of this study, if rationality is considered the central signifier within the discourse of moderation in the case of the JCPOA, the key elements orbiting this central signifier include the prioritization of national interests, de-escalation of tensions, fostering international consensus, achieving stable security, lifting sanctions, removing economic barriers, promoting multilateralism, cultivating international respect and cooperation, normalizing Iran in the region, and international peace. Nevertheless, the discourse of moderation designates some elements as factors that threaten the meaning stability of its chief discourse, i.e., rationality. Among these are the increased costs of abandoning JCPOA commitments, the potential for Iran’s political isolation on the international stage, heightened state costs due to escalating foreign policy tensions, delayed or unattainable stable security in the absence of soft diplomatic solutions, and the risk of Iran being perceived as “a part of the problem” rather than a constructive actor in the context of the JCPOA and other international issues.
Floating signifiers within this discourse, such as advocating for constructive interaction and collaboration with neighboring states to safeguard mutual interests, projecting Iran as a proponent of interactive foreign policy, and fostering international trust, contribute to its overall discursive order.
In the case of the JCPOA, rationality is the defining idea of this order, configured through commitments to constructive interaction, de-escalation of tensions, sanctions relief, and stable security for Iran.
Given that any discourse defines and solidifies itself by rejecting alternative discourses, the moderates shaped their foreign policy in the JCPOA around increasing benefits relative to costs and promoting rationality grounded in national interests and expediency. By articulating that, within the current domestic and regional context, political rationality and national interests necessitate the JCPOA’s acceptance, the moderates fortified their discourse while discrediting opposing narratives by associating heightened costs with rejecting the agreement.
In conclusion, the analysis of the moderates’ foreign policy discourse suggests that rationality functions as the central organizing principle, shaping and determining the configuration of other elements within their discourse.
[1] 1984
[2] With the acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution 598 in July 18, 1988
[3] Approved by the council of ministers’ Act 838T110318 in December 6, 1989
[4] Talks between Iranian and European Union political and economic officials that began after the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait (August 1990) and took place in Tehran, Copenhagen, Bonn, Paris, and Madrid, continued until the Mykonos restaurant assassinations (September 1992).
[5] William Jefferson Clinton (42nd president of the United States (1993-2001)
[6] The nuclear negotiations during Mohammad Khatami's administration with the directorship of Hassan Rouhani (then-secretary of the Supreme National Security Council) and presence of Mohammad Javad Zarif (then senior negotiator), Hossein Mousavian, Sirus Naseri, and Ali Akbar Salehi (then representative of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency), leading to the Saadabad Statement (October 20, 2003), the Brussels Agreement (February 23, 2004), and the Paris Agreement (November 14, 2004).
[7] From September 22, 2013 to July 14, 2015 (finalized) and implemented in January 5, 2016.
[8] When the eleventh president of Iran took office (August 2013), the Islamic Republic of Iran was under six UN Security Council Resolutions (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929), all of which were issued from 2006 to 2010 under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government.
[9] For example, refer to Hassan Rouhani’s speech, published on Tabnak in January 17, 2014 (Rouhani: We will confront Iranophobia, 2017).
[10] For example, refer to Mohammad Javad Zarif’s speech at the meeting with Iranian staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran embassy in Ankara, published on ISNA in August 29, 2014 (Zarif: Zero-Sum Games are over, 2014).
[11] The day the UN Security Council resolution ended ten years after the day the JCPOA was finalized, recorded in article 34 (Zarif et al., 2021 B:284).
Subjects
