International Studies Journal (ISJ)

International Studies Journal (ISJ)

The UN Human Rights Council and the Architecture of Global Governance

Document Type : Original Independent Original Article

Authors
1 Ph.D. Student in International Relations ,Faculty of Law and Political Science. Kharazmi University
2 Associate Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.
3 Researcher, Fundamental Governance Studies Group, Governance Studies Office, Research Center of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), Tehran, Iran.
10.22034/isj.2026.517556.2334
Abstract
The plural social spaces that have emerged in global governance around particular norms interact with one another and, through these interactions, contribute to the formation of the architecture of global governance. Within this architecture, human rights, as a fundamental normative domain, provide a basis for interaction among different blocs. In this context, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) constitutes a central institution within the architecture of global human rights governance. The main question of this article is how the UNHRC has influenced the architecture of global governance. The study aims to explain the role and position of the UNHRC within the architecture of global human rights governance and to identify the mechanisms through which the Council influences states’ compliance with human rights norms. Drawing on the communities of practice perspective and employing an explanatory–genetic research approach, the study seeks to contribute to policymakers’ understanding of human rights within the networked architecture of global governance. The findings demonstrate that the UNHRC plays a significant role through its interaction with actors situated in other blocs of the architecture of global human rights governance. Through these interactions, states may be encouraged to comply with human rights norms either through persuasive mechanisms, such as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), or through systemic pressure, including the interaction of Special Procedures and fact-finding missions with coercive institutions.

Highlights

Extended Abstract

Introduction

Over the past several decades, global governance has moved increasingly beyond a centralized and hierarchical model, operating through a multilayered and networked arrangement in which formal and informal institutions interact in shaping international affairs. Human rights are no longer understood solely as matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of states or as concerns governed exclusively through conventional intergovernmental relations. Rather, human rights governance is shaped through the interaction of international institutions, monitoring mechanisms, civil society networks and transnational actors. Respect for human rights has consequently become more than a legal obligation. It also serves as a measure of the legitimacy, credibility and standing of states within the international community.

Global human rights governance, however, lacks an integrated institutional structure. It consists of dispersed institutions and mechanisms which, despite different competences, rationales and instruments, contribute to the production, interpretation, monitoring and implementation of human rights norms. The central problem is how to connect these dispersed components and transform the information, assessments and findings generated by different mechanisms into an effective influence on state conduct. In this context, an institution capable of mediating between the production of human rights knowledge, intergovernmental dialogue, political pressure and international accountability assumes particular importance.

The United Nations Human Rights Council has acquired significance within this institutional setting. It serves as a forum for interaction and assessment among states and, through the Special Procedures and fact-finding missions, as a source of specialized information and analysis concerning human rights situations. It also makes such material available to other international institutions. Yet the Council’s significance within the architecture of global governance cannot be adequately explained by viewing it merely as a monitoring body or an institution issuing recommendations. The central question of this article is how the Human Rights Council, through its various mechanisms, connects different components of the global governance architecture and thereby advances respect for human rights norms.

The article argues that the Council is not simply supervisory, but operates as a community of practice and as an institutional intermediary. Through socialization, social learning, information validation, reputational costs and systemic pressure, it helps bring state conduct into closer conformity with human rights norms.

 

Methodology

The study employs an explanatory–genealogical method. Its genealogical dimension examines the formation and transformation of the relationship between the Human Rights Council and the architecture of global governance. It traces the Council’s development from a predominantly intergovernmental body into a center of interaction among states, independent experts, international bodies and local actors. The explanatory dimension analyses the mechanisms through which the Council influences the perceptions, calculations and conduct of states.

The theoretical framework is grounded in the theory of the community of practice. From this perspective, norms are not established solely through formal rule-making or direct sanctions. They are also formed and internalized through sustained interaction, shared experience, practical knowledge and processes of social learning. The Human Rights Council provides an institutional setting in which dialogue, mutual assessment, knowledge production and the development of shared understandings concerning appropriate state conduct can be repeatedly performed and reinforced.

 

Results and Discussion

The findings indicate that the Human Rights Council performs its mediating and connective function through three principal mechanisms. First, the Universal Periodic Review primarily reveals the Council’s persuasive mode of operation. Under this mechanism, states are subjected to peer assessment, receive recommendations from other states and participate in an ongoing discussion of their human rights performance. The significance of the Universal Periodic Review lies not only in its recommendations, but in the continuing social learning and socialization it sustains. Through this process, respect for human rights enters governmental policy agendas and becomes relevant to calculations concerning international credibility and standing. The Council thus creates conditions for the gradual modification of state conduct through dialogue and reciprocal assessment, without resorting directly to coercion.

Second, the Special Procedures establish a link between specialized human rights knowledge and the political sphere. Special Rapporteurs and independent experts engage directly with states through country visits, communications, reports and, particularly, quiet diplomacy. These practices provide states with an opportunity to respond to allegations and undertake corrective measures. At the same time, by bringing violations to light and placing them on the international record, the Special Procedures increase the reputational costs associated with non-compliance. Their significance also lies in their ability to translate technically complex human rights concerns into a form that can be communicated to political institutions and to other components of the global governance architecture. This information therefore does not remain confined to the expert domain, but can enter political agendas and serve as a basis for action by other institutions.

Third, fact-finding missions perform a function that extends beyond ordinary reporting when they address grave and systematic human rights violations. Through documenting events, identifying patterns of abuse and collecting credible evidence, these missions contribute to combating impunity and facilitate the transmission of their findings to international judicial and political bodies. Fact-finding transforms dispersed information concerning human rights violations into a documented, verifiable and usable account capable of supporting accountability processes.

The relationship among these three mechanisms is particularly important. The Universal Periodic Review, the Special Procedures and fact-finding missions follow different institutional paths, but they are not isolated from one another. Together, they enable the Council to move between persuasion, information production, reputational pressure and systemic influence. The Council’s connective role therefore arises not from any single procedure, but from the way in which these procedures allow information, assessments and findings to circulate across the wider architecture of global governance.

 

Conclusion

Within global human rights governance, the United Nations Human Rights Council is not merely an institution for monitoring states or issuing recommendations. It is an intermediary and connective institution that brings states, international bodies, independent experts and local actors into interaction. Its principal function becomes visible through this process of mediation: information concerning human rights violations is produced and validated through the Council’s mechanisms and is then transmitted through international institutional networks, where it may be converted into political pressure, reputational costs and a basis for accountability.

The Council’s effectiveness should therefore not be assessed solely by reference to the legally binding character of its decisions or its possession of direct enforcement powers. Its deeper influence lies in its capacity to foster community formation, promote social learning, shape shared meanings and impose political costs on states responsible for violations. Through these capacities, the Council connects the dispersed elements of global human rights governance and transforms respect for human rights from an abstract commitment into a factor with practical consequences for the political, reputational and international calculations of states.

Keywords
Subjects

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