Document Type : Original Independent Original Article
Highlights
Introduction
While the Cold War bipolar system caused transient chaos and instabilities, it has been recognized as the most security-providing system of the post-Westphalia era in terms of its impact on intra-system order components. A major feature of this system was the expansion of the system model to regional subsystems. Basically, notions such as deterrence, order, security, containment, etc., were definable within this framework. The regional subsystems have also taken on some of the international system’s overload and carried it forward, thereby strengthening security subdomains. In this bipolar system, some security subsystems or regional systems were active but have received less attention. The Nordic balance system is among the most important yet neglected systems for maintaining regional peace and security. This subsystem depicted the Nordic security map through four decades (1949–1989). The security environment during this period necessitated that the foreign policy issues of all states be aimed at achieving similar goals, especially preserving peace and protecting the sovereignty of the states. However, the states avoided raising security and defense issues, which could jeopardize their cooperation in other areas and cause additional problems. The main question in this study is how changes in the Nordic balance system affect the strategies employed by Sweden and Finland as buffer states. This study hypothesizes that with Sweden and Finland joining NATO, the Nordic states’ historical-political buffering role has been transformed into bandwagoning. As a result, the Nordic region and the Nordic people have lost their security identities. This study is fundamental in terms of its purpose, descriptive-analytical-prescriptive in terms of the nature of its data, and library-based in terms of its data collection method.
Methodology
This research is applied and developmental in terms of its purpose. It is descriptive-analytical in terms of its methodology and library-based in terms of its data collection method. This descriptive-analytical study uses a securitization approach analyzed in the theoretical foundations section.
Research Findings
1- Regional Security Behavior of Small States
Being a buffer state is linked strongly with being a small country. These two variables are so strongly related to each other that one cannot be prioritized over the other. As a result, it is incorrect to claim that the environmental variables take shape first before a small country transitions to a buffer state. Basically, “buffer statehood is a condition of small states.” In other words, buffering is not an acquired characteristic of the buffering state; moreover, “these states do not choose to become buffers” (Ziring, 1987: 90).
2- “Buffering Statehood” of Finland and Sweden—A Sociological Outcome of Security
2-1- In-Between Two Big Powers
As mentioned above, the key role in the Nordic model was played by two buffer states. Located between the interests of the West and the East, Sweden and Finland played the role of “the heart of the Nordic balance system.” Meanwhile, the international powers recognized the role assumed by these two states. Thanks to this international recognition, Sweden and Finland also arguably functioned as “balance controllers.” They sought to prevent the dominance of “polar states” in the regional environment. For many reasons, including historical, cultural, social, and political ones, they could serve as a buffer between polar states, such as the Soviet Union on the one hand and Denmark and Norway on the other hand. In the meantime, a gray zone emerged that could potentially develop into a strategic and security gap at the international level (Geronik, 2014:2). For this strategic gap or security vacuum not to be filled by other polar actors, the buffer states themselves were the best-suited actors (which, due to the acceptance of their role by the polar powers), played a significant role as balance creators and order controllers.
2-2- The Significance and Role of External Factors
Even at the height of international conflicts during World War II, rebellious actors such as Nazi Germany recognized and respected Sweden’s neutrality and role as a buffer state HÄGGLÖF 1960: 153–167). The significance and function of external factors in maintaining Finland and Sweden’s international acceptance can be linked to the need on the part of external and great powers to maintain the buffer states’ position.
2-3- Neutrality and Territorial Protection
Finland and Sweden have long been regarded as buffer states. The geopolitical status of the Nordic buffer zone is critical because its geographical location can have a significant impact on conflict resolution, third-party intervention, and power politics (Beehner and Meibauer, 2016:1). Accordingly, small Nordic states find themselves in a dual geostrategic position: first, as buffer states (due to their location between great powers’ interests), and second, as peripheral states (due to their avoidance of polarization). Indeed, neutrality is an appropriate choice for a marginal state. In the post-Cold War era, Finland’s historical role of neutrality, imposed by the constraints of being a buffer state, assured Russia that Finland posed no threat to it and would not act as a conduit for Western influence. However, dangers spread from elsewhere.
2-4- Smallness of the Buffer State
“Sweden is regarded as a small country in terms of size, population, territorial extent, and military power; Sweden and other Nordic states are not considered large countries in terms of hard power components” (Rahmati, 2023: 75). These physical limitations have also influenced the security policy options available to these states. They have also had to adopt unique choices such as neutrality, balancing, regionalization, sub-regionalization, sheltering, bandwagoning, and formation of alliances with great powers or military-security institutions (Rahmati, 2023: 11-39).
2-5- The Geopolitical Bottleneck of the Buffer States
Given their peculiar geopolitical location, Finland and Sweden are in a “geopolitical bottleneck” state. This has rendered them perpetually vulnerable to Russian expansionism. Before February 24, 2022, both actors sought to strengthen their national and regional defense arrangements. However, Russia’s attack on Ukraine made a psychological shift in the Nordic region’s security macro-strategy. Thereby, these two actors prioritized multilateral extra-regional defense cooperation and NATO accession over national and regional security policies.
5-2- Strategic Ambiguity
As a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting geopolitical bottleneck for the Nordic buffer states, Sweden and Finland recalibrated their strategic choices (Binnendijk, 2020: 10). The decision to join NATO was a “sudden and unexpected” reaction to Russia’s aggressive war. In other words, Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO was an uncertain outcome of the interplay of certain factors in Finland’s political landscape and the international security environment. If public opinion had not shifted, or Russia had achieved greater success on the battlefield, Finland and even Sweden might have considered NATO accession to be highly uncertain and risky (Pesu, 2023).
Conclusion
Physical limitations have affected the security policy options of these buffer states. To escape strategic ambiguity, they regarded NATO membership to be on their security agenda. Finally, joining NATO was used to distance them from security uncertainty and reduce ontological risks.
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