سیاست خارجی قطر و استفاده از قدرت ظریف

نوع مقاله: مقاله مستقل پژوهشی

نویسنده

استاد مطالعات بین المللی دانشگاه جرج تاون ،قطر،دوحه

چکیده

به طور کلی فرض ما بر پایه این تحلیل قرار دارد که کشورهای کوچک به جای منبعی از قدرت، طرف گیرنده قدرت در عرصه بین‌المللی می‌باشند. از اواخر دهه 1990 تا اواسط سال 2013، زمانی که شیخ حمد الثانی حکومت این کشور را به عهده داشت، قطر به قدرت رسید. این قدرت با مفهوم سنتی قدرت "نرم"، "سخت" یا "هوشمندانه" مطابقت نداشت، بلکه ترکیبی از قدرت بود که بهترین توصیف آن را "قدرت ظریف" می‌دانست. سیاست خارجی قطر در آن زمان شامل چهار جزء اصلی بود که شامل فراگیری،حمایت و امنیت نظامی، دیپلماسی فوق فعال و صاحب نام، و سرمایه گذاری‌های بین‌المللی است. در مجموع، این چهار بخش سیاست خارجی، قطر را با سطح قدرت و نفوذی که فراتر از وضعیت آن به عنوان یک کشور کوچک و تازه بود، وارد سیاست‌های منطقه‌ای و جهانی کرد. این نوع قدرت نه در جذب هنجارها (قدرت نرم) و نه در توانایی نظامی (قدرت سخت) ریشه دارد. به جای این، شامل یک شکل از تنظیمات برنامه اغلب پشت صحنه است که می‌تواند بهترین توصیف به عنوان قدرت ظریف باشد.
 

کلیدواژه‌ها


[1]. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 5.

[1]. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Long Grove, IL: Waveland, 1979), p. 72.

[1]. Ibid. p. 73.

[1]. Robert A Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Sciences,Vol. 2, No. 3, (July 1957), pp. 202-203.

[1]. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 12.

[1]. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, (December 1962), p. 948.

[1].  Miriam Fendius Elman, “The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard,” British Journal of Political Science,Vol. 25, No. 2, (April 1995), p. 175.

[1]. Anthony Payne, “Small States in the Global Politics of Development,” Round Table,Vol. 93, No. 376, (2004), p. 634.

[1]. Two essays, both in the same volume, best represent this trend: Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy W. Shaw, “The Diplomacies of Small States at the Start of the Twenty-first Century: How Vulnerable? How Resilient?” and, Anthony Payne, “Vulnerability as a Condition, Resilience as a Strategy,” in The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience, Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy W. Shaw, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 1-18 and 279-285 respectively.

[1]. Neil Ford, “Qatar Punches above its Weight,” The Middle East,(March 2004), pp. 49-54.

[1]. Robert Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy, No. 2, (Spring 1971), pp. 162-163.

[1]. Cooper and Shaw, “The Diplomacies of Small States at the Start of the Twenty-first Century,” p. 4.

[1]. Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “How America Can become a Smarter Power,” in CSIS Commision on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America, Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, eds. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), p. 7.

[1]. Despite a number of groundbreaking works on the topic, the definition of a small state remains essentially contested. See, for example, Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Introducing Small State Foreign Policy,” in Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior,Jeanne A. K. Hey, ed. (Boulder, CO: 2003) pp. 2-4; Christos Kassimeris, “The Foreign Policy of Small Powers,” International Politics,Vol. 46, No. 1, (2009), pp. 88-89; Matthias Maas, “The Elusive Definition of the Small States,” International Politics,Vol. 46, No. 1, (2009), pp. 65-83; Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstohl, “Introduction: Liliputians in Gulliver’s World?” in Small States in International Relations, Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann, Sieglinde Gstohl, and Jessica Beyer, eds. (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2006), pp. 4-7; and, Payne, “Small States in the Global Politics of Development,” p. 626, among others. Much of the difference in the conception of small state can be traced to the criterion used to measure smallness—i.e. geographic and/or population size, leaders’ perceptions, etc. Sutton goes so far as to say that it is difficult to classify small states as a “distinct category” and instead “we are dealing with degrees, not kind.” Paul Sutton, “What are the Priorities for Small States in the International System?” Round Table, No. 351, (1999), p. 399. In specific relation to Qatar, the country is small regardless of the yardstick against which it is measured. The country’s total population numbers approximately 1.6 million, of whom only about fifteen percent are citizens, with the rest tightly controlled and segregated. The country’s landmass, meanwhile, measures only 11,500 sq. km., as compared to the neighboring states of Saudi Arabia (approximately 2,000,000 sq. km.), the United Arab Emirates (77,700 sq. km.), and Iran (1,640,000 sq. km.), with only Bahrain being smaller (691 sq. km.).

