Clausewitz and the Struggle for Recognition in a Newly Globalized World

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Abstract

The recognition as an equally valued subject as a solution for conflicts about material interests and power related subjects is the main point of the Clausewitz theory. In the twenty-first century, due to the effects of globalization, war and violent conflicts are characterized by the hybrid combination of the instrumentality of war and the struggles for a renewed recognition as a result of a formerly denied recognition. It is not our intention to psychoanalyze Clausewitz and the meaning this problem has for his development, but only to stress that he was ready to defend his equality. Relatedly, today, the Arab world is in a state of change and social overthrows are due to increased mobility, progressive urbanization, and a secular intercourse with Islam. People in the Arabic world are still in the adjustment process within the first modernity and at the same time have to deal with the unstoppable globalization. The nature of this study is analytical and descriptive, intending to analyze the hybrid wars, especially in the Arab world, in the twenty-first century through the Clausewitz theory, while focusing on the definitions of ‘recognition’ and ‘violence’.

Keywords: Clausewitz, Hybrid Wars, Arab World, Recognition, Violence.

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Introduction

Conflicts concerning world politics in the 21. Century are marked by contrary, but nevertheless simultaneous processes. Globalization leads to “the Rise of the Others” (Zakaria, 2008) and a multi-complex world (Acharya 2010) of nation-states, non-government organizations, worldwide acting institutions as well as global players. Besides all separate conflicts, the following macro developments are clearly visible, which are directly related to the sphere above and simultaneously below the formerly Westphalian system of states:

1. Globalization enables the former big empires and civilizations (China, Russia, India) to tie in with their former status as great...
powers and accelerates the rise of emerging nations (Brazil); their ambitions are related to their former past as great civilizations and transcend therefore the notion of a state within the Westphalian system;

2. The distraction/dispersal of traditional identities and forms of government (not just but highly in consequence of enormous social inequality on earth); this leads to fragmented societies and re-ideologization of intra-societal conflicts.

The Rise of the Others (Zakaria) and the ideological segmentation of society due to Globalization result in intensified struggles for recognition in the national, thus intra-societal, and also in international spheres (regarding the difficulties of mutual recognition by the US and China see Terhalle 2015). China’s foreign policy is oftentimes seen through the own glasses of understanding of international relations by the US and vice versa.

The so-called hybrid wars represent a specific challenge for the security policy of states, in particular for democratic states, due to their hermaphroditic character in between state and non-state wars. Clausewitz made the hybrid character of war the defining characteristic of his conceptualization of war in his “result for theory” in the first chapter of his masterpiece, “On War”, in which he defines war as a “wondrous trinity”. Clausewitz's concept of the wondrous trinity is quite different from that of trinitarian warfare, which is not derived from Clausewitz himself, but is nothing than a far reaching misinterpretation by Harry Summers Jr., Martin van Creveld and Mary Kaldor. The decisive difference is, that Clausewitz is elaborating and justifying a floating balance between the three tendencies of the wondrous trinity, whereas in Summer's and van Creveld's account the trinity is reduced to a mere hierarchy between them. This proposition implies that Clausewitz's concept of the wondrous trinity can be applied to all forms of war, whereas trinitarian warfare can only be applied meaningfully to interstate-war, in which the state is composed as a hierarchy between government at the top, then the army and finally the people (Herberg-Rothe 2009).

What does Clausewitz imply by war’s hybrid character? For him war is not just a chameleon that changes its “color” based on different circumstances. Rather, the “wondrous trinity” (wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) is composed of the three tendencies of the original
violence of war, which can be viewed as a blind natural force, the game of probability and chance and finally the subordinated nature of war as a political instrument, whereby war belongs to “pure reason” (Clausewitz 1984, p. 89).

While Clausewitz advances the world renowned formula of war as a mere continuation of policy, that is just one of three tendencies in the trinity, that of reason, which was equal to the two others. Moreover, the first of these equally valued tendencies is the primordial violence, which Clausewitz explains with hatred and a blind natural force. Pure reason on one side, violence as a blind natural force on the other – these are the decisive contrasts in his result for theory, of which each war is composed of. To put it bluntly: This is a hybrid composition of contrasting tendencies in each war (how Clausewitz came to this conclusion is explained in detail in Herberg-Rothe 2007). The consequence for the theory of Clausewitz (within the paragraph about the “wondrous trinity”) was the proposition that the task of theory is to maintain a floating balance between the contrasting tendencies within wars (Clausewitz 1964, p. 89).

