International Studies Journal (ISJ)

International Studies Journal (ISJ)

Sectarian Political Identity and Political Stability in Iraq: A Comparative Analysis of the Saddam and Post-Saddam Eras

Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis

Authors
1 Supreme NationPhD student, Department of Political Science, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.al Defence University
2 Retired Assistant Professor, Central Tehran Branch, Department of Political Science, Political Sociology, Tehran Branch, Center of Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Iraq has become a hotbed of conflict as a result of regional, national, and international trends and competitions. The political-sectarian identity crisis that was concealed during Saddam's reign has become the primary challenge of the Iraqi political society after the fall of his regime. A sociological investigation of these identities, especially among Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis, demonstrates that the political open space after Saddam increased their tendency towards “sub-sectarianism” to meet their demands and create identities of resistance against the government and the Iraqi national identity. Iraq's political identities are also concerned that political elites, as in the past, seek to establish an identity to dominate others. As a result, supranational identities have grown stronger, and post-Saddam Iraq has experienced more crises and political instability. These supranational identities have ultimately caused and added to the fragility of the Iraqi political system. Therefore, this descriptive-analytical study aimed to investigate the role of political identities in the political instability of Iraq in the post-Saddam era. The main research question was as follows: What was the role of political identities emerging in the post-Saddam era in the political instability of Iraq? Results showed that the emergence of resistance identities as a result of sub-sectarianism tendencies against the national government will lead to “political instability” in the future of Iraq.

Highlights

Introduction

Iraq is now at the center of developments in West Asia as a result of its political events, especially after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The US invasion of Iraq, transition to a fragile democracy, and a series of revolutionary movements in Arab states known as the Arab Spring in 2010 all resulted in the same outcome for Iraq: sociopolitical instability. The Iraqi political-sectarian identity played a major role in the continuation of this instability. In fact, the identity politics of Iraqi political elites both during Saddam's and post-Saddam's eras have underlain the continuation of this instability in Iraq. The political elites in both periods have tried to dominate the Iraqi society with a certain identity. During Saddam's reign, the Sunni-Baathist identity attempted to undermine other identities, which resulted in the suppression of identities and their subsequent transformation into fire under ashes. Iraqi political society is also concerned in the post-Saddam era that every identity attempts to establish itself as a prominent national identity in Iraq. The political instability of Iraq, regional, extra-regional, and international interventions, the supremacy of Shia, the rise of ISIS, and the independence-seeking activities of Iraqi Kurds are examples of such efforts.

Transnational identities have also played a major role in this regard. The nation-state gap has counteracted the national identity policy, which focuses on Iraqi identity. This situation fueled the expansion of factionalism against the ruling government and increased social divisions, which resulted in nothing but political instability in the post-Saddam era. This descriptive-analytical study seeks an answer to the following question: how have sectarian political identities affected the political stability of Iraq? The research hypothesis also indicates that the political identities emerging in post-Saddam Iraq have greatly affected the political instability of this country.

 

Methodology

This descriptive-analytical study employed Manuel Castells’ theory of triple identities as a framework to investigate the effect of political-sectarian identities on the political stability of Iraq in the post-Saddam era. The main research hypothesis indicated that the tendency towards factionalism against the national government, which formed resistance identities, will lead to “political instability” in the future of Iraq. This study considered three major identities in Iraq: Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite.

 

Findings

Iraqi Shiites faced increased pressure during the Saddam's reign. They were less appointed to important and high positions in the government, even though they made up the majority of the army and other government agencies. Arab states and international powers backed the Iraqi Baath regime's policy of restricting Shiites in both regional and global contexts. However, Shiites were no longer subject to political or social restrictions following the overthrow of Saddam; as a result, the future of Iraq is now linked to the Shiite issue. In Iraq, Shiites make up the majority of the population and religious identity. Some authorities claim that Shiites account for at least 60% of Iraq's population. Although they have not played a major role in contemporary political decisions made in Iraqi governmental systems, they have greatly influenced the country’s intellectual life as well as scientific, economic, and social development. After Saddam Hussein's regime was deposed, the Shiites took advantage of the opportunity to expand and deepen their political influence in Iraq by relying on their elements of power. Accordingly, no movement in the modern era can be influential or play an important role in Iraq without taking into account the Shiites and the country's peculiar political power structure. Above all, the Shiites have highlighted the need to advance Iraq’s political process by appealing to democratic norms and procedures.

 

Results

Iraq has traditionally been regarded as a mosaic society in which various ethnic and religious groups and different identities coexist peacefully. However, this peaceful coexistence gradually started fading from the 1950s and during the Cold War, when the international system was divided into two camps, communist and capitalist, each of which had its own policies, interests, approaches, and forces. The policies of the Baathist regime in dealing with other Iraqi identities and sects, particularly after Saddam came to power and emphasized the Baathist identity as the main circuit of developments in this country, intensified ethnic and sectarian conflicts as well as identity tensions in Iraq. Moreover, External factors took their part in the intensification of these conflicts.

It was expected that the Iraqi society would go through a converging process after the overthrow of Saddam and the formation of a modern government, in a way that different political, social, and identity groups coexist peacefully once again. Nevertheless, Iraq entered a new phase of political and identity instability that has persisted like fire under ashes until now and posed a variety of problems and crises throughout the country at various periods. On the other hand, political sectarianism and identitarianism in Iraq were among the factors underlying the occupation of this country by Takfiri-terrorist groups in the past years. Iraq has always been plagued by crises brought on by this problem, including political unrest, conflicts between different religions and sects, etc.

A review of the political background of Iraq's sectarian political identities in terms of political structure and sociology reveals that the inefficiency of the political structure in establishing a national identity comprised of all groups has resulted in a single cycle in the contemporary political history of this country. Accordingly, the new Iraqi governments have also experienced this history, that is to say, to make a catastrophe out of the critical issue of political-sectarian identities. Nation-state building in Iraq has always been accompanied by wrong decisions and long-term consequences because its ultimate goal was to ignore a large part of political society. There is only one outcome to the integration and marginalization policies in Iraq: “political instability”.

It seems that political instability and sectarianism will continue to rule Iraqi politics due to the securitization of political identities and the influence of foreign actors’ interests. Iraq should pursue political socialization around the shared national values if it is to undergo a peaceful transition process in which all political identities play a role; such an identity should include Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites.

Keywords

Subjects


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