THE POLITICS OF SPEAKING 'EUROPE': MAKING CONSTRUCTIVIST SENSE OF TURKEY'S EUROPEANNESS AND INTEGRATION IN THE EU

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INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to draw on constructivism and its defining debates in order to approach the specific problematique of Turkey's Europeanness and further integration into the institutional arrangements of contemporary European society. It is possible to identify the crucial issue in this paper as the particular political process of struggle and contestation involved in the conceptual definition of Europe, which in its turn becomes the normative

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context chosen by particular actors for legitimising solutions concerning the collective governance within the EU. This paper critically deals with the discursive production of Europe as an unstable, not fixed, context of meaning which changes over time reflecting the evolution of the intersubjective understandings shared by those actors implicated in its institutional workings, mainly political elites. As point of departure, the paper then introduces present-day Europe as an idea or normative construct, particularly that of a social kind rather than geographical or physical. What follows is that all matters concerning its identity, membership, and *border of order* have to be discerned at the particular level of norms, practices and language and not stemming from an essential property endogenously produced; as it were, that only some societies can mobilise for it is in their genes. By focusing on this level of constitutive/constituting properties, the paper therefore sets out to expose the way Europe is being de-essentialised to the point where marginal and sometimes contradictory cultural traits cease to be perceived as negating Europeanness. Signalling this change, it is our contention that the 'discourse of Europe' has been shifting over time from a strict patrimonial approach to the more future-looking convergence around the possibility of building a republican polity from cultural and political identity. Drawing and expanding on Wendt's words about sovereignty (Wendt 1998, 114), the paper's purpose here is that of disclosing the extent to which the shift in the 'discourse of Europe' may mean that Europeanness is ceasing to be perceived by political elites as an internal or essential property of states and rather as a collective institution constituting these states with social capacities. Following this argument, the long historical 'discourse of Europe' stands up not as fixed and deterministically causal but as open and enabling alternative narratives of what the European identity is and of what it may entail for collective governance.

The paper set out first to expand on the constructive understanding of Europe as 'cognitive structure'. Further, it intends to deal with the phenomenon of Turkey's Europeanisation as a form of cognitive

evolution/social learning and the subsequent contention that the country has reached that degree of embeddedness in the cognitive structure of Europe so as to have made it possible to be accepted as an European polity. The paper's central contention is therefore that the Luxembourg 2005 decision represents a critical juncture for understanding the long historical transition of Turkey from the 'other' of European identity to a full member of the European society of states. And in addition, compatible with Europeanness as institution.

UNDERSTANDING EUROPE SOCIALLY: A SHIFTING CONTEXT OF MEANING

The social reading or understanding of Europe serving as framework for this paper is intended to confront all kinds of reified accounts of European identity according to which "Europe is Europe is Europe," transforming it into a natural kind and eventually disavowing its social properties. This is still the mainstream account of Europe, we would dare say, and it comes therefore with no surprise that the editors of *The Social Construction of Europe* begin their introductory text to the volume by underscoring the "paradox in what is often referred to as *la construction européenne*" (Christiansen et al. 2001, 1). In the text, it is their conviction that the constructivist turn affecting the social sciences has still left untouched European studies and has missed to make sense of what can be said of the constructivist process *par excellence* – the European political construction. Writing from his reflectivist quarters, Steve Smith avows nevertheless that "constructivism can offer powerful accounts of European governance precisely because it is based on a notion of intersubjective understandings and discourses being central in shaping over time identities, interests and interactions of actors" (Steve Smith 2001, 196). The notion of intersubjective understandings constituting actors' identities and interests is central in all constructivist accounts of the social world and it draws a clear

theoretical line *vis-à-vis* rational choice accounts of social interactions. Furthermore, constructivist processes are perceived to be two-way processes of social construction in which structures and actors mutually constitute (and are constituted) in the course of social interactions and processes. As stands out from Smith's quotation, more often than not the idea of constitution is associated especially with actors' identities and preferences being shaped by structures through a process of complex learning or 'cognitive evolution' (Adler 1997, 319). In fact, *la construction européenne* is a ccounted for by constructivists as a process of this kind, where every new member of the society of European states goes through a critical period or socialisation process standing for the incorporation of the rules of the new game. The games states play are based on intersubjective understandings, as the constructivist lexicon goes, but the fact is that much of the empirical research is still directed to account for the way actors get socialised by structures. Much of the empirical research on the European construction focus therefore on the phenomenon of Europeanisation as the holist socialisation of European states into a relatively stable and essential idea of Europe. That is the main reason for Steve Smith to focus on the powerful account of European governance as constructivism's main asset (*vis-à-vis* the rough strategic interaction account of rational choice theories).