This conceptualization also applies for the relation of the early and the late Clausewitz. Early Clausewitz developed an existential view of war (Münkler 1992), whereas the world renowned formula of the instrumental nature of war is a very late development, which took precedence over the earlier one due to the historical context. On the one hand, the existential view of war can be characterized by the struggle for recognition as being equally valued. On the other hand, in the instrumental view, war is a means in pursuing interests, which are related to power and material wealth. After the devastating and humiliating defeats of the Prussian Army against Napoleon at the battles of Jena and Auerstedt, the desire for being recognized again was the driving force of Clausewitz's thinking and actions until 1815, when Napoleon was finally defeated at Waterloo. It was only his fight against Napoleon's army and the final success that restored the honorable recognition of Clausewitz himself, and in his view, that of the Prussian state. After this re-recognition his approach to war changed once again and he developed the instrumental view of war, which we can find in the world renowned formula of war as the mere continuation of policy/politics by other means. The previous conceptualization of the existential view of war, nevertheless was still present in his thought, when Clausewitz draws at the end of his life the “consequence for theory” in his wondrous trinity (see Herberg-Rothe 2007).
The differentiation between the existential and the instrumental view of war in Clausewitz's theory has far reaching consequences for our understanding of war today and how security policy has to deal with the challenges posed by hybrid warfare in the twenty-first century. In Clausewitz's theory the recognition as an equally valued subject is the decisive and central precondition for the solving of conflicts about material interests and power related subjects in a purpose-rational manner and if necessary, to conduct limited warfare and military operations. Such an approach is especially relevant in the twenty-first century concerning the question, how to conduct limited warfare in a borderless, globalized environment (Strachan 2013).

Our thesis is that the twenty-first century is mainly, although not solely, characterized by struggles for recognition in the intra-state as well as inter-state sphere. Due to the effects of globalization, war and violent conflicts in the twenty-first century are characterized by the hybrid combination of the instrumentality of war and at the same time by struggles for renewed recognition as a result of a formerly denied recognition. In our view, the struggle for recognition is insufficiently taken into account in the approaches to cope with these hybrid wars. Therefore we highlight this subject here, however without intending to argue, that these conflicts and wars are solely determined by the struggle for recognition.

**The existential view of war**

In order to explain the difference between Clausewitz’s instrumental and his existential view of war, we have to turn to his political declaration from 1812. “I renounce: The childish hope of taming the tyrant’s anger by voluntarily disarming, of winning his trust through craven submission and flattery. The ignominious sacrifice of every honor of the state and people, of every personal and human dignity. I believe and confess that a people can value nothing more highly than the dignity and liberty of its existence. That it must defend these to the last drop of its blood. That a people courageously struggling for its liberty is invincible.”

Actually intended only as a justification of those “patriots” who left the Prussian army in 1812 so that they could fight against Napoleon in

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the service of the Russian army, the political declaration from 1812 documents the early Clausewitz’s existential view of war. In preparation for his Russian campaign, Napoleon concluded a military alliance with Prussia in February 1812 that was supposed to safeguard the deployment of his “grande armée” - at that time the largest army in human history. After Prussia's crushing defeat by Napoleon in 1806, it was thereby forced to fight militarily on the side of Napoleon. For Clausewitz, this alliance with Napoleonic France was the low point of his political experiences. For years the reformers had been working to reshape Prussian society and the army, so as to be able to resume the fight against Napoleon. Clausewitz wrote: “Since the Peace of Tilsit, anyone wishing to restore the Prussian state should have thought of nothing except preparing to renew the struggle—about that and about nothing else.”¹ They of all people, Napoleon’s most resolute enemy, were now supposed to support his Russian campaign as allies. At this time, Clausewitz’s entire political thought was defined by his anxiety and fear of a repetition of the politics before Jena in 1806: an accommodation policy on the part of the Prussian state with its subsequent military defeat and the loss of honor and recognition.

