

Comparing Elections Within The Algerian and Iranian Political Systems: Electoral Structures or Super Structures?

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Introduction

Comparison is considered one of the methods used in social sciences to research and discover in order to formulate broader or more general hypotheses. From J. Stuart Mill to G. Sartori and Arend Lipjart there is a considerable literature on comparison¹. One of the principle rules of comparison is the necessary existence of common and uncommon properties between the objects to be compared and that the former should include at least some essential features of both objects.

Algeria and Iran are not countries that readily spring to mind when

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we think of making a comparison. Nevertheless, some comparative studies have been made on these two countries especially dealing with political Islam but not only² in this aspect. For our part, we are interested in revealing certain characteristics of these two countries that are not usually emphasized in monographic essays and which, we believe, could shed new light on transitions from semi-authoritarian countries.

From a theoretical perspective, we aim to deepen the body of knowledge on electoral systems as subsystems in themselves and as one of the connecting gears of the larger political system. To do so we pose a series of questions on the nature of the elections in both countries: participation, regularity or clean elections (e.g. ballot-box stuffing, busying in of voters, multiple voting, voting of the deceased and so forth), democratic conditions, fairness, openness and relevance. We then explore the relations between the electoral and the political system with the ultimate goal of assessing whether the electoral systems function as key structures or mere superstructures of the political system.

What are the similarities on which we base our comparisons? They can be summed up as follows: a medium socio-economic development, a rentier economy (hydrocarbon-oriented), post-revolutionary and post-mobilization regimes and the existence of dominant non-political apparatus (the Army and the clergy). What are the differences? Where do they lie? They can be better seen in Diagrams 1, 2 and 3 and listed as following: State legitimacy (double, political and religious in Iran, and simple, merely political in Algeria³, the sunni-shii divide and its political implications, the absence of political parties in Iran and the role of religion in the conduct of political activities.

All this invites a deepening in the study of the two countries that according to the indicators available on political trends and democratization display, paradoxically, similar or antithetical results. For instance, for Freedom House and the Bertelsmann Foundation,⁴ neither Algeria nor Iran are considered democratic countries. Both indicators place them at similar levels of political transformation, economic change and civic liberties. But if we examine other indicators such as Polity IV⁵ we find that Algeria and Iran get perfect opposite scores, very positive for Iran although below democratic standards (4 out of 11 for democratic consolidation, 1 out of 11 for autocratic consolidation) and very negative for Algeria (1 out of 11 for democratic consolidation, 4 for 11 for autocratic consolidation). This all leads us to think that a comparison may yield up interesting results that account for such a resemblance and yet such contrasting results.

In order to make our comparison, the periods we chose to cover are respectively the so-called "second Iranian republic" starting in 1989 after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the pluralist Algerian period that took off also in 1989 with the end of single party politics, was interrupted in 1992 and restored in 1995 lasting to present.

Elections as mirror of political systems

In other words, polls can be viewed as a reflection of the whole political system, as a lubricating part of the political system that at the same time reproduces its most salient elements. Let us examine this in our two cases:

In Iran, electoral rules depend on two established principles of

the political game. They are the absence of political parties *stricto sensu* and the person-based institutional filters which influence the electoral results through the admission of the number and political orientation of candidates. These filters reveal the pre-eminence of the Council of Guardians, responsible for the application of the filters;⁶ it is without doubt the decisive decision-making body in Iranian politics. The filters not only convey this, but also express the centralized model of state organization (as the lack of a chamber of territorial representation testifies) and the communitarian (therefore separated) conception of ethnic-religious groups (visible in the functioning of two electoral colleges, one for the shii majority and one for the remaining five (5) religious minorities).

The dissolution of the Islamic Republican Party – the only one that had managed to survive since the Revolution – obeyed Khomeini's interest in preventing the concentration of absolute power in a party-like structure able to control the different State institutions. Therefore, the consequent absence of formal political parties was replaced by alliances and electoral supports from politico-religious groups and associations. This has resulted in a very flexible and changing structure of political factions, which have not remained at all constant throughout the seven legislatures to date. The very electoral formula used in Iran, consisting of uninominal candidatures, is conceived so that no group or political faction could claim an electoral victory and condition through party discipline all legislative votes during a given term.

For their part, the eight presidential mandates, not coincident with the legislative terms, have generated periods of cohabitation in a number



of occasions, making more difficult the approval of government cabinets and the execution of government policies. The flexible and blurred limits of each faction sometimes duplicate and contradict the support given from different political associations to candidates. For example, one group may give its support to contending candidates or conversely one candidate may receive support from two contending groups.