[1]. Christopher Easter, “Small States Development: A Commonwealth Vulnerability Index,” Round Table, No. 351, (1999), pp. 403-422; Anthony Payne, “Small States in the Global Politics of Development,” Round Table,Vol. 93, No. 376, (2004), pp. 623-635; Barbara Von Tiggerstrom, “Small Island Developing States and International Trade: Special Challenges in the Global Partnership for Development,” Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, (2005), pp. 402-407; Ganesh Wignaraja, Marlon Lezama and David Joiner, Small States Transition from Vulnerability to Competitiveness,(London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004), p. 4; and, World Bank, Small States: Making the Most of Development Assistance,(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), pp. 2-3.

[1]. Christos Kassimeris, “The Foreign Policy of Small Powers,” International Politics,Vol. 46, No. 1, (2009), p. 90.

[1].Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security,Vol. 9, No. 4, (1985), p. 33.

[1]. Heinz Gartner defines alliances as “formal associations of states bound by mutual commitment to use military force against non-member states to defend member states’ integrity.” [Heinz Gartner, “Small States and Alliances,” in Small States and Alliances,Erich Reiter and Heinz Gartner, eds. (New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001), p. 2.] My usage of “alliance” here is less restrictive in that it may involve a formal security pact or, alternatively, a less formalized but no less solid arrangement or understanding whereby the small state endorses the general policy objective of the great power in exchange for overall support in international relations, as well as guarantees of security and protection against outside threats.

[1]. Robert O. Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy,No.2, (1971), p. 166.

[1]. Gartner, “Small States and Alliances,” p. 3.

[1]. Charles-Michel Geurts, “The European Commission: A Natural Ally of Small States in the EU Institutional Framework?” in Small States Inside and Outside the European Union, Laurent Goestschel, ed. (London: Kluwer, 1998), pp. 49-64; Antti Kuosmanen, “Decision-Making in the Council of the European Union,” in Small States Inside and Outside the European Union, Laurent Goestschel, ed. (London: Kluwer, 1998), pp. 65-78.

[1]. Mark Hong, “Small States in the United Nations,” International Social Science Journal,Vol. 47, No. 2, (1995), p. 278.

[1]. Laurent Goestschel, “The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today’s Europe,” in Small States Inside and Outside the European Union, Laurent Goestschel, ed. (London: Kluwer, 1998), p. 17. For a full treatment of alliance behavior see Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics,Vol. 36, No. 4, (1984), pp. 461-495.

[1].Volker Kraus and J. David Singer, “Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns,” in Small States and Alliances,Erich Reiter and Heinz Gartner, eds. (New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001), p. 19.

[1].Svend Aage Christensen, “The Danish Experience—Denmark in NATO, 1949-1999,” in Small States and Alliances,Erich Reiter and Heinz Gartner, eds. (New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001), p. 93.

[1]. Gartner, “Small States and Alliances,” p. 2.

[1]. Neumann and Gstohl, “Introduction: Liliputians in Gulliver’s World?” p. 11.

[1]. J. W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy,(Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1984), p. 189.

[1]. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1, (2009), pp. 86-87.

[1]. Jakobsen, “Small States, Big Influence,” p. 87.

[1]. Hong, “Small States in the United Nations,” p. 279.

[1]. Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to Rising China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia,Vol. 30, No. 2, (2008), p. 163.

[1].Evan Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Security,” The Washington Quarterly,Vol. 29, No. 1, (2005-06), p. 145.

[1]. Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The US in Southeast Asian Regional Security Challenge, Policy Studies 16. (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2005), p. viii.

[1]. Balancing and bandwagoning need not be viewed as opposites. Walt sees both strategies as responses to threats as “states will ally with or against the most threatening power” (“Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 8-9; original emphasis). Schweller agrees, to a point. “The aim of balancing,” he argues, “is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted. Simply put, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain.” He also goes on to argue, however, that “the presence of a significant external threat, while required for effective balancing, is unnecessary for states to bandwagon.” Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security,Vol. 19, No. 1, (1994), p. 74.