The basic assumption in this paper is that there is something missing in mainstream constructivist accounts of Europe, at least at the level of empirical research, something that goes beyond the more easily researchable topic of governance to focus on the broader domain of Europeanness and the concomitant historical constitution of Europe as an idea and process. Assuming that "discourses do not cause but enable" (Diez 2001, 98), that they are not rigid but change over time, it is fundamental to approach the problematique of Turkey's Europeanness and integration in the institutional mechanisms of the EU, not merely from the viewpoint of Turkey's complex learning and will to Europeanise over the last century but crucially also from the viewpoint of the particular constitution of the 'discourse of Europe'

through the dialogical relation with 'Others'. A social reading of Europe stands therefore in sharp contrast with all essentialising approaches to its identity and is meant firstly to trigger a broad discussion on the kind of object Europe is. It is at this particular point, a previous point before discussing governance, where the paper argues that constructivism becomes especially suitable as the social theory of European integration. Drawing again on Wendt, it is impossible to ignore that "within the community of academic students of international politics today there is a deep epistemological rift over the extent to and ways in which we can know our subject" (Wendt 1998, 101). Epistemology matters crucially in the present context because the possibility of producing knowledge about Europe and deciding, for instance, the kind of object it is depends upon how one believes knowledge can be produced. Epistemology matters because we cannot decide what Europe is, whether it is an essential work of nature or an intrinsically unstable cognitive structure, unless one has made it clear how this kind of knowledge is to be obtained. As far as this problematique is concerned, I tend to follow Hollis and Smith when they argue that one must always choose between two 'stories' or approaches to the social world (Hollis and Smith, 1990, 1). One is an outsider's story, working as to uncover the causal mechanisms inter-linking social phenomena and to produce social laws; the other is an insider's story meant to recover the subjective and intersubjective meanings actors attach to their interactions. To understand the social world is then to make sense of it from within, i.e. to recover the processes and interactions that have turned it into what it is at a particular juncture. In epistemological terms, to understand the social world involves a critical action of de-essentialising what otherwise are but social kinds, subject to on-going constitution and reconstitution, to the on-going elaboration of meanings social actors collectively attach to the material world. In this paper, we set out to understand Europe from within, i.e. from within the realm of the enabling discourse social actors have been producing about it and which becomes crucial in order to legitimise political options

such as the enlargement of the EU. It is then the 'story' or narrative involved in the understanding of Europe that makes it possible to uncover its ontology as social kind and the concomitant on-going process of negotiation over its meaning. In other terms, the on-going process of negotiation over Europeanness and what it means for a group of sovereign polities to recognise one another as European.

The 'story' of understanding Europe from within and tracing back its enabling discourse is then closely associated with the specific choice for a social ontology of human consciousness and the kind of ideational factors that make it possible to perceive change and the impact of transformative processes within this particular state system. Following John Ruggie, "At bottom, constructivism concerns the issue of human consciousness: the role it plays in international relations, and the implications for the logic and methods of social inquiry of taking it seriously" (Ruggie 1998, 33). Taking constructivism seriously in social inquiry, and European studies more specifically, is then a matter of acknowledging the two-way process of constitution mutually involving structures and actors. The individualist methodology should be carefully avoided, but so should the holist one, in favour of a middle ground acknowledging (and drawing on the fact) that the 'discourse of Europe' has the transformative power to change its actors but also that their interactions and relations with the multiple 'Others' at the gates have proved to be able to change, in turn, the 'discourse of Europe'. We should also bear in mind that, for constructivists, structures are not material but cognitive. Moreover, we should take seriously the way this makes structures vulnerable to the changing ways human consciousness attaches meaning to the material world, depending for instance on the shifting of perceptions, identities and interests stemming from complex social interactions. The point I want to make here comes close to that made by James Fearon and Alexander Wendt when they write that "constructivism is not subjectivism or pure idealism; instead, the emphasis on ideas is meant to oppose arguments about social life which emphasize the role of brute

material conditions like biology, geography and technology" (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 57). Intersubjective meanings and understandings are the stuff the social world is made of and they are otherwise real in the way they shape social practices and institutions (and in their turn are shaped by them). By setting out to understand Europe socially, we intend to underscore that the materiality of geography does not cause a predetermined cognitive structure called Europe, along with particular institutional features. Rather, it is the cognitive structure resulting in the utterance 'Europe', that which enables specific understandings of its geographic setting and of what should follow politically from it. The bottom line is that Europe as cognitive structure, or context of meaning, is what its relevant actors make of it – the political elite primarily. Historically, the intersubjective consensus on this matter has shifted from the idea of a *Republica Christiana* to the idea of a concert and balance of nations and further on to that of what some have already postulated as a post-sovereign polity of polities. The 'discourse of Europe' is enabling rather than causal for it may draw on these and other references – or possible combinations of references – depending on the understandings actors bring to the table and how capable they are of promoting them through a mixture of persuasion and bargaining.

In this paper then, the 'discourse of Europe' becomes the narrative of the on-going contestation over the meaning of Europe and its border of order even before it becomes entangled in the different realms of daily governance and policy-making. As William Connolly has endeavoured to demonstrate, contestation over concepts is not a mere detail in the way groups interact; it is not a redundant and merely symbolic feature in contrast with the supposedly crucial bargaining over actors' interests and preferences. On the contrary, it is where the crucial political struggle between different groups and their opposing projects begins, a struggle in the construction of the social world (Connolly 1983, 30). This particular understanding of socially constituted interactions and identities making up the European state system leaves then its own mark in the rationalism/constructivism debate. In our

view, it is possible to subsume the rational choice model of strategic exchange and bargaining among states within a broader understanding of the social world furthered by constructivism and based on a de-essentialising approach. According to this, Europe can no longer be approached as tacit ontology and the bargaining of day-to-day policy-making must be understood as both intervening in and resulting from the complex process of contestation over the meaning of Europe. As Thomas Diez has put it, "The power of discourse is that it structures our conceptualisations of European governance to some extent, rather than us simply employing a certain language to further our case" (Diez 2001, 92).