The electoral system also reflects the dominant conception of power in the political system. Given the existence of person-based filters, the possibility of participating in the elections basically depends on the proximity of candidates to groups of power, either through friendship ties, revolutionary militancy, parenthood or belonging to the clerical-bazaar-military elite.

In Algeria, the nominally proportional electoral formula tends to create paradoxically large majorities, ideally suited for strong presidential leadership. Parliament is neither electorally nor constitutionally conceived as a potential balancer to the executive. Instead, it is only allowed to leave space for small but inoffensive voices of opposition. Since there are two main officialist parties (FLN and RND), once the winning party obtains the majority of seats, the opposition has to share with the second officialist party the remaining seats. Being divided, opposition parties can only represent and voice small electorate's interests.

The Algerian electoral model reflects as well the importance of the Presidency, manifest in the application of candidate filters and the supervision over electoral regularity. The Constitutional Court, the organ in charge of these missions, is clearly influenced by the President,

who can use it to eliminate dangerous adversaries in the presidential race.

An interesting feature of the Algerian political system is the saliency of platforms and alliances in the presidential competition. Facing a very tough process of selection, many parties decline to present their main figure and instead rally behind some of the most powerful candidates. This gives place to presidential alliances that may become government alliances when successful. The fact that one single party (for example, the FLN) presents two (2) or more candidates as happened in 2004 and 1999 demonstrates that party support is not decisive in the final result. Parties are weak and their backing is in no way sufficient in itself to secure presidential election. In fact, it has become habitual in the last few years, in keeping with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's disdain for political parties, that candidates base their campaigns on other elements such as personal and local platforms, army allegiance and the State apparatus. What really makes the difference is the privileged access to State resources as Bouteflika's recent re-election bears eloquent witness. The decision to vote for presidential candidates is not therefore linked to party preferences⁷, which makes the Algerian case different from presidential, semi-presidential and even Arab presidential regimes such as the Egyptian or the Tunisian where the President clearly proceeds from one dominant party. It also brings it closer to the Iranian case, where election victory cannot unequivocally be claimed by any particular political group.

The nature of the electoral systems

Competitive and participative elections. Algerian elections are formally competitive but exclude political parties which respect constitutional order and condemn violence, such as Taleb Ibrahimi's Wafa wal Adl or Sid Ahmed Ghozali's Front Democratique. This is not to mention any eventual successor of the FIS willing to become legal, despite the latter's rejection of violence since the San Egidio Platform (1995) and its armed section's dissolution in 1999. Clear proof of this is that on release from prison the FIS leaders Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj were forbidden the exercise of any political activities in Algeria. Therefore, not all the existing parties and political forces are contestants in the elections even though the legal framework does certainly allow for it as long as they do not subvert the Constitution.

The question of whether the filters are clean and transparent is another matter (See Table 3). The recognition of political parties is conditional on their acceptance of a series of constitutional principles regarding the core structure of the political system (republicanism, triple national identity (Arab-Muslim-Berber), democracy, rejection of violence, power alternation, etc.) and to the holding of a party congress to choose their leaders. However, the filter for presidential elections is truly severe and consists of presenting a large number of signatures either from deputies to local assemblies or from simple citizens (75,000, in this case). A single signature of a passer-by, the man in the street as it were, is not sufficient as this person must also provide a receipt proving residence in the place of signature collection. The doubtful point is that this second condition opens a considerable margin of discretion for

the authorities to invalidate part of the 75,000 signatures presented by a candidate.

Participation in the Algerian elections has been falling since the restoration of electoral processes in 1995. It has done so in a very alarming way; significant falls in turn-out in all types of elections and reaching almost 20 points in the Presidential polls (see Table 2). Another issue concerning how legitimating the elections are is the problem of the excluded vote. Due to a particular mode of vote count (the "Hare" formula with an electoral threshold and double conversion system for local and national elections), a very large percentage of votes (up to 30% on one occasion) may be ignored in the conversion of valid votes into seats. This means that a theoretically proportional system produces a very majoritarian bias as though it functioned with a double electoral barrier. The fact of excluding so many votes during the count-conversion process makes it possible to multiply the ratio between the percentage of votes and the percentage of seats for the parties that managed to pass the "double" threshold. It therefore amplifies the disproportionate nature of representation and enables parties with moderate popular support (around 30%) to rule with a majority in Parliament. The exclusion of such an important number of votes discourages small candidatures and voters who seek alternatives.

