

## Global Citizenship

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### Introduction

Globalization is a new phenomenon of human life and mind has been the focus of numerous definitions. Actually, there is no standard definition of globalization in popular literature, but if we have a look at these, we can find a common denominator: all definitions regard globalization as a step in which human and social relations take unbounded quality. Thus, the concept of citizenship will face a very vast and new approach. Concerning the fact that the globalization or cosmopolitan condition is no longer merely a mirage, we attempt in this paper to see how can we have global citizenship? Citizenship usually refers to the specific legal, political and social rights which individuals have as members of a separate sovereign state. Following globalization, the question of whether it is valid to detach the idea of citizenship from the nation state has received three different answers.

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Some theorists developed the statist position which argues that citizenship means legal rights and duties of the bounded sovereign state (Linklater, 1990b). Sovereign communities are authorized by the social contract to do the best they can for fellow-citizens rather than dissolve national arrangements because of attachment to global citizenship. The second approach has been offered by the Kantian conception of global citizenship. This approach supports the project of enlarging the moral rather than the political boundaries of the community (Beitz, 1994). The individuals have ethical obligations to the rest of the human race that could overrule their obligations to fellow-citizens. Kant says all human beings should extend hospitality to strangers as fellow-citizens of a universal state of humanity (Kant, 1970:206). The third answer is a dialogic approach which argues for a greater sense of responsibility, and establishment of concrete transnational rights and duties (Held, 1996). This approach supports cosmopolitan democracy and looks forward to the development of a transnational citizenry. In other words, citizens and aliens come together as co-legislators within a wider public sphere. The EU is a good example of this approach which may be broadened to the other parts of the world.

### **Statist approach**

Secular natural law theorists such as Pufendorf and Vattel in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries developed the statist approach.

This approach argues that citizenship has been controlled by the sovereign state and it is utopian to consider that it can be coupled with various political arrangements. Sovereign communities have not been issued with a moral license to treat the interests of outsiders without consideration and they are not entitled to impose terrible costs on them for the sake of inconsiderable national gains. Hegel subsequently decorated the statist approach arguing that cosmopolitanism has to be treated with great suspicion because it represents a threat to the only viable form of political association: the modern sovereign state (Linklater, 1990b; Linklater, 1998). The practice of citizenship should be confined within the boundaries of national political communities. Those who aspire to create transnational or global forms of citizenship have failed to understand the conditions under which genuine citizenship is possible. Either their purposes are simply utopian, or what they aspire to is not properly described as citizenship.

Rousseau gives an argument in the *Discourse on Political Economy*, "let us make peoples love their homeland. But how will they come to love it, if their homeland means nothing more to them than it does to foreigners, and if it grants to them only what it cannot refuse to anyone" (Rousseau, 1988:70). He lays special emphasis on the system of education: It is education that must give souls a national formation, and direct their opinions and tastes in such a way that they will be patriotic by inclination, by passion, by necessity. When he first

opens his eyes, an infant ought to see the fatherland, and up to day of his death he ought never to see anything else. Every true republican has drunk in love of country, that is to say love of law and liberty, along with his mother's milk. This love is his whole existence; he sees nothing but the fatherland; he lives for it alone (Rousseau, 1953:176).

The nation as a focus of identity and allegiance appeared on the scene when enhancing mobility and more effective means of communication, especially the printed word, made it possible for large aggregates of people to conceive of themselves as members of communities with specific cultural character that separate them from their neighbors. Rousseau's citizens are supposed to gather face to face under the shade of an oak to make laws. If modern social conditions make this impossible, something else must generate the trust and loyalty that citizenship requires. Common nationality has served this purpose in the developed societies.

All our experience of citizenship has so far been of bounded citizenship; initially citizenship within the walls of the city state. The boundaries have been actively policed. Although the procedure may differ, admission to citizenship has always come with strings attached. Let us contrast the German model of citizenship with the French. Although recent German legislation reveals a shift towards a more inclusive conception of citizenship, the German model gives citizenship a strongly ethnic basis: to become a German citizen

you must be of German descent. This means, on the one hand, that immigrants are excluded, and even those born in Germany to non-citizens do not qualify. On the other hand, people outside the state of the desired descent –ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, for example – have been immediately granted citizenship rights upon entering Germany. The French model, by contrast, is based on the principle that every inhabitant of the territory of French should be eligible for citizenship, but includes strong policies to ensure that each citizen absorbs doses of French national culture, particularly through the education system. The German model extends citizenship to only those it sees as German nationals by ethnic criteria; the French model works hard to make immigrants into Frenchmen, as earlier it tried to make peasants into Frenchmen, to quote the title of Eugene Weber's well-known book (Miller, 1998; Weber, 1979).