This way, and drawing on the Austinian lexicon, what characterises language is not the fact that it is 'constatative', as common sense would have it; rather, it is its 'performativity', the fact that to speak is already to do something (Kratochwil 1989, 8). Approaching Europe as discourse and context of meaning starts therefore from the basic assumption that to utter 'Europe' is to do something, for this utterance subsumes a whole range of speech acts – acts performed through speech. According again to Diez, "the whole history of European integration can be understood as a history of speech acts (following Onuf: rules) establishing a system of governance (which, after all, is about rules that are binding for the members of the system" (Diez 2001, 88). It is crucial to understand that these speech acts go much deeper than this acknowledged and more easily researchable level of governance and concomitant rules. They structure the very struggle for fixing the meaning of Europe, its values and heritage, who should be in and who should be denied access to its border of order. It is right that the power of the 'discourse of Europe' is that it structures collective governance within the European state system. However, and in a much more critical sense, this power stems also from the basic fact that the 'discourse of Europe' structures the process of fixing the identity of that system, what it can become, and what it cannot. Drawing on Diez's approach, I would say that it reveals a structural property in that it has become more than the sum of the individual

acts and projects of the European agents. At the same time though, it is always dependent on the latter. Like all discourses then, the 'discourse of Europe' is not causal or rigid but, on the contrary, enabling. It sets limits to what is possible to be articulated as 'Europeanness', "but do [discourses in general] also provide agents with a multitude of identities in various subject positions, and are continuously transformed through the addition and combination of new articulations" (Diez 2001, 98). The 'discourse of Europe' is enabling in that it sets up a space of contestation over what Europe is, or may become, in whose definition social actors take part and from which they can draw on so as to consolidate their bargaining position or persuasion status.

This understanding thus matches a certain kind of Wittgensteinian constructivism in that its point of departure is the language-as-action approach. According to Christiansen and others, "The assumption is that, beyond mere utterances, language constitutes meaning within specific contexts. If successfully performed, speech acts cause a particular meaning that, in turn, leads to rule-following" (Christiansen et al. 2001, 8). What is at stake here, after all, is to uncover the constructive power of language within specific processes of identity and interest formation – in this case within the European state system – with the main aim of understanding the emergence of social reality. In the classification furthered by Emanuel Adler, this corresponds to a modernist linguistic constructivism, a combination of subjective hermeneutics with a 'conservative' cognitive interest in explaining and understanding social reality, based on the primacy of epistemology (Adler 2002, 98). Eventually, it is this primacy of epistemology over ontology that which turns the understanding of Europe from within into the narrative or 'story' (to use the lexicon of Hollis and Smith) of the multiple processes by which Europe becomes an on-going construction and consequently an unstable and shifting context of meaning. This is then the problematique of Europe as social kind or fact grounding the paper and guiding the search that follows for a de-essentialising itinerary of Europe.

A HISTORY OF EUROPE FROM ATTILA TO TAMERLAN

The title of this section draws on the work of the French intellectual and writer Emmanuel Berl, invoked by Charles-Olivier Carbonell in his edited *Une histoire européenne de l'Europe* to illustrate a certain tradition of historiographic euroscepticism. Berl presents in this text a heretic version of Europe *vis-à-vis* the much-consolidated French tradition of the "crusades of European historiography" represented, among others, by Julien Benda, Denis de Rougemont or Charles Seignobos (Carbonell 1999, 16). In his *Histoire*, Berl sets out to underscore the 'deceiving stability' of the designation 'Europe', the 'deceiving continuity' of its chronology, the 'genealogical false claim' in invoking Europe through the medium of 'quantic leaps' taken from within its history. For Berl, Europe is not an entity but rather a mere enunciation, and its history seldom ceases to split into different structures. Our interest in *L'Histoire de l'Europe d'Attila à Tamerlan* does not lie in its scepticism regarding the existence of Europe – its social ontology – which in 1946, the date of its publication, was not easy to deny. Rather, what we find intriguing in Berl's work is the way the author de-essentialises Europeanness and turns it into a matter of sociality and evolving historical consciousness. *Contra* Julien Benda, who was eager to affirm, in his well-known *Discours à la nation européenne* (1933), that ever since the fall of Rome left Europe in pieces, their inhabitants have proved common feelings and embarked on common projects, or Denis de Rougemont, who invoked Beethoven's *cantata* for the Vienna Congress – "Europe is born" – as a sign of the long lineage of Europe, Berl ascertained otherwise that "she reveals her unity only through the confluence of destinies" and that "she is no other than the series of successive projects" (quoted in Carbonell 1999, 13).