In Iran, the filters to pre-candidatures, established by the Council of Guardians and often very strict and do not allow the representation of all sectors of society. Leftists, liberals and secularists are normally excluded. The criteria used by the Council of Guardians are normally deliberately both unclear and arbitrary, preventing anti-system

candidates to run in the elections.

Participation, according to official data, would normally legitimise the results, at least from a quantitative point of view since turn-out has exceeded 50% in all polls (See Table 1). Electoral participation is a fundamental element to assess the population's acceptance of the conditions set by the regime and its confidence in the political class to promote change. This is why in a regime such as that of Iran, established in a revolutionary process and maintaining a limited participation out of the political elite, each poll is considered to be a plebiscite not only by the Iranian rulers but also by Western analysts.

Since the creation of the Islamic Republic twenty-four (24) elections have been called in which the participation of the entire population was required, leaving aside the complementary elections to cover vacant positions. In Table 1 it is possible to appreciate the difference in participation rates according to election type and time period when they have been carried out. The highest participation percentage in all the electoral processes was that of the Referendum for the Islamic Republic in 1979, with a 98.32% turn-out, according to the information of the Ministry of Interior. The second more important rate of participation was the seventh presidential election in 1997 that elected Mohamed Khatami as President and marked the beginning of a process of popular mobilization.

As a whole, the elections to the Assembly of Experts are the elections with the lowest turn-out, clearly showing the scant interest that these polls have for Iranian society. The last electoral processes that have been carried out demonstrated a clear drop in the electoral participation,

mainly in Tehran, as mentioned above. The second municipal elections of 2003 showed the lowest participation rate (after the elections to the Assembly of Experts) with 49.17%, while the seventh legislative election of 2004 barely reached 51%, endangering the legitimacy of an electoral process that was already highly controversial for the veto of great quantity of candidates introduced by the Council of Guardians.

Democratic elections

In Algeria the true positions of power are occupied now as under the one-party system by high-level bureaucrats, technocrats and high-ranking officials of the Army. Political leaders as such, that is, charismatic persons are *rara avis* and there is a marked scarcity of them in the political parties. The confrontation of programs and ideas within the parties is something incipient that is far from consolidating. More debate takes place in the media, however, especially in the press, because it channels varied postures from all political forces.

In the Iranian case, the recruitment of political leaders is intra-elite. The functioning of the institutional filter precludes the possibility that a leader not accepted by the elite could participate in the electoral process. The written mass media are the tribunes from which the different candidates express their ideas and political opinions. The newspapers are generally linked to pressure groups (Islamic associations, professionals and commercial bazari) and they represent political lines or factions.

Open and fair elections

The inequality in the use of public resources was in fact what


decided the result of the last elections in favor of the incumbent, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Although the election was technically clean, the campaign and the pre-campaign were the occasion for this candidate to make a mass tour through the interior of the country where promises were made and the infamous "envelopes" were distributed. The opposition candidates could scarcely match with Buteflika having managed to organize 85% of the total number of rallies. Also, the media did not always respect the proportional screen quota laid down by the law. Therefore the use of public resources in favor of the incumbent candidate was decisive. On the other hand, this factor has passed more unnoticed in previous elections.

The Iranian electoral results are determined by three factors: 1) the candidate's passing of the electoral filter, for which reason he/she should necessarily be considered systemic; 2) the support that different factions, political associations and press-media express in his/her favor and 3) the participation of voters during the electoral process.

Regular conditions (clean elections)

In Algeria there are three mechanisms that monitor electoral regularity: the Council of State, the Constitutional Court and the National Commission for Electoral Supervision. There have also been international observers in several of the last elections. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court is an organ visibly dominated by the President, because he directly appoints three of its members (including the Chair) and influences through the presidential third of the Senate and the majority party of the two chambers in the appointment of the remaining

6 members. The National Commission for Electoral Supervision represents the parties and electoral platforms, and for that reason it is not a strictly official organ. It faces two problems; one is the lack of definition of its composition since the countless personalist platforms that have given their support to Bouteflika weighed as much as the same political parties, thus removing validity from the organ's representativity. On the other hand, this commission only can observe and take note while lacking powers of sanction. As for the international observers, they have not usually been very numerous and in the last elections they came for the most part from diplomatic circles of the Arab League and the African Union. The reduced number of 200 observers for more than



40,000 electoral colleges obliges us to be prudent about the statements of total cleanness that these observers issued.

