International Studies Journal (ISJ)

International Studies Journal (ISJ)

Dominance of Bab Al-Mandeb; Houthis Geopolitical Weapons in Confrontation with Israel Regime and Its Allies

Document Type : Original Independent Original Article

Authors
1 ministry of foreign affairs
2 Tehran University, Law and Political Science Faculty
10.22034/isj.2025.504055.2289
Abstract
Although the principle has always been that the strong actor wins the battle field, sometimes the weak actor has been the winner of the battle field by taking advantage of some advantages; Like the Houthis in Yemen. They have been fighting with the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia in the domestic arena for years. During the Gaza crisis, they have tried to play a role in regional issues by taking advantage of Yemen's proximity to the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab strait and to improve their position at this level as well. During Israel's attack on Hamas, the Houthis tried to force Israel to end its attacks by leveraging geopolitical threats. According to these issues, the question that arises is how they took advantage of the dominant geographical position to achieve their goals. In response to this hypothesis, it is proposed that the Houthis, by taking advantage of the geopolitical advantage of maritime dominance and disrupting the process of control and governance of the great powers over the maritime communication lines, threatened their commercial, energy and maritime security and caused their vulnerability. The findings of the research showed that the Houthis, by attacking commercial ships and oil tankers passing through the Bab al-Mandab strait and disrupting the supply and fuel chain, caused the vulnerability of international maritime, economic and energy security and put Israel's western allies in a dilemma, which can be a factor to exert pressure to end Israel's actions.

Highlights

Introduction

According to the fundamental principle of international relations, power means victory in war, and in asymmetric battles, especially when the relative power gap is very large, the strong actor must always win. But history reveals a different reality. In almost 30% of all asymmetric wars, weak actors have won the field. Some believe that the reason for this is the actor's determination, will, and relative interests for survival and the resulting political vulnerability. In battles where the survival of the strong actor is not at stake, it has less will to win, which increases the level of political vulnerability In contrast to, the risk of the survival of a weak actor makes him more determined to win, which makes him less vulnerable. In explaining the reason for the success of the weak actor, some emphasize the strategies adopted by it to analyze the enemy's resistance capacity and overcome it . Strategies such as direct defense or guerrilla warfare strategy.  In addition, the mastery of geographical situations in the form of opportunities can influence the adoption of policies, strategies, and political choices of actors to achieve goals. Access to seas, straits, and waterways is one of the spaces that clearly shows the impact of geography. The fact of the superiority of the weak actor with a geographical advantage can be seen in the case of the dominant actor of the seas and waterways. Thus, this actor, by virtue of his mastery, can attack wherever and whenever he wants by disrupting the enemy's communications. It always tries to limit the maritime control and supervision of the actor whose interest is in using maritime communication routes. Attacking the isolated naval forces of the adversary or targets such as merchant ships of the navy, which requires spending a lot of money to maintain the maritime trade and impose on that actor, is an example of these efforts. Dominance even makes it possible to challenge the powerful navy by taking advantage of new and relatively cheap technologies. The Houthis in Yemen are the weak actors who, taking advantage of Yemen's proximity to the Red Sea and their control over Bab al-Mandeb, have tried to disrupt the maritime communication route in the area to bring in Israel to end their attacks on Gaza. The research seeks to answer the question of how the Houthis use their geographical dominance to achieve their goals. The research hypothesis is that the Houthis, through the geopolitical advantage of maritime dominance, threaten the great powers by disrupting maritime communication lines and threatening the commercial, energy, and maritime security of the great powers, and take steps to achieve their goals by increasing their vulnerability.

Methodology

This descriptive and analytical article, which has been conducted in a qualitative manner using library and online resources, seeks to describe an example of a weak actor's attempt to use the advantage of maritime dominance and make a strong actor vulnerable to meet its demands.

Results and Discussion

By disrupting maritime communications through selective drone and missile attacks on ships transiting to Israel or in the service of Israel, the Houthis forced them to take a long alternative route around Africa, which, in addition to imposing large transit and insurance costs, has jeopardized commercial and economic security by disrupting the supply chain. Attacks on oil tankers and ships carrying energy and creating a crisis in the energy markets threatened the energy security of countries that import energy from the Middle East, especially European countries that are heavily dependent on these resources. The diversion of transit ships to routes around Africa that are highly prone to piracy and the increase in the number of actions by pirate groups against commercial ships and oil tankers have disturbed the maritime security of the region. This issue has doubled the situational effect of the Houthis' actions and has caused the insecurity to intensify.

Conclusion

The findings of the research indicate that the Houthis, by taking advantage of the geopolitical advantage of dominating Bab al-Mandeb, which is the link route between Asia and Europe, and posing a threat to international security, energy, and sea, and consequently putting Israel and its Western allies in a bind, have paved the way for increasing international pressure against Israel to end their attacks.

Keywords
Subjects

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