An analysis of the first part of the “political declaration” reveals little about the chances of military success. Just to the contrary, it does contain a great deal about honor, human dignity, and freedom. Clausewitz the patriot’s main motive does not appear to be a concrete political purpose, rather the restoration of recognition, respect, and honor to him as an individual and to the state by resuming the battle against Napoleon.²

The subject of honor is directly linked to self-respect and the respect granted by others, which is experienced as essential. The life-and-death struggle for honor and recognition can be seen as a stage in the historical development of the basic need for mutual respect – a vital component for the stability of social relations and communities. When the young Clausewitz says that no one in the world has a greater need for national honor than he does, he expresses his existential need for recognition. He himself discussed in a letter to his fiancée the problematic fact (to point out: only problematic for himself) that his family’s noble origin was not entirely clear - nevertheless, he and his brothers would answer anyone who questioned it with a sword, “which protects us from all humiliation.”

Although Clausewitz himself does not doubt his parentage, he still finds it necessary to insist on his absolute equality with his future wife. It is not our intention at this point to psychoanalyze Clausewitz and the meaning this problem has for his development, but only to stress that he was ready to defend his equality with a “sword in the hand.”

At a time when the equality of mankind had not yet developed into a “general prejudice” (Hegel), a constant readiness for the life-and-death struggle appeared to be the only way to guarantee honor and recognition. Clausewitz writes: “. . . whatever our condition, it is essential that we decide to fight to gain our independence. . . . It does not matter at all whether we have more or less means with which to save ourselves; the decision should arise from the need for salvation, not from the ease of gaining it.” Clausewitz values dignity, morality and recognition being by far more valuable than physical existence. Already before the Prussian defeats at Jena and Auerstedt he wrote that he does not fear a total surrender, but a deprecating situation, in which the civil existence is not yet threatened, but in which the independence and dignity of the Prussian state would be already lost.

Once a war is understood as existential, a distinction must be drawn among totally different forms of existence:

a. Direct “physical,” objective or substantial existence;¹
b. Existence as the identity of an existing political subject, i.e. a community, society, nation, etc.;
c. Existence in the sense of an identity to be created, that has yet to be instituted;
d. “Moral” existence, recognition as an equal state among states, an equal citizen within a state.

The early Clausewitz attempted a clear ranking of these forms of existence: at the very top he placed the “moral,” followed by political existence. For the sake of these first two forms, he was prepared to risk his own physical existence and that of the state. Quite similarly, Johann Gottlieb Fichte also emphasizes that freedom is a more important precondition of people's self-fulfillment than physical existence. “Freedom is the highest good. Everything else is just the means, good as such a means, evil if it hinders it. Therefore temporal life itself has worth only to the extent that it is free; it has absolutely none if it cannot be free but is an evil and torment. Its only purpose is first of all to use freedom, if not then to keep it, if not then to fight for it; if life perishes in this fight, it is right to perish and does so voluntarily because temporal life is—a fight for freedom. Life itself, the eternal, never perishes, no power can give it or take it away: death is then where temporal life was not able to be the liberator.” Fichte then offers this succinct formulation as well: “Who can coerce the one who is able to die.”²

¹. This form of existence is not yet relevant for Clausewitz, because the French army was not waging a war of extermination against the Prussian people. In the 19th and 20th centuries, however, there were wars in which nations had to fight for their very existence. Van Creveld focuses only on this immediate existence of the “struggle for existence” and criticizes Clausewitz for supposedly seeing war solely as instrumental. Thus van Creveld is overlooking not only the views of the early Clausewitz, but also the fact that there are very different forms of “struggle for existence.” Most importantly, there are wars for political existence that cannot so easily be limited to an instrumental war for political purposes as van Creveld represents; Creveld, Zukunft des Krieges, S. 211-216.

Self-preservation and self-transgression in the life-and-death struggle

We must differentiate between two major theoretical threads in the life-and-death struggle and its meaning for the development of societies. The first is basically defined by Machiavelli and Hobbes. The English social philosopher Thomas Hobbes distinguished between the natural and social state. He used the phrase “state of nature” to describe the general state of mankind if every governing political body were fictitiously subtracted from social life. In Hobbes’s conception, the individual maintains a stance of preventive power-escalation toward his fellow human beings. The social relations resulting from such a “subtraction” have the character of a war of all against all.1 Are there such “fictitious subtractions” in real life? One possibility is to identify the state of nature thus created in basic social upheavals, uprisings, and revolutions. In these situations, the old political powers are no longer capable, and the new powers are not yet capable, of controlling social life. The “natural state” of the struggle for survival fills this vacuum between the old and new political powers.

