Document Type : Original Independent Original Article
Highlights
Introduction
The Ukraine crisis has presented the EU with another serious challenge. In addition to other crises such as the 2008 financial and national debt crises, illegal immigration, Brexit, the emergence of right-wing parties in Europe, and the COVID-19 pandemic, the current crisis will significantly jeopardize the future of European convergence. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, explicitly recognized that the Ukraine crisis has exposed the EU's vulnerabilities, e.g., inflexibility, disunity, and a weak security policy. Some experts argue that the EU requires reforms in various policies, e.g., defense and military, to survive in an environment characterized by heightened geopolitical dynamics between strategic competitors and strategic partners. The EU's response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine was unprecedented and remarkably swift, demonstrating an unparalleled unity among its member states. Some interpret the EU's measures as a geopolitical awakening of Europe. For instance, French President Emmanuel Macron asserts that a pivotal moment has transpired in European societies, people, and initiatives. As a major geopolitical event in recent decades, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has profoundly affected the international system, particularly the security of Europe. Following its onset in February 2022, this war challenged numerous post-Cold War beliefs regarding European stability and security. The war in Ukraine, which brought new security concerns to Europe, dramatically disproved the long-held belief among Europeans that a full-scale war between European nations was highly unlikely. The EU has always sought to promote peace and stability in Europe; however, it is now forced to deal with new challenges such as emerging security threats, convergence of member states in crises, and management of economic and energy dependencies on Russia. In response to the new security environment, European countries increased their defense budgets, sent weapons to Ukraine, and changed their neutrality policy, all within a few days of the beginning of the Ukraine war. In other words, the annexation of Crimea to Russia and the war in Ukraine in 2014 can be construed as catalysts for increased unity among the EU's member states. However, there are still disagreements between the central and eastern EU states, who desire the imposition of more severe sanctions on Russia, on the one hand, and Russia's traditional partners in the EU, such as France, Germany, and Italy, who suggest diplomatic precautions, on the other. As a result, despite the EU's endorsement of the sanction regimes against Russia, many EU member states maintained their economic and political ties with Russia, particularly in the energy sector. That is why Brussels–Moscow relations suffered a decline following the 2014 war; however, the security preferences of the EU member states toward Moscow have not changed fundamentally. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 drastically altered the security priorities of the EU member states, particularly those of Russia's long-standing allies.
Methodology
This descriptive-analytical study addressed the stances of European states on the Ukraine crisis, their agreements and conflicts in this regard, and the future of the EU in the face of different crises, such as the energy crisis. This study comprehensively analyzed the status quo and future prospects of the Ukraine crisis, particularly from the perspective of the EU. It also investigated the historical events that have escalated into a crisis of the present magnitude, based on a review of available domestic and foreign references.
Findings
The EU has demonstrated its capacity to manage various crises over the last two decades, from the global financial crisis to the refugee crisis, terrorism, Brexit, and the COVID-19 pandemic. However, these events have resulted in the formation of nationalism and the emergence of far-right parties. The Ukraine crisis somehow precipitated the recurrence of previous crises within the EU. There have been divisions and differences in Europe as a result of each of these crises. For instance, the financial crisis exacerbated the divide between the North and South, whereas the immigration crisis accentuated the divide between the East and West. The Russo–Ukrainian War has elevated these crises to a new magnitude. Although the EU has attempted to exhibit appropriate reactions to these crises, they have caused new disputes among the member states, an important reason for these disputes is the dependence of the EU member states on Russian energy. However, the EU has unprecedentedly reacted to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, encouraging the European states to abandon their long-standing stance toward Russia. Any crisis in Europe, including the Ukraine crisis, exposes the vulnerabilities of the EU. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, European states have maintained their unity in imposing sanctions on Moscow and providing military, economic, humanitarian, and political support to Kyiv. However, this consistent approach will face a challenge if Trump takes office once again, which could lead to less US–EU convergence. Based on the assumption that the Ukrainian crisis is a catalyst for European unity, this study showed that the true measure of European unity would manifest in the forthcoming months of the war. It was much simpler to preserve unity in Europe at the outset of the crisis due to public outrage; however, the energy issues have made it seem increasingly challenging to maintain this unity. These issues will pose economic, political, psychological, and cultural difficulties and problems to European citizens. This can be attributed to the abrupt collapse of the post-war European notion promoted over the past three decades. The EU's success in the management of this challenge within the next year will establish a new balance of power between the EU member states and pave the way for the development of a new Russia-independent economic model for this union. As a result, Brussels can adopt a more assertive stance on Moscow. The recent agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan to increase natural gas imports from the Caspian Sea represents an effective initial step in this regard; however, the EU must undertake more measures. In other words, the EU may finalize an accord with Turkmenistan to construct a pipeline for transporting natural gas from Central Asia to Europe, circumventing Russia and Iran.
Subjects