Therefore, citizenship is, and has been, a valuable status, and political systems naturally wish to restrict their possession to those who identify themselves with the nation and are carriers of the right cultural identity. To give citizenship rights to all is to risk undermining the conditions of mutual trust and assurance that make responsible citizenship possible. Citizenship depends on a certain level of reciprocity: people must vote responsibly, must carry whatever duties are required of them, and so forth. Thus, citizenship even in the modern world has necessarily been confined within national

boundaries. Statists maintain that global citizenship not only fails to specify the concrete rights and duties which bind citizens in relations of co-operation within bounded communities but, at a deeper level, it fails to engage them in any effective form of shared rule.

### **Kantian approach**

Many scholars have objected to the statist approach in the belief that the whole world human race should live under a single world government, but most current advocates of global citizenship support the project of enlarging the moral rather than the political boundaries of society (Beitz, 1994). This second approach of treating with the problem of citizenship, of deciding whether it should be national or global in orientation, maintains that individuals have ethical obligations to the rest of the human race which can overrule their obligations to fellow citizens. This is the essence of Kantian approach of global citizenship. Support for the purpose of promoting stronger loyalties to the cosmopolis has increased over the last few years. Earlier anxieties about nuclear war (Falk, 1994), contemporary anxieties about the risk which environmental devastation poses to the human species and to unborn generation, and the recent worldwide objection to the US-led war against Iraq, have engendered a deeper sense personal responsibility for the fate of the earth, along with greater support for social movements and non-governmental organizations in a world that

is still largely dominated by the nation-state. For many, the attraction of global citizenship is its appeal to individuals to demonstrate moral concern and individual responsibility for the future of the planet in the light of growing doubts about the efficacy of the territorial nation-state (Heater, 1990; Linklater, 1998).

Kant is a self-proclaimed enlightenment thinker and cosmopolitan remains one of the most frequently cited ancestors--(different word—predecessor?) of contemporary political cosmopolitan arguments. He argues that the *ius cosmopolitanum* obliges all human beings to extend hospitality to strangers as fellow 'citizens of a universal state of humanity' (Kant, 1970:206). Many exponents of cosmopolitanism, and the advocates of good environmental citizenship who believe in a greater sense of responsibility, imitate the opinion of Kant by arguing that global citizenship enjoins co-nationals to transcend the morally parochial world of the sovereign state (Arendt, 1973). The advocates of global citizenship redefine the moral society to include the whole human race, and they are concerned with emphasizing duties to a universal society of humankind which exists usually alongside a sovereign state.

This approach which carries the idea of extending citizenship beyond the borders of states invites the citizens of different states to have a deeper moral concern for human beings elsewhere. In reality, obligations to humanity have never been satisfactorily

dealt with through citizenship of bounded, sovereign communities. This is becoming increasingly evident because of growing global interdependence; we should, therefore, look forward to following through with the logic of Kant's original insight as to the moral irrelevance of state boundaries in relation to fundamental human rights.

Cosmopolitan identity or global citizenship is understood as the identity of each individual with a universality encompassing an integral whole in which nature and reason are one. The common ethical identity of human individuals, in Kant's view, is premised on a universality present tension between their common moral and their national citizenship (identity). Kant presents human beings as having the capacity to know the moral law and to act according to its precepts, but equally as having the capacity to be motivated by nature rather than reason. In the former case, we will be ruled by the requirements of the moral law which is necessarily universal in form; in the latter case we will be ruled by the particular passions which are part of our common natural condition. The way in which Kant uses this dichotomy is to articulate principles for action which serve to test and confirm whether a subjective maxim is in accordance with reason and to insist that the crucial determinant of the morality of an action is that it is motivated by a good will (i.e., determined by reason rather than by nature). The principles for action which Kant articulates are categorical

imperatives that take a universally legislative form, most famously "Act according to the maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law." (Kant, 1969:63; Hutchings, 1998) What is interesting about this in terms of Kant's ethical cosmopolitanism is that this moral philosophy, premised on a recognition that we are all in some sense cosmopolitan by virtue of being human, places its principal emphasis on the imperative to construct the global citizenship.