Hobbes used the theoretically constructed condition of a war of all against all to demonstrate through its negative consequences that the contractually regulated submission of all subjects to a sovereign ruling power is the only reasonable outcome of an instrumentally rational weighing of interests. In this conception, instrumental rationality is central to limiting violence.2 The return of the “state of nature” in developed societies can thus be grounded in this theoretical tradition: if the state or another organization within a society is no longer capable of exerting political control over this society or is unable to maintain its monopoly of power, there is a constant danger that individuals or social groups may return to the natural state of the struggle for self-preservation.


2. Honneth, Axel, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte. (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt 1992 (in the following cited as Honneth, Anerkennung), p. 117-118. It should be noted that Machiavelli and Hobbes developed their positions in the context of lost wars or civil wars. Their emphasis on the necessity of a state monopoly of power was—despite all the issues it raises—primarily aimed at the limitation of power.
The opposite strand uses a total different argumentation, as is evident from its most important representative, Hegel. In contrast to Machiavelli's and Hobbes's presupposition of a struggle for self-preservation, Hegel postulated a life-and-death struggle for recognition. It was his position that the struggle for recognition generates inner-societal pressure toward the practical, political establishment of institutions that would guarantee freedom. Consequently, it is the individuals' claim to the intersubjective recognition that is built into social life from the very beginning as a moral tension, that transcends the level of social progress institutionalized thus far, and so gradually leads—via the path of recurring stages of conflict—to a state of lived freedom. In contrast to the concept of self-preservation, the individual is transcending himself step by step to a higher level; this process relabels a self-transgression instead of self-preservation. The struggle for recognition on the basis of preexisting recognition is here determined by a hierarchy in which the particular level reached is transcended by resuming the struggle for recognition. According to this view, the violation of an originally existing recognition is the decisive motive for resuming the struggle for recognition.1

In order to comprehend the distinction, Clausewitz has made, we have to distinguish the following paths in political philosophy

1. The conception of Hobbes and Machiavelli is basically characterized by the category of self-preservation. They reflect the self-destructive consequences of the civil war and deduce from it the need for a state monopoly of power, to which the citizens conform out of rational motives of self-preservation. The basic problems with this position are, for example, the danger of abuses of power and the development of totalitarian states. Despite all the necessary questioning of this position, its historical impetus is self-preservation and an instrumentally rational limitation of war.

2. The early Clausewitz's theoretical approach is primarily characterized by a violation of existing forms of recognition. Despite all the exaggerations specific to his times, his conception can be described as self-preservation through self-transgression. The transformation of the former Prussian society and of the state, war and Clausewitz’s own person is fundamentally limited by the principle of self-preservation, to which transgression remains subordinated.

1. Honneth, Anerkennung, p. 11. and p. 36-44.
3. Hegel, on the other hand, advocates a historical hierarchy of higher development. Thus he gives primacy to human transgression which, nevertheless, continues to be bound to maintain the fundamental structures of state and society. Methodologically speaking, this conception of transgression within the boundaries of self-preservation is expressed in the fact that for Hegel, the “other” is only one element in the development of self-consciousness. (Herberg-Rothe 2005)

4. In contrast, the conception of Ernst Jünger and others, in which war is experienced as rapture, can be identified as pure disinhibition. It corresponds to his historical experience of the First World War, the experience of “losing himself” in war, where violence first becomes an end in itself. The paradox is that war sets in motion a process of losing their identity as a person in which people can find themselves again only by exerting even more violence.\(^1\)

By summarizing our approach for now, we can highlight the following proposition: Self-preservation and self-transgression are fundamental opposites in the political philosophy of war and nevertheless belong together. The conceptualization of Hegel is determined by the emphasis on self-transgression, but within societal and political boundaries. It is solely the category of recognition, the respect by others and the self-respect, which transformed the existential view of war of early Clausewitz into the instrumental concept which we know from On War. In Clausewitz’s theory the lack or denial of recognition contribute to the escalation in war, the granting of honor to the reverse is enabling the purpose-rationality in the instrumental view of war.\(^2\) In the wars of liberation, 1813 till 1815, the Prussian state regained his honor again, at least in the eyes of Clausewitz. For Clausewitz, this restoration of honor was not primarily caused by the victory as such, but much more by the renewal of the fight.\(^3\)

