International Studies Journal (ISJ)

International Studies Journal (ISJ)

China's Digital Silk Road Initiative: The Infrastructure for Chinese Digital Order

Document Type : Original Article from Result of Research Project

Authors
1 Prof, at Department of International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Khwarazmi University.
2 Post Doctoral Researcher at Department of International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
The digital order is emerging in addition to other pillars of the existing global order including financial, commercial, political, security, cultural, and cyber domains. Numerous actors, especially China and United States, as major global powers, are keen to implement their preferred models and standards in the global digital order. Continuing its overseas initiatives, including financial infrastructures and technological and health ventures, China has expanded an initiative called the "Digital Silk Road," which facilitates China's influence in the global digital sector. This article aims to elucidate how the Digital Silk Road functions in extending China's influence over the global digital order. It addresses the question: How has China's Digital Silk Road provided the infrastructure for a Chinese digital order? The hypothesis is based on the assumption that China's Digital Silk Road has contributed to the expansion of a Chinese digital order to secure greater benefits through introduction of the Chinese digital model, promoting Chinese rules in the digital domain, and implementing them across various regions of the world. The research findings, obtained through an analytical-explanatory method, demonstrate that China, by adopting an innovation mercantilism approach, has infused Chinese characteristics into the global digital order in both theory and practice. Thus, it sparked a strong reaction from proponents of the existing global liberal order.

Highlights

Introduction

In the 21st century, the decline cycle of U.S. hegemony as the leader of the global liberal order commenced with the endless wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). This decline is accelerated by the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the following Great Recession, as well as conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, and Libya post-2011. New pillars and issues—such as emerging technologies, cyber, and digital domains—surfaced within the global order, necessitating states, especially great powers, to establish their positions therein. In this context, China, as an influential actor, prioritized overseas initiatives and projects, including monetary and financial infrastructures (the New Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), the "Belt and Road Initiative," "Made in China 2025," the "16+1 Initiative," "China Standards 2035," and the "Health Silk Road." These initiatives signify China's agency in shaping the global order. Following these initiatives, efforts to play a pivotal role in digital transformations and the development of digital standards were also placed on China's agenda. The expansion of multiple programs for the growth of digital trade, an active foreign policy for international cooperation in the digital arena, focused investment in the digital sector, and the initiation of digital institution-building at the international level are among China's measures for effective presence in the global digital sphere. These initiatives paved the way for the inception of the "Digital Silk Road" [1] as a subset of the "Belt and Road Initiative" in 2015. This article aims to explain the role of the Digital Silk Road in the global digital order and demonstrates that Beijing, by introducing the Chinese digital model, promoting Chinese rules in the digital realm, and implementing them across various regions to secure greater benefits, has facilitated the expansion of a Chinese digital order.

 

Methodology

This study employs an experiential epistemology and an analytical-explanatory method, gathering credible evidence through empirical methods to elucidate the reality and relationships between variables. The research design began with an initial idea and evolved as the researcher's understanding of the subject deepened. Data were collected through library research, including specialized library searches, internet resources, and databases, to obtain the necessary theoretical information and literature.

 

Results and Discussion

Within the framework of the innovation mercantilism approach, China leverages all instruments of power in the global digital arena to establish the predominance of Chinese characteristics in the international digital order to reap associated benefits. Beijing endeavors to disseminate Chinese principles and standards within the digital order for gaining advantages and solidifying its position in the emerging digital order through rule-making, ultimately facilitating China's access to global wealth. Standardization, nationalism and support for state-owned enterprises, legislation, and the control of key procedures and flows in technology and digital domains are pillars of China's mercantilist approach to shaping the digital order. In advancing the Digital Silk Road, the Chinese government has devised and implemented measures that have empowered the nation in technology and global digitalization, setting the grounds for organizing a Chinese digital order through the introduction of new procedures and processes.

The Digital Silk Road encompasses the expansion of China's model of a regulated internet through legislation, surveillance, and technology. This initiative extends beyond physical infrastructures and includes the export of ideological principles regarding digital governance. By launching new initiatives such as "Made in China 2025," "China Standards 2035," and strategic plan for artificial intelligence development in the digital realm, China positions itself as a rule-making actor. Within the framework of the Digital Silk Road, China seeks to embed Chinese characteristics in the digital domain. The central feature of China's digital development policy is the "state-centric regulatory model," which aligns with the innovation mercantilism theory. Additionally, the export of digital techno-authoritarianism, digital nationalism, protectionist policies, and non-liberal rule-making are other attributes of the Chinese model for digital order formation globally.

China's preferred principles for the digital realm augment a non-liberal Chinese network within the global system, promoting clusters of non-liberal norms among various governments. China aims to cement its status as a global technology leader and to propagate its perspective on the norms and principles governing the digital domain through conceptualizing the Digital Silk Road, seeking a novel architecture at a global level.

Digital infrastructures aligned with Chinese norms and standards have proliferated globally through practical actions supported by the government. China extends its digital model via multiple instruments, including Chinese ownership of critical digital infrastructures in other countries that adopt Chinese-style norms and laws, and active participation in institutions that set technical standards. Furthermore, the Chinese government advances its mercantilist policy in technology by supporting Chinese companies, aiming to secure a superior role in the global digital order. In Africa, Chinese firms design technologies that establish Chinese technological standards within these countries. Collectively, countries in the Global South—including regions in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and coastal African nations—are focal areas for China's digital development with Chinese characteristics. China increasingly adopts stances divergent from the West and seeks allies for its position within the Global South.

 

Conclusion

China's innovation mercantilism policy within the framework of the Digital Silk Road has been pivotal in bolstering the development of China's digital sector through targeted industrial policies, practices of collaboration in technology, the digital industry, and introducing China's digital model globally. China's efforts to establish digital rules worldwide are founded on principles such as state-centrism, political control, the export of authoritarianism, protectionist policies, and nationalism, all of which are coherent within the technology mercantilism approach. The scope of China's activities has led to the formation of a network of governmental cooperation and non-liberal digital relationships, provoking reactions from the United States and proponents of the global economic-political order. Liberal countries, led by the United States, have mobilized in various ways to counter China's innovation and digital norms and standards globally. Currently, the promotion of norms associated with China's Digital Silk Road is expanding rapidly in African countries, coastal Africa, South Asia, Latin America, Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Central Asia, creating challenges for the interests of the United States, its allies, and democratic partners. It is estimated that intense competition will emerge between the liberal model led by the United States and its partners and China in shaping the digital order, which will impact the global technology and digital value chain.

Keywords

Subjects


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