This de-essentialising of Europe starts, for Berl, right with the Foucaultian notion of enunciation. In fact, what the French writer wants to convey is that, like all enunciations, Europe does not hold any meaning in itself; only in relation to other enunciations does it acquire one. It is, after all, the admittance of the fact that the 'other' is part and parcel in the

constitution of one's own identity. Berl's phrasing is clearly constructivist in that he is not interested in denying Europe, only in unveiling its unsettling nature, its lack of predetermination or genetic legacy, or even clear destiny. All there is in Europe is then a series of successive projects marking, at best, the confluence of the destinies of a bunch of peoples lead by their elites. It is his constructivist reading of Europe, after all, that which allows Berl to eventually conclude that "the Europeans are those who have associated or associate themselves with these projects; those who have rejected them have also ceased to be European" (quoted in Carbonell 1999, 14). With this formula, Berl introduces an inherently fluid and unsteady notion of 'Europeanness' according to which 'Europe' is an idea or enunciation some peoples (or rather their elites) decide to adhere to or, in contrast, to stay away from. This way, Kiev Russia was European, as well as the Russia of Peter the Great, but that of the Mongol Khans was not. Likewise, Spain is said to have represented Europe's vanguard by granting Columbus the caravans he needed for the journey to America, but contradicted such a role in the nineteenth century, when it despised the building of factories. The bottom line here is that Europe must not be approached as continuity; it does not make sense in terms of the meanings that historical actors attached to their actions. Continuity is therefore a constructed notion in itself, an artificial logic bestowed upon historical facts by later generations of self-conscious Europeans. In Berl's own words, "It is not reasonable to see in Henry the Navigator the heir to Urban II, nor in the Germanic Caesars Charlemagne's successors, not even in Charlemagne a reincarnation of Augustus or Adrian" (quoted in Carbonell 1999, 13). The politics of speaking 'Europe' is then about this and other ways of doing something through speech and enunciation. It is about the critical usage that the elites make of the word 'Europe' (as context of meaning) in order to advance and legitimise governance options for the European state system and its relations with 'others'.

What kind of social fact is then Europe, once its essential nature and

character are suspended or put aside? According to Peter Rietbergen, it is even a mistake "to call it a continent and to attribute to it the specious security of a distinct geographical entity, as so often happens" (Rietbergen 1998, xvii). Rietbergen's phrasing is especially intriguing, I sustain, in the way the author consciously acknowledges geography to be the source of a particular sense of security involved in the act of defining Europe and producing its discourse. The naturalness of geography has therefore become the crucial idea grounding the belief in the distinctiveness of that which is but a socially constructed space. The traditional, mainstream, 'discourse of Europe' is undoubtedly grounded, we would say, on the pivotal idea of the specious security of a collective identity being safeguarded behind the natural walls of geography. After discarding Europe as 'natural fact', Rietbergen proceeds to affirm that "If anything, Europe is a political and cultural concept, invented and experienced by an intellectual elite more specifically whenever there was cause to give a more precise definition of what can pragmatically yet simply be described as the western edge of Eurasia, the earth's largest land mass" (Rietbergen 1998, xvii). And the cause, or reason, for definition came, beyond doubt, in moments of crisis or confrontation, invented or constructed for the sake of physical resistance and moral resolve. If anything, 'Europe' is thus an invention or enunciation, socially constituted by the particular experience of the elites involved in the historically complex processes of collaboration and competition among the states of a bounded political system, evolving in time and producing a set of recognisable values and rules. The paradox then lies in the fact that whenever those elites invoke the specious security of a natural unity as the indisputable ground for seizing the particular spiritual geography of Europe (to draw on Husserl's expression), all they can find is but an idea, a spirit – *l'évanescence de la notion* [*européenne*]', as Yves Hersant and Fabienne Durand-Bogaert have put it in their critical anthology revealingly entitled *Europes*, in the plural. In their preface, the authors set out critically to de-essentialise, or de-reify, even the idea of an European culture by

underscoring that "by way of looking for the unity of its culture, all one finds is its compartment; by wanting to objectify it, all one gets is to dissolve it; every assertion that takes it as an object may revolve against it" (Hersant and Durand-Bogaert 2000, iii). It is a curious assumption this one, closely related to Jacques Maritain's who, when asked about what he thought human rights amounted to, declared that he knew it better when he was not asked about the subject. It is definitely the evasive and insidious character of the social kind we name 'Europe' (and 'European culture') that which the above-mentioned authors have in mind when they conclude that "from Julien Benda to Edgar Morin, from Valéry to Derrida – to mention just the French, and only those relatively close to us –, more than one author has recognised the evanescence of the notion" (Hersant and Durand-Bogaert 2000, iii). This is, after all, the kind of spiritual evanescence Dominique de Villepin tries to convey when he approaches 'Europeanness' from the viewpoint of the unusual richness and singularity of memory: a complex and only apparently paradoxical European memory drawing both on the faces of the Italian Madonnas and the Arabic calligraphies of the Andalusian palaces (Semprún and Villepin 2005, 16).

Revealingly, it is also this evanescence of Europe as idea and project, always difficult to objectify and defying the stability of essential definitions, that which grounds the modern discourse of 'Europeanness', shifting from the patrimonial archetype – quasi-biological– of past centuries, to a dialogical one. Drawing on Jorge Semprún, I would locate the symbolic origin of this discourse in Vienna, May 1935, on the occasion of Edmund Husserl's speech on "Philosophie and the Crisis of European Humanity". According to the Spanish intellectual, it is a German and a Jewish who invokes, for the first time, the spiritual figure of future Europe as political project, "the same kind of project the Europeans of today strive to build" (Semprún and Villepin 2005, 26). Husserl's speech must be approached as a critical juncture in the evolving 'discourse of Europe' and the ground for the political project that would eventually raise from the ashes of World War II.

