Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis
Highlights
Introduction
Foreign policy analysis is generally considered a subfield of international relations. However, unlike the theories of international relations that focus on the major player, view the government as a uniform entity, and regard the international system as a whole, foreign policy analysis seeks to explain the foreign policies of governments based on small-scale theories and behavioral analysis of human entities (i.e., individuals and groups) as active agents in foreign policy. Accordingly, the outcomes of their actions are reflected in the actions or foreign policies of governments. Foreign policy analysis emphasizes the process of foreign policy formation, taking into account a considerable range of topics, e.g., culture, leading figures, media, influential groups, and public opinions. Organizational behavior is a model in this field that focuses on intra-governmental organizations to explicate the foreign policy of a given country, presenting it as the organizational output. In this model, organizational culture, priorities, processes, and capabilities form a government’s foreign policy, and leaders only coordinate and optimize decisions. Military organizations or armed forces play a key role in every government, guaranteeing the security and survival of the state in the anarchic international system. Therefore, studying the role of the armed forces in shaping the foreign policy of a government is of significant importance. Based on the “look to the East” policy as one of the major aspects of I.R. Iran’s foreign policy, the main research question was formulated as follows: How have the Iranian armed forces affected the adoption of the “look to the East” policy in Iran’s foreign policy?
Methodology
This qualitative study is characterized by a positivist or empiricist epistemological framework in which knowledge is derived from experience and observation. In this descriptive-analytical study, the data were collected from bibliographical references, e.g., books, papers, websites, and governmental reports.
Findings
I.R. Iran’s “look to the East” policy relies on two pillars: China and Russia. Since strengthening relations with China and Russia as the two major opponents of the US in the international arena is at the core of Iran’s foreign policy, the “look to the East” policy can be seen as the other side of Iran’s discourse of anti-Americanism. In Iran’s view, close ties with China and Russia can consolidate the front against the American hegemony, a stance that lies at the heart of this policy. In addition, opposition to the US is much more manifest in the security sector for Iran. This highlights the role of the Iranian armed forces as an organization directly associated with security affairs. Through its culture, priorities, and performance, I.R. Iran’s military organization has served as a prominent player in Russo-Iranian and Sino-Iranian relations. Regarding organizational culture, anti-Americanism has become the dominant discourse of the Iranian armed forces since the Islamic Revolution, and its practical outcome was the emergence of a process that emphasized challenging the US. In other words, the Iranian armed forces act as the leading organization in Iran’s opposition and conflict with the US. We could say that it is the conflict zone manifest. Organizational culture shapes the organizational priority. Accordingly, in the framework of anti-Americanism as the organizational culture of the Iranian armed forces, maximizing unbalanced military power against the US can be considered the organizational priority, which is also a primary goal of foreign policy in the armed forces. Rooted in organizational priority, organizational performance is the next crucial factor. The organizational performance of the Iranian armed forces’ foreign relations with China and Russia can be summarized in the following items: arms deals, joint military exercises, cooperation with China and Russia in the missile industry, and military cooperation with Russia in the Syrian crisis. This framework can fulfill the software (training) and hardware (equipment and arms) needs of the armed forces.
Conclusion
The results indicated that the organizational culture, interests, and performance of the Iranian armed forces affected the emergence and continuation of the “look to the East” policy. In line with the organizational culture of the Iranian armed forces, the Russo-Iranian and Sino-Iranian ties have fulfilled the needs of the armed forces (including training and arms), thereby reinforcing the Iranian armed forces in performing their main duty, i.e., safeguarding the security of I.R. Iran. The Iranian armed forces’ behavior has incorporated China and Russia into the task of safeguarding the security of the Islamic Republic. Relations with China and Russia have provided an opportunity for the Iranian armed forces to expand and develop Iran’s missile industry as the main defensive pillar of the country. When the Iranian armed forces were debilitated by the crippling sanctions against Iran, the expansion of Iran’s missile arsenal increased the cost of any potential US actions against the I.R. Iran, placing the US bases and forces in the region within the range of Iranian missiles. Therefore, countries participating in the Iranian missile industry have played key roles in bolstering Iran’s security. The same argument applies to the import of military equipment from Russia and China as it can make the Persian Gulf unsafe for the US forces and its allies. Some of the instances in this regard are naval mines and anti-ship missiles (ASMs). Whether used directly or as a model for localization and domestic manufacturing, such military equipment has boosted the anti-access capabilities of the Iranian armed forces. Therefore, the analysis of the Iranian armed forces’ behavior through the lens of organizational behavior indicates that it has served as a key factor in the emergence and continuation of Iran’s “look to the East” policy. Considered the fundamental agenda for Iran’s foreign policy today, this strategy can be considered the output of the organizational culture, capacity, priority, interests, and performance of the Iranian armed forces.
Subjects