### **Dialogic approach**

A dialogic approach to global citizenship calls for the establishment of an international public sphere to enlarge the realm of politics which comes under the dominion of dialogue and consent. This approach assumes that sovereignty ultimately resides in the whole human race is very close to the Kantian approach. It is important to emphasize that Kant's writings did not set out the detailed vision of a world-wide public sphere which brings the whole of humanity together as co-legislators in a universal domain of ends. Modern vision of cosmopolitan democracy which believes that citizens and aliens should become associates in joint rule, were alien to the basic principles of Kantian political philosophy.

According to dialogic approach, all humankind should act as if they are co-legislators in a universal domain of ends, although they will never participate in deliberations together. Global citizens would

remain members of bounded communities, each in possession of its rightful sovereign status and free from external intervention. The act of imagining themselves as participants in a universal society of co-legislators in which all human beings are respected as ends-in-themselves would place strong moral and psychological constraints on the wrongful exercise of state power (Linklater, 1998). Global citizenship may embody commitments to deal the vulnerable with compassion, but it must also embrace the principle of engaging others as equals within wider societies of discourse. Complying with a dialogic approach of global citizenship therefore requires attempts to provide wider communication communities and measures to reduce the powerlessness and vulnerability of others so that they can exercise their moral right 'to refuse and renegotiate offers'. The duty to establish these arrangements is based on the belief that autonomy for the self should not be secured through heteronomy for others (Ibid).

This approach makes the notion of global political participation of individual actors a central item in their agenda. Work of this kind tends to concentrate on both the importance of a ground swell of transnational social movements within 'global civil society' and on the potential of existing international political institutions to be restructured more accountably and democratically. Held is at the forefront of those arguing for the globalization of democracy and citizenship beyond the boundaries of the state (Held, 1996).

Some scholars call a global democratic law, a legal framework which would serve both to regulate conflict between states and to give recourse to individual citizens whose rights have been violated by their own states. In other words state sovereignty should be constrained by international law enforced by international courts, of which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) serves as the prototype. Citizens can assert their rights against the state and appeal to a higher court to make good their claims that the state has violated those rights. International agreements and court decisions can indiscriminately be used as moral ammunition, putting pressure on those states to adopt better human rights policies. Global democracy anticipates the possibility of general referenda cutting across nation and nation-states in the case of contested priorities concerning the implementation of democratic law and the balance of public expenditure, with constituencies defined in accordance with the nature and scope of disputed problems (Held, 1995; Miller, 1998). People also should act as citizens within a global civil society (i.e. as members of global groupings with a particular concern or interest): for example, environmental groups, or group of lawyers concern about the international protection of human rights. Members of such groups as 'citizen pilgrims' are committed more or less consciously to the construction of a compassionate global policy in the decades ahead (Falk, 1995:212).

States should settle their disputes not by methods of force

and economic pressure, but by appealing to a commonly agreed set of principles which are recognized as having the status of law and, presumably, would be applied by an international body such as a reformed UN. This is plainly desirable, and it does not seem a wholly unrealistic objective.

We can draw on the EU as an empirical example that there is both a variety of citizen identities available to particular individuals and a continual process of negotiation (dialogue) and renegotiation of those identities in relation to each other (Huntington, 1998). The rights of the European citizen which are set out in article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty do little to erode the sovereignty of member states. Each EU member admits that the citizens of other signatory states may stand as candidates, and vote, in its local elections, and each recognizes similar rights concerning elections for the European Parliament. But the Maastricht Treaty does not invite the citizens of different states to transcend their differences in a transnational citizenry which is empowered to elect the members of the European Commission (Peruß, 1995; Linklater, 1998).