Facing the crisis of the particular form of humanity designed by Europeans in the course of previous centuries, Husserl devised two options: spiritual hatred and barbarity or, otherwise, the philosophical renaissance of Europe on the basis of reason. As Semprún keeps reminding us, Husserl's vision of Europe is intrinsically dynamic, grounded, as it were, on the constitutive potentiality of politics assumed as the crucial "appeal to practical reason, rooted in reality, producing the norms of collective life through citizenship and the rule of law" (Semprún and Villepin 2005, 27). In Husserl's words, this amounts to an appeal to the heroism of reason resisting crisis from within the core of Europe's democratic values and the richness and variety of its cultural background. In Husserl's words, there is a vision of a new Europe departing from its past, the vision of a new Europe whose spiritual fulfilment is only possible provided a great deal of its heritage is overcome.

This dynamic, Husserlian, vision draws consequently on a dialogic archetype of 'Europeanness' and European identity identified, for instance, by Edgar Morin in his *Penser l'Europe*. According to this archetype, the crucial trait to characterise Europe can be found in the etymological source of the Greek word for it. Europe thus stands for promontory, which for Greeks was a synonym of 'problem'. Europe as problematique and polemic, an on-going, future-oriented project, due to avoid at all cost the pitfalls of spiritual closure: here is the deep sense of Husserl's 1935 discourse on the crisis of European humanity. The dialogical archetype of Europe is then represented, as underlined by Hersant and Durand-Bogaert, by the will for dialogue within and without, "a radical auto-denial precluding its conception as a fixed and stable reality; far from introducing it as an accumulation of values, we must describe it therefore as perpetual maelstrom" (Hersant and Durand-Bogaert 2000, v). Doing without all simplistic representations, putting away the naivete of originary myths, the Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski inspiringly identifies the source of the European spiritual strength in the refusal to admit a sealed identity, the capacity of putting itself in perspective and to abandon, not without pain, its most basic facticity.

Europe as unstable idea and project, the on-going work of human consciousness, finally finds its deepest meaning in the words of Milan Kundera, in his *l'Art du roman* – "European: the person feeling nostalgia for Europe" (Kundera 1986, 154). *Contra* Kundera, we would conclude though by arguing that the nostalgia for Europe matching this on-going work of consciousness deals with the future, rather than with the past. It is a form of nostalgia having as its object the critical possibility of coming to terms with the fulfilment of the husserlian heroism of reason, within a new type of polity.

TURKEY'S EMBEDDEDNESS IN EUROPE: FROM OTHER TO PARTNER AND BEYOND

According to the language-as-action approach that we have been drawing on in this paper in order to ground our purpose, to say something always already amounts to doing something. The politics of speaking 'Europe' has therefore been identified above as the historical, on-going process of politically shaping the European state-system and its border of order through a series of speech acts that strive to attach meaning to both. In the previous section, I then placed Husserl's 1935 Vienna address at the centre of the modern 'discourse of Europe' and consequently as critical juncture in the process of contestation and struggle for the meaning of Europe. From then on roughly, and as Diez has stressed, we can make sense of the history of European integration as the history of particular speech acts setting up a system of collective governance around which the expectations of some states (acknowledged as European) converge. This implicit reference to regimes and Krasner's definition thereof is meant just to finally open the black box of European identity and membership and then introduce the case of Turkey. In this regard, it is important to underscore once more that the history of speech acts shaping the meaning of Europe and its border of order went through a critical actualisation after the fall of the Berlin wall and the

eventual closure of the bipolar era in international relations. Before this critical, defining juncture, Europeanness was well defended behind the 'specious security' of geography and ideological confrontation. After it, the discursive struggle for Europe re-emerged in the centre of European politics and the shift that would follow in the always unstable 'discourse of Europe' can be followed through the declarations of the EU Counsel of Ministers. Among these, the crucial ones are, first, the 1993 Copenhagen Counsel of Ministers declaration and the 2001 Laeken Counsel of Ministers declaration, both involved in the clarification of different criteria prospective states would have to meet in order to be acknowledged as 'European', but also ready to be part of the European governance system. The history of speech acts is then crucial in producing the 'discourse of Europe' given that it represents, I would say, a series of moments in which language becomes the fundamental tool for negotiating and contesting the intersubjective basic ground on which states then further their particular interests and identities. Governance is then the name of the game(s) states play(s) giving substance to 'Europe'. In a deeper level though, 'Europe' is the ultimate speech act and the context of meaning within which states' expectations are embedded and governance itself becomes cognitively structured.