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1. Geyer, Eine Kriegsgeschichte, p. 150. Sofsky writes about how violence and atrocities are often not only experienced as rapture but can also be addictive. Sofsky, Traktat, p. 55.
2. In contrast to Axel Honneth, we don’t believe that all kind of violence are caused by the denial of recognition; Honneth, Anerkennung
3. To some extent, war is also an instrument to regain dignity. Nevertheless, we stick to the difference between an existential view of war, in which the purpose lies within the fight, and an instrumental understanding of war, in which the purpose is beyond war itself. This difference is based on Aristoteles’s concepts of praxis and poiesis.
The crisis in the Islamic-Arabic world and the struggle for recognition

The Arabic world is in a state of change and not only since the Arabic Spring attracted a lively media response. Developments responsible for drastic social overthrows are: accelerated social change together with bursting social structures and traditions, increased mobility, progressive urbanization, and a secular intercourse with Islam. Simultaneously, religious authorities got weakened which offered new horizons for shaping life. The revolution in the ways of thinking led to alphabetization and birth control accompanied by the upgraded standing of women. All these factors cause a continuous extraction of familiar life conditions out of traditional social and cultural contexts. (Reissner 2007, p. 16-17). Additionally IS use war more as an instrument of dignity than policy i.e. to “awaken” Muslims to their “duty” to conduct jihad.

Being shocked by all these social overthrows in the last decades, the Arabic-Islamic world lost its orientation. As a result, fundamental and mainly Islamist approaches were able to gain supporters and to strengthen their influence, as they deliver putative solutions through simple and unambiguous messages (Reissner, 2007: 21). In a society located in a modernization process (no matter the role model it is based upon) Islamic fundamentalism serves as an answer to complex and unpredictable problems. These problems cause feelings of helplessness and the wish for orientation on easily comprehensible merits and norms (Benz 2011: 13). The so called Islamic State »IS« is very effective in using those re-islamization trends in a very radical but also unprecedented successful manner. In this way the IS exploits the Islam to configure an ideology in order to create a motivation for their murderous battle. For most young recruits life inside the IS stands for power, strength, status and money (Chulov 2014). The Islamic fundamentalism helps the segmented society to eliminate the inner segmentation, social disintegration and cultural loss of meanings through its traditional world outlooks and its reorientation to values and ideals (Münch 2001).

In particular the younger Arabic generation considers itself as a victim or looser of numerous modernization impulses and feels like being at the mercy of these processes since quite a while. Zygmunt Bauman speaks of transition from a “solid“ into a “fluid“ modernity. Along with this arise
large changes, which imply an immense challenge for the individual decision-making concerning life. The individual is hereby confronted with old structures that fall apart or are taken apart, whereby the society increasingly becomes a fragmented entity. At the same time no alternative structure is available, that offers an equal institutional supporting power and is capable of taking the place of the removed one. Hence, all types of relations become unstable and vulnerable and the trust in social relations fades away (Bauman 2000, p. 34).

Along with the process of progressive liquidation of traditional identities comes the IS with some sort of ambiguousness that is not existent in any parts of the young Arabs’ lives (Seeßlen 2015, under II). Since the adjustment-process towards the concept of modernity is considered nearly impossible and the promises of modernity are seen as unrealistic and senseless, another alternative for coping with the rapid changing environment must be found (Münch 2001). An additional problem exists though heavy tensions between a traditionally, familial and religiously shaped inside in contrary to an open, tempting and messy outside. At a certain point of time these tension are extremely hard to bear (Seeßlen 2015, under III).