[1]. Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging,” p. 164.

[1]. Ibid. pp. 164-5.

[1]. Ibid. p. 171.

[1]. Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power,(New York: Public Affairs,2011), p. 5.

[1]. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” pp. 202-203.

[1]. Waltz, Theory of International Politics,pp. 194-195.

[1]. Henry R. Nau, Perspectives on International Relations: Power, Institutions, and Ideas,(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), p. 22.

[1]. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 42.

[1]. Waltz, Theory of International Politics,p. 131.

[1]. Tammen, et al. Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century, (New York: Chatham House, 2000), pp. 15, 44.

[1]. Tammen, et al. Power Transitions, p. 18.

[1]. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 43.

[1]. Ibid. p. 21.

[1]. Ibid. p. 45.

[1]. Ibid. p. 55.

[1]. Ibid. p. 56.

[1]. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (New York: Vintage, 1989), p. xxiv.

[1]. Ibid. pp. 439-440.

[1]. Ibid. p. 446.

[1]. Ibid. p. 539.

[1]. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 18.

[1]. Ibid. pp. 32-34.

[1]. Ibid. p. 40.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power, p. 21.

[1]. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,(New York: Public Affairs, 2004),p. 5.

[1]. Ibid. p. 7.

[1]. Ibid. p. 15.

[1]. Ibid. p. 8.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power, p. 8.

[1]. Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 27.

[1]. Ibid. p. 198.

[1]. Ibid. p. 7.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,p. xiii.

[1]. Nye, Bound to Lead, p. 187.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,p. 5.

[1]. Nye, Bound to Lead, p. 32.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,p. 10.

[1]. Nye, Bound to Lead, p. 31.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,p. 61.

[1]. Nye, Soft Power, p. 16.

[1]. Nye, Bound to Lead, p. 182.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,pp. 114-115. The concept of soft power is not without its critics. Colin Gray, for example, maintains that there are “serious limitations” to the concept since “it utterly depends upon the uncoerced choices of foreigners.” Colin S. Gray, Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), p. viii. Gray goes on to maintain that soft power is “a historically imprecise concept” and “potentially a dangerous idea”. pp. 28-29.

[1]. Nye, Soft Power,pp. 18-19.

[1]. Nye, Bound to Lead, pp. 30-31.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,p. xiii.

[1]. Ibid. pp. 22-23.  There is a complex relationship between soft and hard power, with some hard power resources increasing the effectiveness of soft power, and vice versa. See, Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations,p. 33. Also, as Nye points out, “no country likes to feel manipulated, even by soft power. At the same time, … hard power can create myths of invincibility or inevitability that attract others.” Nye, Soft Power,p. 25.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,pp. 208-209.

[1]. Ibid. p. 210.

[1]. Giulio M. Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 35.

[1]. Ibid.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,p. 80.

[1]. Ibid. p. 55.

[1]. Ibid. pp. 60, 70.

[1].Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 5.

[1]. Ibid. pp. 16-17.

[1]. Ibid. p. 268.

[1]. Ibid. pp. 42-48.

[1].Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organizations,Vol. 59, No. 1, (Winter 2005), pp. 39-40.

[1]. Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations,p. 37.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,p. xvii.

[1]. Ibid. p. 119.

[1]. Nye, Bound to Lead, p. 196.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,p. 8.

[1]. Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 26.

[1]. J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 102. Barkin defines agency as the “behaviors that individuals purposively choose to undertake … that are affected but not determined by the structures, social or biological, within which actors find themselves.”

[1] Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 18-19.

[1]. Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, pp. 28-29. Lebow argues that spirit and appetite lead to risk-taking while reason leads to caution and restraint. There are, according to Lebow, different patterns of risk acceptance by actors motivated by either fear or honor. An actor motivated by honor and standing tends to be especially risk-accepting with respect to both perceived losses and gains. (p. 31)

[1]. Ibid. p. 470.

[1]. Ibid. p. 492.

[1]. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 48.

[1]. Peter van Ham calls this “social power”, which he defines “as the ability to set standards, and create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment. … (It) involves discursive power, drawing attention to the impact of framing, norm-advocacy, agenda-setting, the impact of media and communications, as well as lesser-known practices like place branding and public diplomacy.” Peter van Ham, Social Power in International Politics,(London: Routledge, 2010), p. 8.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,p. xvii.