In the preamble of the Laeken declaration, we can read an extremely revolutionary phrasing regarding the 'discourse of Europe', according to which the only border that the European Union sets up is that of democracy and human rights. Previously, the Copenhagen declaration had already established that the admission of new members into the EU would be assessed on the basis of these countries' capacity to set up stable and democratic institutions, their will to protect human rights and minority rights, and finally the existence of a working market economy. Although the background is, still, the consciousness of a natural European spirit deriving from the self-evidence and naturalness of geography, there is, I sustain, a notorious shift in the discourse meant to ground Europe as future-oriented project. Drawing on the dialogic, problematic archetype of Europe,

Dominique de Villepin answers to the 'what is Europe?' question in *L'homme européen* by underscoring "the adventure of peoples that do not cease to hesitate between the definition of precise borders and the assertion of a broader political project" (Semprún and Villepin 2005, 52). In a way, this formula could well be appropriated to express the very shift in the unstable 'discourse of Europe', between the reified readings eager to restrict Europeanness to a genetic code (and its meagre patrimonial heritage) and the de-essentialising readings focusing on polity construction and the challenge to identity closure, so dear to Leszek Kołakowski.

As we see it, the Copenhagen and Laeken declarations are the expression of that shift in the 'discourse of Europe' ceasing to take Europeanness as an endogenous and essential property of states and transmuting it, instead, into a collective institution of states, constituting them with social capacities. This way, Europeanness emerges as the unstable intersubjective stuff both constituting and constituted by states' identities and interests and attests "the role of shared ideas in producing social kinds, which denaturalises them and thereby expands the potential for progressive change" (Wendt 1998, 117). As intersubjective stuff, Europeanness is what states make of it (or rather their elites) through a long process of bargaining and persuasion, as the meetings leading to the 2005 Luxembourg declaration well testify. As I stressed before, drawing on Diez's words, we must not forget that every discourse sets its own limits to what can be additioned and articulated within it. What I sustain here is that the 2005 Luxembourg decision attests the possibility of new articulations within the 'discourse of Europe' and the eventual shift in the collective, intersubjective understanding of what Europeanness may entail. It is revealing that this new articulation regards Turkey, above all. The concomitant shift produced in the understanding of Europeanness thus becomes the more complex as we acknowledge that it is grounded on the long historical process of Turkey's embeddedness in the European state system – from 'other' to partner and beyond. As I stressed at the beginning, it is never enough to approach this

phenomenon as a univocal process of constitution, as for instance when we set up to research Turkey's Europeanisation efforts since the inception of the Kemalist era. This will of some Turkish elites to conform to an exogenous normative structure called Europe is crucial and must be accounted for, of course, but it does not explain the whole picture, I sustain. Concomitantly, it becomes fundamental to focus on how the 'discourse of Europe' has shifted through different sets of interactions among the states composing the European state system and their relations with 'others' – with those constructed as 'other'. Turkey has played, for a long time, the role of 'other' in the constitution of Europe and Europeanness. It is why Turkey has also played a crucial role in the shifting of the discourse. By this I mean that the progressive embeddedness of Turkey in the European state system accounts for much of the formal and informal negotiation/contestation going on within the realm of Europeanness (as intersubjective institution) regarding the definition of its meaning.

All in all, making sense of the 2005 Luxembourg decision for the opening of negotiations with Turkey implies that we pay attention to the complex historical process of change that has affected European identity, Turkish identity and the complex evolving relationship between the two. There is no way of negating the role of 'other' that Turkey has played *vis-à-vis* the constitution of European identity. What we argue is that this social fact of 'othering' has had different and more complex consequences on the definition of European identity than those that are commonly acknowledged. Moreover, and at least on the level of political elites, Turkey has long ceased – since the demise of the Ottoman empire, at least – to be perceived as playing that part, as other candidates have been occupying the post, for longer or shorter periods of time. Germany played the 'other' of Europe during Nazism; Soviet Russia played that role from 1917 until 1991 and was never recognised as a normal state; present-day Russia is still regarded by the EU as not quite matching the European political values and continuously accused of supporting authoritarian regimes like those that took over in

Belarus, Transnistria and Central Asia after Sovietism. All in all, the new articulations of the 'discourse of Europe' finally enable an understanding of Turkey that shifts from the traditional 'other' of Europeanness to player within the European state system, to partner in it and possibly even beyond. With this phrasing, what can be suggested is the transit from foe to partner to friend that has been embedding Turkey in the European state system, a system that in its turn has also moved towards society, and further to community.

In *L'être et le néant*, Jean-Paul Sartre intriguingly argues that in the realist viewpoint, the 'other' is given, as much as social reality is given for realists. It is exactly this tacit ontology of the other that Hans-Georg Gadamer has endeavoured to repudiate in his *Die Vielfalt Europas – Erbe und Zukunft* (1985) (*The Diversity of Europe – Heritage and Future*) by underscoring that the "vicinity of the Other has to do with each one of us, in spite of all the differences. The Other in the neighbour does not stand only for the timid difference that has to be avoided; it stands also for the difference calling for one's meeting with oneself. We all are Others and we all are ourselves too" (Gadamer 2000, 37-38). When striving to deal with the problematique of Turkey in European self-definition, the 1991 paper of Iver Neumann and Jennifer Welsh, published in the *Review of International Studies*, is still a bibliographical reference impossible to circumvent. More recently (1999), Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez have tried to make sense of the game involving Turkey and Europe, at a moment this game seemed to face an insurmountable obstacle: "relations between Turkey and the European Union have gone badly wrong. After decades of standing in the queue, Turkey is the only country with a current membership application against which the EU door has been slammed shut" (Buzan and Diez 1999, 41). The prospect Buzan and Diez drawn was extremely pessimistic in terms of the problems the situation could entail for both parts and the relations between them. The worries expressed in the paper have revealingly to do with the breach of long-standing expectations and commitments that could

lead to Turkey's resentful reaction against the EU. The authors did not hesitate therefore to advance that the EU door was bound to remain closed to Turkey for the foreseeable future. Both works acknowledge and start even from the critical assumption of Turkey's progressive embeddedness in the European state system, as well as the learning process it has been going through for the last century, and eventually materialising in the adoption of European political standards of governance.

