International Studies Journal (ISJ)

International Studies Journal (ISJ)

Impact of the US-China Strategic Competition on the Middle East Transitional Order

Document Type : Original Article from Result of Thesis

Authors
Khalil Ghalkhanbaz 1
Enayatollah Yazdani 2
Shahrooz Ebrahimi 3
1 PhD candidate, Department of Political Sciences, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran,
2 Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Sciences, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
3 Associate Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Sciences, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
10.22034/isj.2024.434442.2128
Abstract
The US-China strategic competition has escalated considerably since the second decade of the new millennium, prompting the US to turn its focus toward the Pacific region. This strategic shift has contributed to a multilayered disorder and a prolonged period of transition in the Middle East. This study investigates the ramifications of the US-China strategic competition on the evolving geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. The central research question explores how this competition influences the region’s transitional order. The hypothesis posits that the heightened US-China competition exacerbates conflicts, intensifies the security dilemma, and introduces multilayered strategic competition and confusion, thereby escalating regional tensions. Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology in this qualitative study, the data were collected through extensive library and online research to evaluate the sources and test the hypothesis. The findings reveal that the escalating US-China strategic competition has deepened the security dilemma, fostered conflict and competition patterns, and reinforced coalitions and alliances in the Middle East. Consequently, regional powers are increasingly striving to impose their preferred order as the dominant regional framework. Moreover, strategic competition and confusion have become the defining characteristics of the region, with little prospect for the de-escalation of tensions and rivalries.

Highlights

Introduction

Following the optimistic era of US dominance in the 1990s and the subsequent developments of the early 21st century, US policymakers recognized that the People’s Republic of China would soon pose a substantial challenge to American hegemony. Accordingly, Washington prioritized confronting China’s rise. This strategic competition has had significant implications for the regional order of the Middle East. Historically, the region has been vital to the US for various reasons, including maintaining the security of Israel, ensuring unfettered access to oil and energy resources, countering dissidents and competitors, preventing the regional powers from becoming hegemonic, and facilitating peace between the Arab states and Israel.

However, since the 2010s, regional actors have increasingly perceived that the Middle East has lost its former strategic importance for the US. They believe that Washington is limiting its presence in the region through various methods and pivoting towards the Pacific region. This perception was reinforced by Barack Obama’s signing of the nuclear deal to reduce regional tensions, Donald Trump’s promotion of the Abraham Accords, and Joe Biden’s first annual speech and his efforts to prevent the expansion of conflict following the October 7th attacks (Operation Al-Aqsa Flood) and Israel’s subsequent retaliatory actions in Gaza. Biden’s stance indicated a desire to extricate the US from the protracted crises of the Middle East.

The primary research question of this study centers around the impacts of the US-China strategic competition on the Middle East’s transitional order. The hypothesis posits that the intensifying US-China competition has heightened the security dilemma and introduced a complex, multilayered strategic competition in the region, leading to increased alliances and coalitions, and facilitating the emergence of new influential regional and global actors, escalating tensions.

 

Methodology

In this descriptive-analytical qualitative study, the data were collected through extensive library and online research to evaluate the sources and test the hypothesis.

 

Findings

The findings reveal that the US-China strategic competition has engendered strategic confusion in the Middle East. This confusion has affected the regional rivals, complicating relations among regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel with the prolonged transitional regional order. Additionally, it has unsettled US regional allies regarding the nature and extent of their relationship with the US. Amid the conflicting interpretations of the US’s new approach towards the Middle East and the real or illusory perceptions of its diminishing presence, regional actors now seek to fill the perceived power vacuum, thereby intensifying regional conflicts.

Moreover, the extended transition period and transitional order in the Middle East coincides with a broader transition in the international system, marked by the US-China strategic competition. This dynamic has fostered a multilayered strategic competition in the region, involving not only regional powers but also trans-regional and sub-state actors, leading to increased conflicts among the major regional powers. The diminished trust of the regional US allies has led to strategic confusion in the relations of the US and Arab states, further spreading this confusion throughout the region. This strategic competition has also strengthened regional alliances, with many Arab states increasingly aligning with Tel Aviv, and introducing other major global powers into the Middle East. The US-China competition has driven the US to de-escalate tensions between Arab states and Israel, promoting peace accords. Consequently, the shared goal of curtailing Iran’s influence has aligned the interests of the Persian Gulf states with Israel, enhancing prospects for close security cooperation.

Moreover, some trans-regional actors like Russia and China seek to expand their influence. Russia has actively extended its regional footprint, while China has opportunistically pursued a cautious yet strategic approach to expand its role, forging military and economic agreements with key states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Despite these engagements, China has maintained a balanced stance, avoiding overt alignment with Iran while cultivating relations with its regional competitors like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The US-China competition has exacerbated regional conflicts and the security dilemma, marking conflict as a defining characteristic of the Middle East. Persistent disorder, extreme confusion and a lack of prospects for de-escalation of tensions characterize the region, with regional competitors continually escalating tensions and furthering conflicts. These tensions have heightened between the regional powers and the sub-state groups have become significant actors in these conflicts, complicating the landscape. While there was an intense rivalry and cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia before March 2023, today, Tel Aviv stands as the prominent opposing state against Iran's growing regional power.

The increased regional arms race, driven by the need to safeguard state sovereignty and counter adversaries, is a notable aspect of the post-US-China strategic competition era. During this prolonged transitional period and disorder and confusion, regional states have significantly boosted arms purchases and pursued nuclear capabilities to establish a balance of terror. As a result, the Middle East has become a powder keg, where any incident could trigger widespread conflict and war.

 

Conclusion

The ongoing increasing strategic confusion and competition have activated tension-creating dynamics that exacerbate the security dilemma, leading to intricate balancing acts, prolonged regional transition periods, and intensified rivalries between the major regional powers. This has resulted in a multilayered strategic disorder and confusion and significant developments in the relations of regional powers with each other and with global powers. The strategic confrontation has institutionalized an arms race and entrenched the security dilemma in the relations of the regional states. Regional powers have set to heighten the regional arms race and increasingly turned to major world powers as a balancing act. Other major global powers intend to fill the power vacuum in the region, aggravating the security dilemma in the Middle East. The Arab states seek to diversify their security guarantees and are forming alliances with Tel Aviv as a counterbalance to Iran. In some cases, these regional actors have assumed leading roles in shaping the region’s dynamics. In conclusion, the US-China strategic confrontation has created substantial strategic confusion among major Middle Eastern powers, escalating tensions between Iran and both the US and certain Arab states and Israel as they vie for establishing regional hegemony and dominance.

Keywords
US
China
security dilemma
strategic competition
strategic confusion
Middle East

Subjects

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