**Violence, recognition and identity in the field of social sciences and in the analysis of IS**

Charles Taylor emphasizes two notions for the analysis of society: honor and recognition. In pre-modern times social honor and recognition were simple given already in early childhood. These were based simply on the acquisition of social identity as honor by the family you were born in. (Taylor 1995, p. 52ff.). Furthermore, so called “we-identities“(Taylor 1989, p. 171) guaranteed recognition and affiliation. But there is a differing situation in modern societies, where the individual must take care of its honor and recognition only by himself. At the same time a basic need for societal consideration exists. One’s identity is shaped through a difficult and open-ended interplay and mutual interdependency of personal performance and societal consideration (Taylor 1995, p. 52ff.). Recognition is thus the result of exchange, where in the course of it the failure of a human being is feasible. No given script through societal framing is existent anymore, whereby risk and insecurity increase significantly. It is not
necessarily the need for recognition that is «new» and for this reason just generated through modernity, rather the conditions are new in this context (Schwarte 2000, p. 16).

Violence as an «obvious coping resource» of denied recognition is amongst others, Albert Scherr’s focal point. He draws a connection between violence and begging for attention, conspicuous behavior at any price and display of personal strength. The atrocity of IS produces unavoidably high media attention and delivers herewith a feeling of being-recognized for the young generation that became previously «needless«. Violence can serve as an instrument to satisfy the desire for recognition. By means of a self-definition as prone to violence, the individual or group tries to achieve social recognition. This approach was confirmed by several studies, including a study of Elias & Scotson (1993) where the consequences of being excluded from career-making in organizations of modern societies were analyzed (a single person or a whole group). Along with this goes the awareness of denied chances of social recognition. A further point for violence as an obvious coping resource is the efficiency of violence for articulation of social marginalization. Thus the person necessarily wins attention and as a result a compensation of failure through accentuation and display of strength occurs (Scherr 2004, p. 218-219).

The answer to the so essential question “Who am I?” is nowadays not an explicit one. In an era of modernization, where processes like the loss of traditional ways of life, pluralization, individualization and dynamization have a crucial part, the diversity of lifestyles and life-options grows constantly (Fuhrer & Trautner 2005, p. 335). These processes contribute significantly, that identity is not a homogenous, compact whole anymore. Ulrich Beck’s “risk society“(1986) embodies modern experiences of identity in a crisis.

Beck differentiates the term of modernity. His distinction contains societies and their identities within the «first modernity» and on the other side identities within a « modernity». Subjects confronted with the first modernity are, despite all individualization and atomization processes, able to produce a collective identity (Beck 2000). The cornerstone is Beck’s “container theory of society”(1999, p. 49 ff.), which illustrates the fundamental role of social recognition for the construction of identity. In this connection social recognition is mainly based on and also protected by precise structured social figurations
like family, neighborhood, local groups and networks. Despite increasing detachments and individualization impulses of modern change, it is nevertheless secured, that a protection of individual and social identities can be successful (Keupp 2008, p. 41).

In the subject of identity and risk society Beck highlights the following notion: because of cumulative complexity (Beck 1986) less and less orientation for identity shaping is given. Anciendly supporting collective identities or binding traditions fall away and the individual now faces the challenge to arrange his identity and life independently and autonomously. As a consequence, the personal and the social life must be balanced and coordinated in a total different way. This implies a vast difficulty in the modern world. The risk society embodies high-grade individualized circumstances, in which the people’s biographies become loose in their predetermined fixations. The individual is responsible for his open-ended and situational action (Schwarte 2002, p. 260-261).

Not just the situation that the Arabic world sees itself confronted with a single modernization process; rather the difficulty that a double modernization wave overruns the whole region produces a change of unusual high intensity. People in the Arabic world are still in the adjustment process within the first modernity and at the same time have to deal with the unstoppable globalization (fluid or reflexive modernity) that literally floods the entire world. Additionally to the situation of radical change and adjustment process, which have not yet been completed and are still in the first stadium, comes a second transformation. The Arabic society has already lost stability through the transition into the first modernity and is now bound to cope with another deep break. Bauman (2008, p. 52) calls them “latecomers to modernity”. Ironically, they need to find approaches in the local scale for globally caused issues. The prospects of success are at its best little if not even existent, this should be clearly proven in the meantime. The consequences for the individual and his identity are the need to handle the impact of the first and the second modernity and within this confusion the need to build and stabilize the identity.