Neumann and Welsh's research revolves around the problematique of Turkey as 'other' in European self-definitions, and on this account they crucially underscore that "since the Other is a human invention, and although the cultural difference between self and Other may be real enough, it is in the final analysis historically arbitrary who at any given time fills the role of Other" (Neumann and Welsh 1991, 331). They then proceed to conclude that this construction of difference can, in a way, be undone, eventually turning an "apposite Other into a *positive* Other, with which one could have mutually fruitful interaction". A substantial part of the paper then deals with this tracing of the particular historical itinerary through which Turkey has progressively ceased to be perceived as 'apposite other' in European self-definitions and turned into a 'positive other' in the workings of the European state system. The authors thus stress the role of the Ottoman-French treaty of 1536 as the first alliance between Ottoman and Europeans and marking the possibility of a continued friendship and co-operation between the two entities. They then quote Franklin Baumer, for whom the Ottoman-French alliance stood for the end of 'Christendom' as relevant political term and Rodinson, who in his work *Europe* advances that, in 1588, Elizabeth I had proposed an alliance to Sultan Murat II based solely on ideology: "strict monotheists against untrustworthy Catholics" (quoted in Neumann and Welsh 1991, 338). The next landmarks in the itinerary are then 1793, the establishment of permanent embassies in Europe by Selim III and the 1799 Tri-partite alliance with Britain and Russia against Napoleonic France. In 1856, the Treaty of Paris officially recognised the Ottoman

Empire as a permanent and fundamental part of the European balance of power system, a status codified and confirmed thereafter at the Hague Conference of 1899 and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. This itinerary is presented however in the framework of the ambiguous relations between Europe and 'the Turk' –the survival of capitulations at the Second Hague Conference (1907) is presented as a sign of discrimination –whose understanding would require the aggregation of two distinct logics: *raison d'état* and culture. As for contemporaneity, Neumann and Welsh have little to say, except for the disparity accounting for Turkey's membership in NATO vis-à-vis Turkey's unsuccessful 1987 application to the EC. For the two authors then, what is at stake here is "the apparent discrepancy of the logic of *raison d'état*, by dint of which Turkey obtained membership in NATO, and the logic of culture, which contributes to keeping Turkey outside the European community" (Neumann and Welsh 1991, 346).

The point these authors want to make is that the disparity between the two logics at work in the relationship between 'Europe' and 'Turkey' eventually explains why the latter could have been accepted as part of the European inter-state relations while denied, at the same time, equal status within the community of Europe. Maybe in 1991 it was still too early to devise a shift in the 'discourse of Europe' away from traditional conceptions of culture, especially at a moment when the fall of the Berlin wall and the liberation of the sovietised societies reinforced such essentialising readings of Europe. The bottom line here is that Neumann and Welsh are too hurried to draw conclusions from what I deem a static and reified version of the cognitive structure grounding the new community of Europe after 1989. Writing in 1999, Buzan and Diez's perception of this problematique draws roughly on the same line, i.e. that there is a cultural logic of sorts preventing Turkey from being acknowledged as fully European – but also preventing its society from fully merging into this identity – inspite of the Westernisation efforts associated with the Kemalist project. For these writers, Turkey's social learning over the last century should then be approached as the typical

case of a Westernistic state. By definition, due to endogenous and exogenous cultural barriers, a state like this can never be purely Western or European. It aspires instead "to synthesise its own culture with Western ideas about organising the political economy, as Japan has done with such conspicuous success" (Buzan and Diez 1999, 49). As far as we understood the point the authors make here, a stable solution for the relationship of Europe with 'the Turk' would then have to accommodate the 'natural' boundedness of the European community and the argument of joint interests compelling both entities to co-operate and to reach a common ground. As they put it, the model for future relations with Turkey would serve to structure the manner the EU engages with its 'penumbra'. For Buzan and Diez, this could well be an imaginative way of discarding the old-fashion inside/outside approach to European membership. For me it seems more a clear way of relegating embarrassing candidates to membership to a grey zone of order, outside the gates or rather to a series of concentric circles reflecting different degrees of compromise *vis-à-vis* the European idea. However, and as they also recognise, this imaginative solution is not easy to devise in the case of the Turkey, given that it has already achieved a very high degree of embeddedness within the European system of governance. In fact, in 1963, the Ankara Agreement gave associate membership of the EC to Turkey and, in 1996, the reinvigoration of this agreement meant the conclusion of a customs union with the EU. Both articles make important points for discussing the nature of the relationship between Europe and Turkey. However, they also stop short of recognising the on-going mutual constitution of the two entities and the way the 'discourse of Europe' has been shifting in order to absorb or accommodate alternative cultural influences, provided that the ideas, norms, and rules grounding the political project be fulfilled. Going back to a previous quotation of Wendt and at the same time rephrasing it, we would therefore underscore that both works fail to recognise the way social kinds like 'Europe' are being produced and reproduced by evolving shared understandings. Consequently, the stress on

the social character of Europe becomes crucial in order to denaturalise what is just an intersubjective construct and expand the potential for progressive change within it (Wendt 1998, 117).

