International Studies Journal (ISJ)

International Studies Journal (ISJ)

The Application of the Missile Technology Control Regime in the Practice of the Security Council: A Case Study of Resolution 2231

Document Type : Original Independent Original Article

Authors
Sassan Seyrafi 1
Abdollah Abedini 2
Sara Vaez 3
1 Assistant Prof. at Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 Assistant Prof. and Faculty Member of the Institution for Research and Development in the Humanities (SAMT)
3 M.A. of Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran.
10.22034/isj.2024.453073.2165
Abstract
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a group of like-minded states that was established to prevent the proliferation of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The originating documents of the MTCR are not legally binding. Nevertheless, in the past two decades the UN Security Council has been on the path of making the MTCR binding through its sanctions resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In this context, Resolution 2231 (2015) is unique insofar as how the MTCR was incorporated into its structure and the tensions those MTCR-related provisions created between Iran and the Western powers. Thus, the question this paper aims to answer is how has the MTCR been applied in the practice of the UN Security Council especially in case of Resolution 2231 (2015)? The research findings indicate that by incorporating the MTCR Annex control list into the structure of its sanctions resolutions, the Security Council has used the MTCR as a tool to establish hard-law obligations for the purpose of non-proliferation of missile and UAV technology; obligations that are by far more rigorous than the MTCR’s own guidelines.

Highlights

Introduction

The term "multilateral export control regime" refers to voluntary arrangements between likeminded states, in order to prevent the proliferation of technologies related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons. Currently, there are four export control regimes, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in regard to the nuclear weapons and materials, the Wassenaar Arrangement in the conventional weapons context, the Australia Group concentrated on chemical and biological weapons proliferation, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in the area of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies. Still, among these regimes, the MTCR deserves special attention. The MTCR is a group of states (presently 35 states) that was established to prevent the proliferation of missile and UAV technology as WMD delivery systems. The MTCR was established under its originating documents -namely the MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex- in the 1980s. What makes this regime stand out is its application in the practice of the United Nations Security Council (SC) which, during the past two decades, has attempted to transform the MTCR into a binding regime through its legislative and sanctions resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Following the conclusion of the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by Iran and the P5+1 group, and the adoption of the SC Resolution 2231 in 2015, the policy of making the MTCR mandatory entered into new phase. Moreover, the integration of the MTCR control list into the structure of Resolution 2231 in paragraph 3 - as claimed by western powers- and explicitly in paragraph 4 of Annex B of this resolution led to the extreme political tensions between Iran and the western powers.

 

Methodology

The present study is a descriptive-analytical research using library resources. The research method is based on the textual and metatextual analysis of documents related to the MTCR, as well as related SC resolutions. In the first step, the legal nature and functions of the MTCR will be described based on its originating instruments. Afterwards, the integration of the MTCR in SC sanctions resolutions on Iran and North Korea will be analyzed. Thenceforth, the application of the MTCR in SC Resolutions 2231 will be examined.

 

Results and Discussion

Export control regimes are not legally binding. These regimes are informal arrangements between groups of like-minded states - mostly industrialized states - that voluntarily join these regimes in order to prevent the proliferation of technologies related to WMD and specific kinds of conventional weapons. Member states of export control regimes have no legal obligation to adhere to regime standards. The "originating documents" of export control regimes lack binding legal effect, they are merely recommendations that each member state voluntarily implements in its internal export laws and regulations, so that the transfer of items covered by the regime “list” is either prohibited or subject to a kind of special license that is granted according to the standards prescribed by the regime's “guidelines”. That is why the originating documents of export control regimes are considered as “soft-law” instruments.

Although MTCR-related sanctions on Iran were lifted by SC Resolution 2231, the MTCR played a key role in the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of its Annex B. Undoubtedly, the most challenging part of Annex B provisions were in paragraph 3 regarding Iran's ballistic-missile activities. In this paragraph, Iran was called upon to refrain from "any activity regarding ballistic missiles designed to be capable of launching nuclear weapons, including launches using missile technologies" for eight years. Western governments insisted on two positions regarding the interpretation of the above paragraph. First, any ballistic missile that is classified as a Category I system under the MTCR – based on the payload/range criterion is "inherently capable of carrying nuclear weapons". Second, space launchers (satellite carriers) are considered MTCR Category I systems due to technological similarity with ballistic missiles. As such, during the eight years of the implementation of paragraph 3 of Annex B of Resolution 2231, all ballistic missile tests and satellite launches by Iran were condemned as violations of Resolution 223.

Moreover, paragraph 4 of Annex B laid down a kind of licensing procedure regarding the transfer of MTCR-listed items from or to Iran. Although the validity of this licensing procedure was limited to 8 years and ended on October 2023, the fact that not a single transfer license for the listed items was issued according during this time, indicates the continuation of the previous Western policy of preventing missile and UAV technologies to Iran. More importantly, it should be kept in mind that due to the so-called "snap-back mechanism” under paragraphs 11 and 12 of Resolution 2231, the revival of MTCR-related sanctions as per SC Resolutions 1737 and 1929, is not only possible but very probable. The main point that can be learned from the implementation of paragraph 4 of Annex B during its validity period is that the functioning of the MTCR regime in the specific case of Iran is to prevent the transfer of ballistic missiles and drones from Iran to other countries rather than the reverse. This is ironic since the MTCR regime was formed to prevent the transfer of said technologies from regime member states to "countries of concern" such as Iran.

 

Conclusion

An examination of the Security Council’s practice over the past two decades indicates that the Western powers are perusing a policy of transforming the MTCR regime into hard-law obligations at the global level and the use of the Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter has been a key tool in implementing this policy. The sanctions resolutions of the Security Council against North Korea and Iran have been the main platform for the said policy. The positions of Western powers regarding the implementation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Annex B of Resolution 2231 can also be considered as an example of this policy, which aims to equate technology-transfer of WMD launch systems with the weapons themselves, so that the ground is laid for the development of a “hard-law” regime of non-proliferation regarding missile and drone technologies.

Keywords
Missile Control Regime
UAVs
Ballistic Missiles
Security Council
Sanction
Iran
Resolution 2231

Subjects

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