A supposedly simple back door represents the IS with its numerous mechanisms of assuring to have power and therefore a kind of identity. Violence, as one of those mechanisms, plays a very important part as an exceptionally influential instrument for the individual. It helps to achieve
a new identity and gives herewith primarily sense to the belonging to such a fanatic and cruel organization. In the primal urge of human being for recognition lays the key to the cause of violence – this is a basic assumptions in the field of socialization research. Erik Erikson holds the view that a young person with unsecured identity tends to extreme intolerance, violence and cruelty, in order to gain identity. An unsatisfactory identity building leads to rage and an imminent loss of identity leads to fear – both hold enormously destructive potentials (Erikson 1971, p. 84). The paradox of all rebellious attempts to create an identity is thereby that a conspicuous or provocative behavior of young persons if often just a “request for brotherly recognition” (translated into English; Erikson 1998, p. 24).

Like Clausewitz emphasizes: Recognition as equal subject is crucial an essential precondition for conflict resolution in an instrumental-rational way. ¹ Due to a feeling of absent recognition the choice of IS followers is a non-instrumental-rational approach. So it is eventually the total self-transgression embodied in the use of excessive force and inside the inhuman war of IS, which is the chosen way of mostly young men in order to gain recognition.

**Meaning of violence?**

To pick up the individuals with unsecured identities and to tie them into a firm and meaningful collective, needs a striking instrument. The experience of collectively and cruelly committed violence is such an instrument that seems to be meaningful. Personally and directly experienced use of force leaves a lasting, vital and inerasable memory (Bauman 2000, p. 40). “Solidarity in crime” (translated into English; ibid.) – An extremely attractive method that represents an alternative for the above mentioned issue of absent recognition.

Bill Buford defines the fascination of violence by stating that in the moment of direct use of force no multiplicity and possibility of differing directions of thought is existent. Simply the present in its

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¹. In the latest academic literature, the significance of recognition is being relativized, because recognition is understood as a purpose-rational tool for conflict resolution (see for example: Daase, Christopher et. al. (Hrsg.), Recognition in International Relations. Rethinking a Political Concept in a Global Context. Basingstoke: 2015). In our conception is simply the diskursive recognition a precondition for purpose-rational conflict resolution.
absolute form and in the particular moment counts. Violence brings the person one of the strongest experiences, in which he is able to abandon himself completely (Buford 1992). Defining violence in this way, a clear delineation from the assumption, that violence only serves as a means to an end, can be drawn. Buford holds the view, “that there is no cause for the violence” (1992, p. 234). He simply emphasizes the character of violence as an end in itself, so to speak as some kind of drug with intoxicated attributes.

Through the effective propaganda machinery and the manipulative action of IS, the recruits on one side lose their scruples and on the other side are set into a murderous frenzy. In this way they commit collectively barbarous violence and in doing so they feel the intensive moment of collective identity.

To the above mentioned self-transgression, and with it the choice of a non-instrumental-rational approach, belongs the use of massive and partly sickening-like violence. Ulrich Oevermann sights the meaning of »atrocities«, produced by the use of violence, in virtually mocking ethical and moral behavior and conditions. With his thesis he describes, that under certain circumstances, like the absence of family ties, positive future prospects, perspectives towards a satisfying life or most of all deficits in social recognition, the likelihood for violence is increased. In order to gain more power (possibly also to »become equal«) violence is used and serves as “a symbol of a monstrously act of indecency” (translated into English; Oevermann 1998, p. 111). The only precondition is the fulfillment of a function in terms of a heavily immoral and violating effect. The IS recruits try to recapture an equal, with recognition supplied position and also to actualize own power.

Furthermore, a radical break with the old, the civilized and the regular happens. There is probably no greater and more brutal practice of feeling power than to horrify somebody else (Seeßlen, 2015, under IV). The violence and killing excesses of the IS and the terror that is being spread hereby, are their most powerful propaganda tools. Through the publication of propaganda films, execution videos and their brutal action in Iraq and Syria is the IS bestowed on a huge media attention. The IS is provided with a large platform for presenting its power, strength and brutality. The major factor here is that the world public looks with horror upon it.

Just therewith, so the promise, can powerlessness and inferiority be
defeated and directly transformed into almightiness. The recognition of their followers is obviously secured, because the more radical and monstrous the violence the higher the level of recognition (Seeßlen, 2015, under XI).