CONCLUSION: NEGOTIATING EUROPE'S IDENTITY, BECOMING EUROPE

In their 1991 paper, Neumann and Welsh grounded their overall argument on the particular remark that, "In European eyes, the 'Turk', with his pagan and barbarian political culture, could not be incorporated into the [European] cultural consensus. Thus, while the logic of raison d'état, through diplomatic and economic contact, extended the boundaries of the European international system to encompass the 'Turk', the prevalence of the logic of culture made his status ambiguous from a societal point of view. The 'Turk' remained the relevant Other for the cultural community of Europe" (Neumann and Welsh 1991, 348). Not unlike much of the work on European identity, the authors assume there is an unambiguous stable agreement on what the European culture is and how it epistemologically grounds, and legitimises, the creation of a system of political governance. Not unlike much of the work on European identity, the authors assume a bounded process of identity formation giving rise to 'Europeanness' as cultural entity, thereby truncating alternative understandings of what the cultural process in operation in Europe could stand for. *Contra* this kind of understandings, we have set out to argue that this cultural process has more to do with the convergence around a series of political norms and rules for collective governance – a political culture within a new type of polity. In addition, the very process of European integration is a two-way process through which its actors collectively negotiate the European identity and, at the same time, endeavour to become European.

The discursive struggle involving Turkey's accession to the EU is the latest step in this intersubjective negotiation over new ways of giving

meaning to Europe as political project. This is then the kind of reasoning that de-essentialises Europe as natural kind, as in primordial discourses of the nation. As Ole Wæver has put it, 'Europe' is not constituted as another state or nation and its guiding idea, far from having a constant element, is grounded on shifting elaborations of alternative meanings. Furthermore, "there is no project to defend a sovereignty or a communal identity. *Integration* as such is made an aim in itself..." (Wæver 1996, 123). Again, the question here is that of conceiving Europe as open possibility, the nostalgia of its becoming what it has only been in potential. Within this process, Europe's most real 'other' eventually becomes its own past of primordial cultural claims and military rivalry. This way, it is possible to finally come closer to Milan Kundera and argue that "the image of the European identity withdraws into the past" (Kundera 1986, 154), but only if pointing to the particular sense that its crucial vocation lies ahead. Consequently, the 2005 Luxembourg decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey matches the decision of European leaders to avoid what could be a very real identity conundrum in the definition of Europe. Opting to bring Europe to Anatolia and to refashion the collective project in the process of negotiating Turkey's accession, European leaders do strengthen a 'republican' construction grounded on the allegiance of states and citizens to a set of political values. Drawing on Wæver, to avoid the identity conundrum thus means that the national and regional levels remain the locus of cultural identity for citizens who, in turn, progressively transfer their political allegiance and identity to the European level. What this may entail is that "these citizens may be patriotic in a purely political sense, but they do not necessarily feel that they belong in any organic sense to one big European family. The political state can be rather hollow as long as its shell is hard" (Wæver 1995, 410). The hard shell must be that of a de-essentialising Europeanness built on a civic political identity rather than on a primordial ethno-cultural identity within a strict religious affiliation.

Going back to the quotation of Neumann and Welsh opening this

conclusion, we would like to challenge their approach on the relationship between Turkey and 'Europeanness' based on the dual logic of culture and *raison d'état*. Mine starts with Europe (as cognitive intersubjective structure) giving rise to a new (civic political) culture, rather than with a homogenising (primordial) European culture giving rise to Europe as system of governance. *Contra* Neumann and Welsh, we would finally conclude this paper by reminding that who cannot be incorporated into the new cultural logic or consensus called Europe is the 'barbarian', not the 'infidel'. That which cannot be articulated in the new 'discourse of Europe' is therefore the incapacity or unwillingness of prospective members to fulfil the basic political patterns in the definition of the normative structure grounding the system of governance. It is not the deviance from a supposedly primordial and homogenising cultural pattern. In this context then, and independently from the conclusion of the accession negotiations with Turkey, the failure to fulfil the promise of opening these negotiations by the beginning of October 2005 would have presented an unbearable threat to the European identity meant to ground the kind of republican project Europe is already becoming. Drawing one last time on Diez, I would then argue that this stems crucially from the fact that there is an illocutionary force to language: "what we say may have an effect on other people; by saying something, we may not only act ourselves, but also force others to do so" (Diez 2001, 87). By negotiating the conditions of Turkey's Europeanness and accession to the EU on the ground of a series of speech acts redefining Europe, European leaders finally felt bound by the illocutionary force of the promise they had been making.❖

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