Document Type : Original Independent Original Article
Highlights
Introduction
Following Davutoğlu's viewpoint, Türkiye has prioritized extensive engagement with its neighboring countries ever since the Justice and Development Party assumed power in 2002. As a result, Türkiye tried to strengthen its ties with the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Ankara–Baku relations deepened significantly during the 2020 Nagorno–Karabakh War, culminating with the Shusha Declaration. This declaration can be considered the cornerstone of Türkiye–Azerbaijan relations in the context of new developments. The Shusha Declaration explicitly articulates the alignment of overarching policy in the two countries' military, political, and foreign relations spheres. In essence, this document signifies a strategic alliance between Türkiye and the Republic of Azerbaijan. This research aims to explore the factors underpinning the formation and deepening of the Ankara–Baku alliance. It is hypothesized that geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocultural factors at the international, regional, and domestic levels have contributed to the formation and deepening of alliances between these two countries. This paper uses a three-level, three-domain theoretical framework and a descriptive-analytical approach to test the research hypothesis.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of this research is rooted in a tripartite, three-dimensional reading of geopolitics. Every nation encounters a system of threats and opportunities shaped by dynamic and varying environmental factors. These threats and opportunities manifest across three geopolitical domains: geopolitics, geoeconomics, and geoculture, operating at three levels: domestic, regional, and international. Within this system of threats and opportunities, states endeavor to mitigate or neutralize threats to the greatest extent possible while simultaneously maximizing the exploitation of opportunities. In this context, Mohiyoddin Mesbahi's tripartite, three-dimensional framework presents a distinctive reading of geopolitics, offering a trilateral perspective of the international system encompassing domestic, regional, and international levels, as well as interconnected yet distinct geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocultural domains. Threats and opportunities can propagate across different domains, cascading from regional and international levels to domestic spheres and vice versa. Furthermore, threats and opportunities within one domain can spill over into other domains. This theoretical foundation serves as a novel comprehensive reading of geopolitics, facilitating a comprehensive understanding of the factors affecting the formation of the strategic Ankara–Baku alliance at the domestic, regional, and international levels across the geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocultural domains.
Results
The factors underpinning the strategic Ankara–Baku alliance can be examined at domestic, regional, and international levels as well as in geopolitics, geoeconomics, and geoculture domains. In the geopolitical domain, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the US support for Türkiye were the initial elements binding Türkiye and Azerbaijan. However, Türkiye was not the most significant regional player in Azerbaijan. In other words, Russia's historical role as a key player in the success/failure of regional cooperation projects cannot be overlooked. Nevertheless, the Russia–Ukraine war has drained Russia of its political, economic, and soft power. The reduction of Russia's political, economic, and military presence in the Caucasus has allowed Türkiye to play a larger role in the region. Türkiye's involvement in Azerbaijan can be attributed to the geopolitical dynamics of the South Caucasus region, particularly the ongoing conflicts, as well as Ankara's competition with Russia and Iran. Ankara seeks to play an active role in the regional equations, especially in relation to Azerbaijan. The Second Nagorno–Karabakh War and Türkiye's substantial support for Baku provided a critical opportunity for both countries to deepen their bilateral ties. A shift in Türkiye's foreign policy strategy is another crucial factor contributing to the strengthening of Ankara–Baku relations.
In the realm of geoeconomics, a pivotal aspect of the Ankara–Baku relations is the bilateral cooperation on regional projects, particularly in energy production and transit. The Justice and Development Party in Türkiye perceives the Eurasian geopolitical landscape, especially Azerbaijan, as strategically significant. Turkish policymakers have been supportive of cross-regional initiatives. Concurrently, Baku seeks integration into the global economy. It has also aimed to establish a foothold in European energy markets. In essence, Baku's overarching goal is to assume an international role through the exploitation of its energy resources. Azerbaijan also intends to enhance its leverage over Armenia and diminish its own dependence on Russia by developing its resources. To achieve these objectives, Baku has tried to forge strong ties with the West through Türkiye. A further significant factor is the substantial investments made by both states in each other's economies.
In the geocultural domain, the geopolitical vacuum created in the region following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, coupled with the nascent state of national identity in Azerbaijan, presented a unique opportunity for Türkiye. Leveraging shared ethnic and linguistic ties, Ankara could forge a deep-rooted bond with Baku. Culturally, contemporary Turkish–Azerbaijani relations are characterized by a process of increasing integration, with Türkiye acting as the axis. Azerbaijan's victory in the 2020 Nagorno–Karabakh conflict, facilitated in part by Turkish support, had a profound psychological impact, enhancing Türkiye's image among Turkic-speaking populations.
Conclusions
A confluence of factors underpins the geopolitical alliance between the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Azerbaijan. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the bipolar system, the ensuing power vacuum, Azerbaijan's independence, Türkiye's frustration with EU accession and its subsequent pivot towards its periphery under Davutoğlu's doctrine, the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict, and Baku's demand to reclaim its occupied lands have all been pivotal. Geoeconomically, Ankara–Baku ties have been driven by Azerbaijan's energy exports and Türkiye's reliance on energy import and attempts to diversify its energy supply, exacerbated by the Ukraine War and Europe's energy crisis, and, in turn, the support of the US and Europe for the transfer of oil and gas from Central Asia and the Republic of Azerbaijan through Türkiye. Ankara's pursuit of Turkification of pipelines and ambitious economic projects, coupled with substantial mutual investments in regional projects, especially in energy production and transit, has further solidified the economic bond. Geoculturally, the strategic Ankara–Baku relations have profoundly been shaped by the post-communist ideological vacuum in Azerbaijan, US support for Türkiye's political and cultural model to counter the Iranian and Russian models, shared linguistic and cultural ties, the absence of national identity in Azerbaijan and the effort to compensate it by approaching Türkiye, and the pursuit of pan-Turkist aspirations by both Ankara and Baku.
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