In Iran it is the Ministry of Interior which organizes the elections and publishes the results. Nevertheless, these are not valid until the promulgation of such results by the head of State. There is an Electoral Council under the direction of the Council of Guardians, that is, the organ in charge of supervising the whole electoral process.

Relevant elections

This may be the most important question in Algeria because the legislative elections, theoretically vital, have no repercussion at all in the government's formation. It is the President who decides when and how to build up his government. Following the American pattern of presidentialism, although obviously not its larger implications, the Algerian President makes and unmakes his government largely at will. He can appoint chief of government the head of a party that is not the most voted candidate; and he can do this regardless of when the legislative elections take place. Therefore, the Algerian case is very far from the parliamentary regimes where the government is formed and should be drawn from legislative elections. And far too from the semi-presidential French model in which the government, being elected by the Parliament, may become a serious counterweight to the President of the Republic, who cannot dissolve it at his own will and must rule in cohabitation with governments of different political

The experience of the Iranian reformist period embodied in Mohamed Khatami's presidency (1997-2005), the Sixth Majlis (2000-2004) and the first municipal elections (1999), has demonstrated that the capacity of the elected institutions in socio-economic and political

transformations are very limited. The elitist structure of the Iranian political system, with the Council of Discernment, the Council of Guardians and the Velayat-e Faqih (Iran's supreme leader), still rules the structure of power and guarantees its stability and survival as an elite. Therefore, the elections are not very relevant as a generator of permanent institutional change.

In the two reformist presidential terms the mobilization generated a popular pressure over the institutional filter allowing the entrance of many candidates that were not part of the elite and that would not have been able to enter otherwise. However, the system was retrenched closing the filter again and those not belonging to the elite who had entered the system were forced out. Therefore the changes are not irreversible and seem to be superficial rather than substantial.

Conditions and trends

The two electoral systems are designed in a manner that they can resist low participation rates. This is curious enough if we keep in mind that both political systems were born in the heat of revolution. This is the outcome, possibly deliberate, of the majority electoral formulas, used by definition in the Iranian case and de facto in the Algerian case. These formulas hide the illegitimizing effect that a great abstention would have, by means of multiplying the votes into parliamentary seats and contributing to an appearance of normality.

Moreover, in both cases -and this is something that is beyond coincidence or special circumstances- the low participation reinforces the status quo and/or the conservative forces. In the Algerian case, the

reduced participation widens the breach among the first party (one of the two (2) semi-official ones) and the rest. Among the rest, those of opposition should distribute the spare benches with the second official party, assuring that they never can displace the winning party. Also, the low electoral affluence in a fragmented party system causes greater harm to small parties than to big ones, preventing the former from overcoming the "double" electoral barrier. In the Iranian case, the low electoral affluence has taken place because of a descent of the urban vote, mainly in cities like Tehran, Tabriz or Isfahan affecting the so-called reformist candidates' results in municipal and legislative elections.

In post-revolutionary and post-mobilization regimes it is often the paradox that political systems tend to stabilize by playing off non-charismatic leaders against each other; these leaders are normally people from the apparatus or apparatchiks. In this sense, the elections replace the loss of charisma of the revolutionary leaders with a new legitimacy based on the popular vote. Furthermore, it seems that the system itself assumes the function of impeding that the emergence or consolidation of new charismatic leaders can be translated into substantial reform of the rules of the political game. In the Iranian case, the electoral system allowed that Mohamed Khatami, a man rose through the regime and promoted by the dominant group led by Hashemi Rafsanjani, won the presidential elections twice. His charisma, unexpected on the part of the political elite, gained him popular mobilization of support but was insufficient to consolidate himself in power or generate fundamental changes during his mandates. In the Algerian case, the Army as tutorial institution in any presidential succession has traditionally taken over

promoting military figures or suchlike to President's position (case of Bendjedid, Zeroual and Bouteflika). The three, lacking in charisma and/or democratic credentials, have got themselves elected by popular proceedings to compensate their limitations. When one of them was able to impel a substantial change of regime, as Chadli Bendjedid did between 1988 and 1992, this change was aborted by stronger forces within the state apparatus that considered he had exceeded his duty.

Conclusions

Throughout this paper and our research we found a considerable number of similarities and differences between Iran and Algeria, sometimes where we did not expect them to be. The sense of informality and personalism evident in Iranian politics is also present in Algeria, where in a different manner, political parties account for little in Presidential results and arbitrariness based on personal criteria permeate the filtering of candidates. What Weber called the routinization of charisma is a common phenomenon in both countries, whereby legitimacy becomes more rational and bureaucratic as the leaders who arose from the revolution disappear and new apparatus leaders resort to popular elections in search for acceptance. Participation has been declining in both countries, with the exception of Khatami's first election, signaling a hardening of conservative or status quo forces. But then elections have managed to resist increasingly low turn-outs and give the impression of normality.