Obviously, through phase of globalization the achievements of national citizenship can only be secured by investing the development of a new European transnational society which makes greater inroads into the principle of national sovereignty. But the ethical principles which require the development of a transnational citizenry in Europe

invite deep concerns about the harms and injustices that the region may do to outsiders. To take the project of global citizenship seriously, any European society has to show compassion in its dealing with non-European world. Nothing less than a commitment to creating wider dialogic frameworks which respects the moral equality of the individual members of the rest of humanity will suffice. Institutionalizing equal political rights within Europe would represent important progress towards the condition of global citizenship, but it would be basically incomplete without concurrent measures to ensure that the principles of dialogue and consent shape its behavior towards the rest of the world.

It deserves mentioning that in the different religions that govern the world such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Islam there are also references to global citizenship, and a world government which is presided over by a person who will come as the savior of mankind. The leader of such a global society in the language of Islam, for example, is called the Mahdi. These religions have usually given happy tidings of his coming, although there are naturally certain differences in detail that can be discerned when these teachings are compared. Therefore, by reason of even inner necessity and determination, the future will hopefully see a day when global society will be replete with justice and when all will live in peace and tranquility. The establishment of such a condition will occur through

human hands but with Divine succor. Plano and Olton believe that world government can be established by peaceful international cooperation. A world government and a global citizenship might evolve out of wider regional agreements, perhaps based on the model of the European Union. Cooperative government at the world level will happen when advocates of diverse ideologies are able to agree on a definition of the common good, and when international cooperation transcends national loyalty (Plano and Olton, 1988).

### Conclusion

Political, economic and cultural globalization means that the nation-state now has greatly reduced power with respect to certain issues, having been over-ridden or bypassed other institutions and processes. Global corporations are now overtaking national governments to build blocks of world order. Citizenship is one of the major phenomena which has been challenged by the era of globalization. In a world in which people from professionals to amateurs have to constantly be moving across borders as a fact of life, membership of the nation-state can no longer count as the basis of citizenship. A fundamental principle of citizenship is that the rights and duties of citizens are global in the sense that they do not depend on the particular circumstances of noble birth, religion, race or gender. Within the vast limits of universalism, ideas about the nature of the

relationships between citizens vary.

Statist approach of citizenship maintains that global citizenship lacks the crucial ingredient of involvement in the public affairs of a distinctive form of life. Citizenship has been harnessed to the sovereign state and it is utopian to suppose that it may be coupled with various political arrangements. Global citizenship is a misnomer, albeit one which can have praiseworthy effects within a world of nation-states. The Kantian approach of global citizenship stresses the need for personal responsibility for conduct that may have damaging consequences for the environment and defends the virtue of care and compassion for people elsewhere. Kant argued that the heads of state belong to a global-wide public sphere in which they can illustrate some of the hallmarks of active citizenship. Dialogic approach of global citizenship extends this theme by supporting attempts to create new communities of discourse which bring citizens and outsiders together as co-legislators.

While dialogue approach seems to be a relatively new perspective that can go to reality, the idea of human beings as members of a global grouping of the human race has long roots in the major world religions, in the principles of the Enlightenment, and in the concept of the international socialism. Even if we still have a long way to go before fully achieving it, the cosmopolitan condition is no longer merely a mirage. State citizenship and global citizenship constitute

a continuum whose contours, at least, are already becoming visible (Habermas, 1996). People who argue that citizenship is, or should be, emerging point to the growing power of international finance capital and the corresponding lack of power of national governments to influence the welfare of their citizens; the growth in international treaties which may affect national sovereignty; and the increase in international migration.

This is as it should be because from this approach, rights are more and more based on personhood and on international concepts of human rights rather than on national concepts of formal citizenship. Indeed, most people who look forward to global citizenship applaud dual, or multiple, citizenship as a step towards a non-national model of citizenship. The global approach has little to say about duties and it is unclear about the institutional arrangements which guarantee the rights it outlines. The model is also weak on a theory of motivation. With national citizenship, people mostly want to contribute to the well-being of their fellow citizens because they feel that they are part of the same body, and for those who lack this feeling, there are laws which insist that they contribute. The global citizenship approach cannot explain why individuals, except for an altruistic few, should want to observe the duties necessary to underpin rights of strangers on the other side of the globe. And if they do not want to, there is no institution to force them to do so (Betts, 2003).

In general the global citizenship approach has much to say about international human rights, but little to say how these rights are to be supported and enforced. The experience of the European Union seems to be a good example which can facilitate the way towards global citizenship and indicate that the dialogue approach or global citizenship is not utopian or a misnomer. □

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