Inside the political sphere the so-called “self-localization“ (Schwarte 2002) might fulfill a functioning role. Here the creation of identity implies the setting of a vision of how one wants the world to be and in which way and extent one wants to be part of it. Egocentric behavior is being exceeded and the wish for a satisfactory live collectively inside the group comes to the fore (ibid.). In the moment when people become rootless and feel socially isolated, they start searching for acceptance and hold. They eventually find themselves together with like-minded people inside the negative tempered community (Schwarte 2000).

It is not necessarily the IS, the supporters strive for in the end. A different group is able to satisfy the need for backing and acceptance when a person finds itself in a phase of life where a deficit of identity and recognition is existent. The IS is simply exceptionally successful in collecting and integrating such seeking people. While the person is left alone with his life and no matter if family, the social environment, the state or the whole system bears responsibility, the IS welcomes him with open arms into its community. Therein the person receives, what he believes had been lost forever in his old life: homeland (Seeßlen 2015, under VI). A person with unstable identity or self-confidence is due to »peer pressure« easily drawn into the suck of group dynamics of a terroristic organization. The group delivers the chance of stability, fellowship, glory and finally basic recognition (Hamden 2006, p. 12). In the end the individual overcomes his deficit of identity and recognition with help of a radical but effective method: the abandonment of personal identity and in consequence being completely absorbed in a collective »substitute-identity«.

The IS does not only create hardness, violence, hero or warrior being – it offers additionally a homeland and welfare, a feeling of being accepted and appreciated. The »negative freedom« that made the old life inside the fragmented society such an exhausting one, is replaced by strict rules, regulating every field of daily life. So the feeling of own accountability is removed and the members lean to the full extent on the IS’s guidelines (Seeßlen 2015, under XIV). Consequently, they achieve a stabilizing substitute-identity and at the same time resolve the disturbance of their poor developed self-worth regulation (Schwarte 2002, p. 272).
Conclusions

Concerning hybrid wars the tasks for security-policies are doubled: On one side, the atrocities committed by the members of the Islamic State are leading to some kind of self-transgression by the exercise of extreme violence (Sofsky 1996). For a considerable number of IS-fighters the return to a civil life may be impossible by now, given the collaborative exercised amount of violence, crimes and especially sexual cruelties. It may be reasonable that there is only one possibility to fight these disinhibited combatants to the bitter end. Nevertheless, we have to differentiate this struggle from that against the seemingly never ending replenishment of new fighters who are excluded, not recognized and disillusioned in the process of globalization and liquid modernity. In order to restrict and contain this replenishment, the only possibility seems to be the conduction of a discourse of mutual recognition among the great civilizations of the world; here in particular concerning the political Islam not as religion, but as civilization. Religions are tempted to exclude one another with reference to the absolute, whereas the related civilizations are enabling the integration of the other. Worldwide we are witnessing the dramatic rise of a thinking in categories of “We against the Rest”.¹ The solution to cope with this development is not the “clash of civilizations”, as Huntington’s has prophesied (Huntington 1996), but in fact the dialogue among the great civilizations of the earth.

The classical attempts to counter terrorism by operative and structural measures have not yet succeeded in the case of IS, neither in Iraq or Afghanistan. A merely military victory against IS may just multiply the cancer of terrorism throughout the Islamic-Arab World and additionally contribute to failed states stretching from Turkey to China and Saudi-Arabia to Morocco. Although the gruel actions of the IS bands are in no way to be recognized as legitimate, they are bound to the denial of recognition to the great civilizations of the world, which not only have been vanished in the process of European colonialization and subsequent American hegemony, but which also lost their recognition as civilizations. The rise of the others in a globalized world is inevitable (Zakaria) – our task is to develop forms

¹ See Herberg-Rothe, Andreas and Son, Key-young (2016), Balancing East and West. Clausewitz and Confucius within the order wars of the twenty-first century (forthcoming).
of recognition which center on the civilizational foundations of Islam, Buddhism/Taoism, Confucianism, Christianity and Hinduism, to name the most important ones. Only by recognizing their civilizational achievements, the uprooted, excluded and superfluous people of the world, which are the vast majority of mankind, are able to build an identity by their own in a globalized, fluid modernity. The alternative to such a process of mutual recognition as precondition for settling disputes about divergent interests would be the repetition of the catastrophes of the twentieth century.
References