In both countries the determining factor behind the elections is alien to the electoral system; in one case it is the use of state resources

and in the other the filter established by the Council of Guardians. These mechanisms remove the political debate from political parties or parliaments and transfer it to the printed media. At the same time, the mechanisms can operate within a technically clean electoral environment giving a certain impression of openness and fair contest.

A way to respond to the difficult initial question outlined above of whether the electoral systems of Algeria and Iran are structures or superstructures is to approach the question from the political point of view instead of from the Marxist materialism from which is formulated. In both cases the elections are fundamental pieces of the political systems because, as we have seen, they give feedback to those systems, perpetuate them and even condition their trends. Moreover, in certain historical situations the change of the electoral system has signaled a regime change. For example, in France, the passage from the IV Republic to the V Republic meant among other things the passage from a pure parliamentary system to the current semi-presidential regime with all the electoral changes that brought with it. However, this does not mean that electoral systems per se can produce results capable of substantially modifying the relations of power. Indeed, the change in France originated in a "legal coup d'état" executed by General De Gaulle. On the other hand, as we have seen, certain recent tendencies in both countries reinforce the status quo and the conservative forces. Therefore, the decisive changes do not stem from the elections but because of transformations in other levels of power that then are transferred onto the electoral system. □

TABLE 1: ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN IRAN 1979/2004

N°	Election	Date	Potential voters	Effective voters	Participation
1	Referendum for Islamic Republic	01/04/1979	20789268	20439908	98.32 %
2	Revision assembly for the constitution	03/08/1979	20809268	10723788	51.53 %
3	Constitutional referendum	03/12/1979	21189268	15690142	74.05 %
4	First presidential election	25/01/1980	20993643	14152887	67.42 %
5	First legislative election	15/03/1980	20857391	10875969	52.14 %
6	Second presidential election	24/07/1981	22687017	14573803	64.24 %
7	Third presidential election	02/10/1981	22687017	16847717	74.26 %
8	First Experts Assembly election	10/12/1982	23277871	18013061	77.38 %
9	Second legislative election	15/04/1984	24143498	15607306	64.64 %
10	Fourth presidential election	16/08/1985	25993802	14238587	54.78 %
11	Third legislative election	08/04/1988	27986736	16714281	59.72 %
12	Fifth presidential election	28/07/1989	30139598	16452677	54.59 %
13	Referendum for constitutional reform	28/07/1989	30139598	16428976	54.51 %
14	Second Experts Assembly election	08/10/1990	31280084	11602613	37.09 %
15	Fourth legislative election	10/04/1992	32465558	18767042	57.81 %
16	Sixth presidential election	11/06/1993	33156055	16796787	50.66 %
17	Fifth legislative election	09/03/1996	34716000	24682386	71.10 %
18	Seventh presidential election	23/05/1997	36466487	29145745	79.92 %
19	Third Experts Assembly election	23/10/1998	38570597	17857869	46.30 %
20	First municipal election	01/02/1999	36739982	23668739	64.42 %
21	Sixth legislative election	20/02/2000	38726431	26082157	67.35 %
22	Eighth presidential election	08/06/2001	42170230	28155819	66.77 %
23	Second municipal election	28/02/2003	40501783	20235898	49.96 %
24	Seventh legislative election	20/02/2004		23734677	51.21 %

Source: Authors' elaboration from different sources


Table 2: PLURALIST ELECTIONS IN ALGERIA (1990-2004)