[1]. See, Hanna Newcombe, Michael Ross, and Alan G. Newcombe, “United Nations Voting Patterns,” International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 1, (Winter 1970), pp. 100-121, especially, pp. 102-110.

[1]. After the US’s subtle participation in the NATO campaign to oust Moammar Qaddafi from power in in 2011, through the organization’s imposition of a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace in support of rebel forces operating on the ground, the phrase “leading from behind” was used to describe an emerging “Obama doctrine”. “It’s a different definition of leadership than America is known for,” wrote The New Yorker. “Pursuing our interests and spreading our ideals … requires stealth and modesty as well as military strength.” Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy,” The New Yorker, (May 2, 2011), p. 55.

[1]. Waltz, Theory of International Politics,p. 102.

[1]. Referring to two highly popular American television shows, van Ham makes the following observation: “As long as America presents the world with its Desperate Housewives and Mad Men, it seems to get away with policy failures like Iraq.” van Ham, Social Power in International Politics,p. 164.

[1]. Consumers are shown to form attitudes toward products based on perceptions about the products’ country of origin, and vice versa. There are “structural interrelationships between country image, beliefs about product attitudes, and brand attitudes.” C. Min Han, “Country Image: Halo or Summary Construct?” Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 26, (May 1989),  p. 228.

[1]. Here I draw on insights drawn from Bachrach and Baratz, “The Two Faces of Power”.

[1]. See Mehran Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal,Vol. 65, No. 4, (Autumn 2011), pp. 1-18.

[1]. Peter Beaumont, “Qatar accused of interfering in Libyan affairs,” Guardian, (October 4, 2011), p. 22.

[1]. Reuters, “Qatar’s Big Libya Adventure,” Arabianbusiness.com, June 13, 2011; Andrew Hammond and Regan Doherty, “Qatar hopes for returns after backing Libyan winners,” http://af.reuters.com. August 24, 2011.

[1]. Sheikh Jabor bin Yusef bin Jassim al-Thani, former chief of staff in the offices of the prime minister and foreign minister, quoted in, Clifford Krauss, “For Qatar, Libyan Intervention May Be a Turning Point,” New York Times, (April 4, 2011), p. 9.

[1]. A number of studies have empirically demonstrated that the size of SWFs have often been grossly exaggerated. See, for example, Jean-Francois Seznec, “The Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds: Myths and Reality,” Middle East Policy,(Summer 2008), Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 97-110; Jean-Francois Seznec, “The Sovereign Wealth Funds of the Persian Gulf,” in The Political Economy of the Persian Gulf, Mehran Kamrava, ed. (New York, Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 69-93; and, Christopher Balding, “A Portfolio Analysis of Sovereign Wealth Funds,” in Sovereign Wealth: The Role of State Capital in the New Financial Order, Renee Fry, Warwick J McKibbin, and Justin O'Brien, eds. (London: Imperial College Press, 2011), pp. 43-70.

[1]. In the aftermath of the global economic recession of 2008-2009, in fact, most SWFs were estimated to have lost substantial sums of money— according to one estimate, altogether in excess of $66 billion by 2009—thus lessening their luster as lucrative investment instruments and as potential sources of power and influence. Bernardo Bertolotti, Veljko Fotak, William Megginson, and William Miracky, “Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Patterns and Performance,” Unpublished manuscript, (July 2009), p. 1. I’m grateful to William Megginson for sharing a draft of this paper with me prior to its publication.

[1]. Nye, The Future of Power,p. 212.

[1].Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to Rising China,” pp. 172-179.

[1].The sponsorship of major football teams is a favorite branding tool for these three Persian Gulf emirates. Arsenal and Manchester City Football Clubs are sponsored by Emirates and Ettihad Airlines respectively, while Barcelona FC is sponsored by the Qatar Foundation.

[1]. Hugh Eakin, “The Strange Power of Qatar,” The New York Review of Books,(October 27, 2011), pp. 43-45.

[1]. Waltz, Theory of International Politics,p. 111.

[1]. Because of economies of scale, Nye maintains, larger countries will still benefit more from the information revolution for example, as they are better positioned to benefit from “network effects”. Nye, The Future of Power,pp. 116-117.

[1]. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008).

[1]. Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, p. 442.

[1]. Nye, Soft Power,p. 14.

[1]. Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), p. 165.

[1]. Mehran Kamrava, “The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution,” Orbis,Vol. 56, No. 1, (Winter 2012), pp. 96-104.