	1990	1991	1995	1997	1997	1999	2002	2002	2004		
Presidential Elections			16-11 Zenaid 7 mil, 61% Maiti 1 mil, 2.9% 25% Said Sadi 1.115 mil, 9.6% Nour Bouakrouh 443,000, 3.6% Part: 78.69%				15-04 Bouisk 72.79% Fatah 12.83 Djaballah 3.95 Ait Ahmed 3.17 Hamrouch 3 Mohamad Sif 2.2 K. Youcef 1.22 Part: 60.25%			8-04 Bouisk 69% Djaballah 17% Djaballah 5 Sadi 2% Hamrouch 1 Rebahin 0.6 Part: 59%	
Legislative Election		26-12 (1st round) ES 47% FRS 7.4 FLN 23 RCD 1.5 MDA 2.0 Part: 59%		5-06 RND 37%, 155 MRN 14.27 FLN 14.27 MRN 8.72% FRS 5.03% RCD 4.38% PT 4 sec Other 5 Part: 65.6%				30-05 ELN 38.5% RND 8.5 MRN 10% MSP 7.7 PT 4.8, 21 sec FNA (Touah) FRA 1 Part: 46%			
Local elections*	12-06 ES 54% FLN 26 RCD 21 INDEP 11.6 Part: 65%				25-10 RND: 55 Y 52% FLN 21 Y 19 MSP 6 Y 13- MRN 2 Y 7 FRS 5 Y 3 RCD 3 Y 6 PT 11,741 votes (only AFC) Part: 65.21%					10-10 % ELN 36.6 RND 21.2 MRN 9.3 MSP 7.4 INDEP 6.5 FRS 5.13 FRA 2.3 AHD 54 1.55 PT (APW) 568111 Part: 50.11%	

Source: Bustos, 2004.

TABLE 3: COMPONENTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS OF ALGERIA AND IRAN ¹¹

	Algeria	Iran
Regulation of the electoral system	Constitution	Iran
	Electoral law	Art. 6 (1989)
Active vote	Law from 6/3/97, Modifies 1989 law	Electoral law from 1999
	Age	> 16 years old.
Passive vote	Census	No need to register
	Sex	Both
Incompatibilities	Age	> 30 years old
	Incompatibilities	President, ministers, members of Council of Guardians, High Judicial Council, members of armed forces
Pre-requisites	Ineligibility	Those involved and committed to the Shah's regime or affiliated to old regime parties and outlawed parties
	Pre-requisites	Big land owners of uncultivated lands, freemason Insane, convicted of apostasy, reputedly corrupt. Full commitment to Islam and the sacred system of the IRI IRI citizenship Showing practical allegiance to the Constitution and principle of velayat-e faqih Having at least an university degree Being of sound scandal-free reputation in the district Physical health to the extent of being blessed with vision, hearing and speech capabilities
Electoral campaign	21 days	8 days
Candidatures type	List candidature	Uninominal
Vote expression	Single / list	Single/ plurinominal
Constituencies/ Districts	196	48
Electoral formula ¹²	Proportional representation (PR), Fare	Two round system / majority (TRS Majority)
Electoral threshold	5%	25%
Extension of mandate	Presidency	4 years
	Parliament	4 years
Number of seats	Experts	8 years
	Candidature	290
Candidature acception	Constitutional Court	Guardian Council

Diagram2: The Informal Power Structure

Notes:

1. See for instance, Sartori, Giovanni and Leonardo Morlino. Comparison in social sciences. Translated into Spanish by Professors Juan Russo and M. A. Ruiz de Azúa. Madrid: Alianza, 1994.
2. Some of these comparative works on Algeria and Iran are: Sheikhzadegan, Amir, 1956- Der Griff des politischen Islam zur Macht: Iran und Algerien im Vergleich / Amir Sheikhzadegan. Bern; New York : P. Lang, c2003. 348 p. ; 23 cm. Parveen Shaukat Ali. Status of women in the Muslim world : a study in the feminist movements [in] Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Algeria, and Pakistan / Parveen Shaukat Ali. 2nd rev. and enl. ed. Lahore, Pakistan : Aziz Publishers, 1986. xvii, 345 p. ; 22 cm.. Indian Institute of Foreign Trade., Market opportunities for selected engineering goods in petroleum exporting countries of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria & Iran. New Delhi : Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, [foreword 1977] iv, 363 p. : graphs ; 30 cm.
3. In both cases, the political dimension is a mixed of democratic and a more or less fading revolutionary legitimacy.
4. www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de and www.freedomhouse.org.
5. [Http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm](http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm).
6. Except for the local elections held in 2003 which allowed for a more open participation.
7. In fact, the government appointed by the President may not come from his own party. There is no provision forcing the President to name the first party leader as chief of government.
8. The FLN and the Rassemblement National Democratique, RND, born of a split within the FLN.
9. Mahmoud Nahnah was eliminated from presidential race in 1999 because he was not able to prove he fought in the independence war. After threatening with organizing popular mobilizations, Nahnah accepted the Constitutional Court verdict.
10. When only one result is listed for local elections it is meant for APC, if not, the first is for APC (municipal) and then APW (provincial).
11. Authors' own elaboration, Algerian part based on Montabes Pereira J, 1999.
12. Manual de Diseño de Sistemas Electorales, IDEA, 1999.